Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige

Citation329 N.W.2d 280
Decision Date19 January 1983
Docket NumberNo. 66982,66982
PartiesBEIER GLASS COMPANY, Employer, and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellees, v. William BRUNDIGE, Appellant, and The Iowa Industrial Commissioner, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Robert L. Ulstad, Fort Dodge, for appellant.

William D. Scherle, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

The fighting issue in this appeal is whether a workers' compensation arbitration award of solely medical benefits renders a subsequent petition for disability benefits subject to the three-year statute of limitations on review-reopening or the two-year limitation on original claims. We conclude the three-year limitation on review-reopening is applicable, and reverse and remand.

Claimant William Brundige, a journeyman glazier, sustained industrial injuries on February 23, 1973, March 8, 1974, and April 9, 1975, while employed by Beier Glass Company (employer). In an arbitration decision filed January 20, 1977, the deputy industrial commissioner found any claim based on the 1973 injury barred by the two-year statute of limitations imposed on original actions by Iowa Code section 85.26(1), and that the 1974 and 1975 injuries resulted in insufficient lost time to entitle claimant to compensation. The deputy found, however, that the claimant had a spondylolisthesis (congenital condition of spine) that was aggravated by the claimant's employment activities. The employer was ordered to pay the cost of claimant's medical treatment.

September 1, 1978, claimant filed a petition for review-reopening of the 1977 arbitration award, claiming he was entitled to permanent disability and healing period benefits. The deputy commissioner ruled that although the 1977 arbitration established claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, denial of benefits other than medical payments precluded applicability of the three-year review-reopening limitation of Iowa Code section 85.26(2). Claimant's petition was therefore barred by the two-year limitation on original actions.

Claimant appealed to the industrial commissioner, who ruled the 1977 arbitration and award of medical benefits was sufficient to support review-reopening. On employer's petition for judicial review, district court reversed the commissioner's ruling, holding the three-year statute inapplicable on grounds an award of solely medical benefits was insufficient to support review-reopening. Claimant brought this appeal.

Our scope of review is limited by Iowa Code sections 17A.19 and .20. The commissioner's findings have the effect of a jury verdict, and we broadly apply them to uphold his decision. Ward v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 304 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Iowa 1981). The commissioner's determination of a question of law is entitled to careful consideration, but is subject to our review. Id. at 238; McDowell v. Town of Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1976). We have a duty to correct the district court's errors of law as well. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 1982); Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Board, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1979); Iowa R.App.P. 4.

I. Entitlement to Review-Reopening.

Iowa Code chapter 86 provides two methods a claimant may employ to secure compensation for injuries covered by our workers' compensation act. Under section 86.13, the employer and worker may reach agreement, and a memorandum of the agreement may be filed with the industrial commissioner. Alternatively, either party may initiate contested case proceedings by filing a petition for arbitration. Rich v. Dyna Technology, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Iowa 1973); Whitters & Sons, Inc. v. Karr, 180 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1970). An original proceeding for benefits must be commenced within two years of when the employee discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury. Orr v. Lewis Central School District, 298 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa 1980); see Iowa Code § 85.26(1) (1981). However, an original award or settlement agreement is subject to reopening, so that a claimant or employer may show the claimant's condition warrants a change in benefits. Iowa Code § 86.14(2) (1981).

Section 85.26 provides in pertinent part:

1. No original proceedings for benefits under this chapter or chapter 85A, 85B or 86, shall be maintained in any contested case unless such proceedings shall be commenced within two years from the date of the occurrence of the injury for which benefits are claimed except as provided by section 86.20.

2. Any award for payments or agreement for settlement provided by section 86.13 for benefits under the workers' compensation or occupational disease law or the Iowa occupational hearing loss Act [chapter 85B] may, where the amount has not been commuted, be reviewed upon commencement of reopening proceedings by the employer or the employee within three years from the date of the last payment of weekly benefits made under such award or agreement. Once an award for payments or agreement for settlement as provided by section 86.13 for benefits under the workers' compensation or occupational disease law or the Iowa occupational hearing loss Act [chapter 85B] has been made where the amount has not been commuted, the commissioner may at any time upon proper application make a determination and appropriate order concerning the entitlement of an employee to benefits provided for in section 85.27.

Iowa Code § 85.26(1)-(2) (1981). 1 Because claimant's petition was filed more than two years after occurrence of the injury, 2 it is barred as an original action by section 85.26(1) unless the review-reopening provision of section 85.26(2) applies. Commissioner ruled, and claimant argues on appeal, that an arbitration decision requiring payment of medical benefits constitutes an award subject to reopening. District court ruled, and employer argues on appeal, that this court's decisions in Powell v. Bestwall Gypsum Co., 255 Iowa 937, 124 N.W.2d 448 (1963), and Rankin v. National Carbide Co., 254 Iowa 611, 118 N.W.2d 570 (1962), preclude reopening because only medical benefits were paid.

We find Powell and Rankin are not controlling on the facts of this case. In those cases an employer voluntarily paid a claimant's medical expenses, but neither party initiated arbitration proceedings or filed a memorandum of agreement. We found the claimants' petitions for reopening could not proceed under the three-year review statute, because in neither case had there been an "award for payments" or "agreement for settlement." Mere payment of medical expenses, absent a proceeding before the commissioner, was insufficient basis for reopening. Powell, 255 Iowa at 940-41, 124 N.W.2d at 450; Rankin, 254 Iowa at 615, 619, 118 N.W.2d at 572-73, 575. Here there was a proceeding before the commissioner, and that proceeding requires us to further examine Iowa Code section 85.26(2). 3

Because resolution of the issue requires interpretation of relevant sections of the act, we review the general principles that guide our analysis. Our ultimate goal is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Miller, 312 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1981); American Home Products Corp. v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review, 302 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1981). We look to the object to be accomplished, the mischief to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and place on the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect, rather than defeat, the legislature's purpose. City of Mason City v. Public Employment Relations Board, 316 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1982); Peffers v. City of Des Moines, 299 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1980). We avoid strained, impractical or absurd results in favor of a sensible, logical construction. Ida County Courier and The Reminder v. Attorney General, 316 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 312 N.W.2d at 532. We consider all parts of the statute together, without attributing undue importance to any single or isolated portion. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 312 N.W.2d at 532; Peffers, 299 N.W.2d at 678. The spirit of the statute must be considered along with its words, Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1980), and the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words used. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 312 N.W.2d at 533. Although final interpretation and construction of the statute is for this court, we give deference to an interpretation by the responsible administrative agency. American Home Products Corp., 302 N.W.2d at 143; Charles City Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board, 291 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 1980). Our policy is to liberally construe workers' compensation statutes in favor of the worker. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Shook, 313 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 1981); McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980).

We look to prior statutes in order to determine the legislature's intent. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Bonnecroy, 304 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Iowa 1981); Peffers, 299 N.W.2d at 678. Before 1973, limitations on workers' compensation actions were contained in three separate sections. Iowa Code section 85.26 (1971) provided:

No original proceedings for compensation shall be maintained in any case unless such proceedings shall be commenced within two years from the date of the injury causing such death or disability for which compensation is claimed.

No claim or proceedings for benefits shall be maintained by any person other than the injured employee, his dependent or his legal representative, if entitled to benefits.

Review-reopening was governed by section 86.34, which provided:

Any award for payments or agreement for settlement made under this chapter where the amount has...

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