Behounek v. Grisham

• Decision Date: 03 March 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-00405-JCH-LF
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Parties: JOSEPH F. BEHOUNEK, Plaintiff, v. MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, individually and doing business as Governor of the State of New Mexico, and the STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants.

JOSEPH F. BEHOUNEK, Plaintiff, v. MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, individually and doing business as Governor of the State of New Mexico, and the STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-00405-JCH-LF

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

March 3, 2022

AMENDED PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FOR PLAINTIFF'S OFFICIAL CAPACITY FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS

Laura.Fashing United States Magistrate Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Michelle Lujan Grisham and the State of New Mexico's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Plaintiff's Official Capacity Federal Law Claims, filed on August 6, 2021. Doc. 64. Plaintiff Joseph F. Behounek filed a response on August 19 2021. Doc. 65. Defendants filed a reply on September 2, 2021. Doc. 70. Senior United States District Judge Judith Herrera referred this matter to me for a recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (b)(3). Doc. 33. Having reviewed the briefing and the relevant law and being fully informed of the premises, I recommend that the Court GRANT defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A. Background

Mr. Behounek filed his Amended Complaint on May 3, 2020, alleging that the executive orders issued by Governor Lujan Grisham and Public Health Orders issued by the New Mexico Department of Health (“NMDOH”) during the Covid-19 pandemic violate his civil and constitutional rights. Doc. 11. Mr. Behounek alleges that these orders violate his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 33-44. He further alleges that these orders violate the New Mexico Constitution and various New Mexico statutes. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27, 31, 48, 49.

Mr. Behounek alleges that he was harmed by Governor Lujan Grisham's orders because the orders restricted business occupancy levels and required non-essential businesses to close their doors to the public. See generally Doc. 11 at 3-6, ¶¶ 3-25. Mr. Behounek alleges that he suffered “irreparable financial harm, ” “mental stress, ” and will be unable to resume his business operations and/or will lose his business investment. Id. at 12, ¶¶ 50-52. Mr. Behounek asks for permanent injunctive relief^[1] to provide “relief to the plaintiff from the defendant's orders placing restriction on certain businesses and gatherings.” Id. at 13.

In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Behounek sues Governor Lujan Grisham in both “her individual and official capacity.” Doc. 11 at 2, ¶ 4.^[2] Governor Lujan Grisham previously filed a motion for summary judgment, in which she argued she was entitled to qualified immunity on claims against her in her individual capacity. Doc. 38. On March 11, 2021, the Court granted Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) and dismissed with prejudice all claims of First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations against Governor Lujan Grisham individually. Doc. 50. After the Court granted summary judgment, Mr. Behounek's remaining claims included his state law claims, see Doc. 11 ¶¶ 26, 27, 31, 48, 49, and his claims against the State of New Mexico and Governor Lujan Grisham in her official capacity, see Doc. 48 at 2-3, 6.

On August 6, 2021, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Plaintiff's State Law Claims (Doc 63) and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Plaintiff's Official Capacity Federal Law Claims (Doc. 64). For the reasons explained below, I recommend that the Court grant the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Plaintiff's Official Capacity Federal Law Claims (Doc. 64). Granting this motion will leave no remaining federal claims; I therefore recommend that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Behounek's state law claims.

B. Rule 12(c) Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings any time after the pleadings close, so long as it is early enough not to delay the trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Such a motion is subject to the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-step approach for district courts to use when considering a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, a court must identify the adequately pled factual allegations contained in the complaint, disregarding any legal conclusions in the process. Id. at 678. Next, having identified the adequately pled facts, the Court “should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim should be dismissed where it is factually or legally insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. In making this determination, the court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (Court should “accept all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the same.”).

Mr. Behounek is proceeding pro se. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes the factual allegations. See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to all litigants, and a pro se plaintiff must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994). The Court is not obligated to craft legal theories for the plaintiff or to supply factual allegations to support the plaintiff's claims. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Nor may the Court assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Id.

C. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars Mr. Behounek's claims against the State of New Mexico and against Governor Lujan Grisham in her official capacity. Doc. 64 at 8-14. Defendants assert that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply: the state has not consented to suit, Congress has not abrogated the state's sovereign immunity, and Mr. Behounek lacks standing to bring a claim for prospective relief under Ex parte Young because his claim is based on “speculative future harm.” Id. In response, Mr. Behounek confusingly responds to arguments not made in the motion, cites several cases that are factually and legally irrelevant, and urges the Court not to follow controlling Supreme Court precedent. See generally Doc. 65.

I agree that sovereign immunity bars Mr. Behounek's claims against the State of New Mexico and against Governor Lujan Grisham in her official capacity. I therefore recommend that the Court dismiss these claims with prejudice.

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit federal courts from entertaining suits against States brought by their own citizens or citizens of another State without their consent. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).^[3] State officials likewise enjoy immunity when acting as “an arm of the State.” Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).

Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is not absolute. “Two circumstances exist where a citizen may sue a State in federal court without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.” Ellis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1998). First, such suits are not barred if the State has voluntarily waived its immunity and consented to suit in federal court. Id. Second, such suits are not barred if Congress has explicitly abrogated the State's immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).

Finally although not properly characterized as an exception to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the doctrine that the Supreme Court announced in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 128 (1908), allows for suits against state officials under certain circumstances. See Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of N.M. v. Dep't of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The Ex parte Young doctrine is not actually an exception to Eleventh Amendment state immunity because it applies only when the lawsuit involves an action against state officials, not against the state.”). In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment “does not bar a suit against a state official in federal court which seeks only prospective equitable relief for violations of federal law, even if the state is immune.” Elephant Butte Irr. Dist. of New Mexico, 160 F.3d at 607-08 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60). The Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits to proceed against defendant state officials if the following requirements are met: (i) the plaintiff is suing state officials rather the state itself; (ii) the...