Behrns v. Burke

• Decision Date: 25 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11425,11425
• Citation: 89 S.D. 96,229 N.W.2d 86
• Parties: Mabel BEHRNS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LaVerna Beard BURKE, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 86

229 N.W.2d 86

89 S.D. 96

Mabel BEHRNS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LaVerna Beard BURKE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 11425.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

April 25, 1975.

R. E. Morgan, Morgan & Fuller, Chamberlain, for plaintiff and appellant.

J. B. Shultz, Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent.

DOYLE, Justice.

The plaintiff, Mabel Behrns, was riding with her sister, defendant LaVerna Beard Burke, on a trip from Lead, South Dakota, to Yankton, South Dakota. The parties intended to leave I--90 at U.S. 81 and drive directly south to Yankton. Defendant mistakenly took an exit several miles west of the U.S. 81 exit. This road intersects with U.S. 16, which is protected at the intersection by stop signs. Defendant drove her car into the intersection without obeying the posted stop signs and collided with another vehicle traveling on U.S. 16. As a result plaintiff incurred hospitalization expenses of approximately $16,000 in Mitchell and Lead. She was hospitalized for approximately twenty-two months and was considered by one of the doctors who testified to have a permanent thirty percent disability.

At trial, the court instructed the jury that defendant was negligent and left for the jury's consideration the issue of whether plaintiff was a guest without compensation as provided by the guest statute. ¹ Plaintiff excepted to these instructions on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the guest statute which prevents recovery on the basis of simple negligence. In her brief the plaintiff claims the constitutional question as her only basis for appeal and thereby impliedly admits her guest status and the absence of willful and wanton misconduct.

Plaintiff was protected by a different standard of care than that protecting paying passengers, guests in other cars, pedestrians and social guests on real property who are protected by the negligence standard. This discrimination is claimed to violate Art. VI, § 18 of the South Dakota Constitution, ² the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ³ Art. VI, §§ 2 and 20 and Art. III, § 23 of the South Dakota Constitution. ⁴

The last three alleged constitutional violations are without merit and deserve little attention. Article III, § 23, is a prohibition against special or private laws when a general law is applicable. A legislature has successfully avoided this prohibition when a statute is 'so framed in good faith that by its terms it should apply to all parts of the state and operate on all members of the class when they come within the scope and purpose of the enactment * * *.' ⁵ Generally, a legislature may define any class it wishes, and so long as all members of that class are treated alike the prohibition against private or special laws is not violated; cf. Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 1900, 13 S.D. 309, 83 N.W. 333. The guest statute is not 'Granting to an individual * * * any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise;' it operates on a Class of individuals and treats all members of that class uniformly. Article III, § 23, is not violated.

Nor does this statute violate the due process guarantee of Art. VI, § 2. That clause, we believe, is applicable to the facts before us only so far as it grants every person the right to a hearing on his inclusion in the class affected by the statute. ⁶ Article VI, § 20, is inapplicable since 'It is a guarantee that 'for such wrongs as are recognized by the law of the land the courts shall be open and afford a remedy. '' Simons v. Kidd, 1949, 73 S.D. 41, 38 N.W.2d 883. The guest statute declares that injuries suffered by a guest because of a host's negligence are not caused by "wrongs as are recognized by the law of the land."

Plaintiff finally claims that the guest statute deprives her of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. VI, § 18, of the South Dakota Constitution. We note here that the term 'equal protection' does not appear in Art. VI, § 18, and research leads us to believe that the tests used in applying the federal and state guarantees are not identical. Article VI, § 18, is, if anything, a more stringent constitutional standard than the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause 'den(ies) to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all person similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. '' Reed v. Reed, 1971, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 1920, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989, 990. ⁷ This court has been presented with two proposed objectives to this legislation: the promotion of hospitality and the prevention of collusion which will be discussed later.

The hospitality rationale appears to have three factors: the prevention of ungrateful litigation, the encouragement of free rides, and a desire to offer the guest only the protection for which he pays. (This third factor appears to be a means for achieving the first two.) Without questioning the desirability of these legislative ends, we cannot say that removing the automobile guest from the protection of the negligence standard has no relation to the accomplishment of those ends.

Article VI, § 18, of the South Dakota Constitution has been enforced by this court in two ways. First, this court has invalidated statutes when it has disagreed with the class lines drawn by the legislature. ⁸ The distinction between the classes must be 'clearly and wisely drawn.' ⁹ The legislature may not "arbitrarily discriminate between persons in substantially the same situation. The discrimination must rest upon some reasonable ground of difference * * *." ¹⁰ This test is not a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the legislature regarding the wisdom of the statutory purpose--it is an examination by this court to ensure that the persons affected by a statute are those that should be reached to achieve the desired legislative ends. Where, however, the line between those touching the problem to be remedied and those having no relation to the problem is not easily discernible, we have indicated we will not disturb the legislature's classification. ¹¹

The second method of enforcing Art. VI, § 18, requires that the 'act accomplish what is claimed for it * * *.' ¹² This rule appears rather strict, but it is tempered by reading it in the context of the case in which it appears. State v. Wood, 1927, 51 S.D. 485, 215 N.W. 487, involved a statute forbidding the sale of patent and proprietary medicines except by a registered pharmacist. We held that sale of patent medicines by pharmacists would not protect the public from harmful compounds since, as a practical matter, pharmacists were in no better position to be familiar with the medicines' manufacture and ingredients than any other reputable merchant. 'We (were) unable to see wherein restricting to pharmacists the unlimited and unregulated sale of patent and proprietary medicines Tend(ed) to protect the public health.' ¹³ (emphasis supplied)

This test is not a request for the Brandeis brief but a requirement that the classification scheme not be palpably and obviously in vain. This is a reasonable test, for to classify persons without a chance of result is to classify arbitrarily and without purpose in violation of the very spirit of Art. VI, § 18.

In applying these tests to the South Dakota guest statute we must remember that 'Statutes should not be declared unconstitutional unless their infringement on constitutional rights leaves no reasonable doubt.' Berens v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 1963, 80 S.D. 168, 176, 120 N.W.2d 565, 570. The result of the guest statute is to deny a cause of action in negligence to automobile guests who have not compensated their host drivers. The purposes behind this result have been listed previously. We believe the classification and the effect of the statute are reasonably geared to these purposes. We cannot believe that the guest statute can never act as an incentive to free transportation; we cannot believe that the guest statute does not prevent recovery in lawsuits that could be characterized as ungrateful; nor do we believe we are entitled to question the wisdom of the substantive legislative decision that those who do not compensate their host drivers are not to receive the protection of the negligence standard. We hold the South Dakota guest statute does not violate Art. VI, § 18.

These statements, however, are really only conclusions and are not very illuminating as to why the guest statute is compatible with the notion of equal protection. Were we to stop here with nothing more than the statement that the elimination of the guest statute is a legislative and not a judicial function, we would be derelict in our duty to the future of the law in this state. The definition of Art. VI, § 18's guarantee is too important to be satisfied with an unexplained conclusion.

The best means to this end is a full explanation of our disagreement with the case that started this recent trend of guest statute challenges--Brown v. Merlo, 1973, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212. ¹⁴ To start, we must say that we are in partial agreement with Brown. The rationale of collusion prevention does not support the guest statute under either the federal equal protection clause or Art. VI, § 18, of the South Dakota Constitution. The reasoning of this rationale is that the relationship in the normal guest-host situation is likely to be that of close friendship or blood...