Beiiler v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 27 March 1895
• Citation: Beiiler v. Daniels, 31 A. 582, 19 R.I. 49 (R.I. 1895)
• Parties: BEIILER v. DANIELS et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

31 A. 582

19 R.I. 49

BEIILER

v. DANIELS et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 27, 1895.

Action by H. R. Behler against Daniels, Cornell & Co. for negligence in failing to guard an elevator well, whereby plaintiff fell and was injured while discharging his duty as a member of the fire department. Demurrer by defendants to plaintiff's declaration. Sustained.

Walter B. Vincent and Amasa M. Eaton, for plaintiff.

William G. Roelker, for defendants.

STINESS, J. The declaration in this case, as originally framed, charged the defendants with negligence in failing to guard an elevator well, whereby the plaintiff, a fireman, in the discharge of his duty, fell and was injured. A demurrer to this declaration was sustained upon the ground that it set forth an entry by the plaintiff into the defendants' premises only as a licensee, to whom the defendants owed no duty. Index OO, 61, 29 Atl. 6. The declaration is now amended, and the third count avers that Pub. Laws R. I. 1878, c. 688, § 25, commonly known as the "Providence Building Act," requires hoist-ways and elevators not inclosed to be protected with railings and trapdoors, and that it thus became the duty of the defendants to so protect their elevator, which they negligently omitted to do. The fourth count sets out that the plaintiff received his salary as a member of the fire department of the city of Providence from the defendants and others, taxpayers of Providence, and so became bound to respond to a fire call, and to enter upon their premises in putting out fire, and so was invited by the defendants to enter. In the former opinion, we said that the owner owed no duty to a licensee, as to the condition of his premises, unless Imposed by statute, save that he should not knowingly let him run upon a hidden peril, or willfully cause him harm, while, to one invited, he is under obligation for reasonable security for the purposes of the invitation. The declaration did not set out a cause of action upon either ground. The present amendments are made to inject into the statement of the case a statutory duty and an invitation. The first question, therefore, is whether there was a statutory duty. In considering this question, we need not discuss the limit of legislative power in imposing such a duty, for it is not necessary to decide it. We may assume it, and the question still remains whether an actionable duty is imposed by this statute. It has been before the court in several cases. In Grant v. Power Co., 14 R. I. 380, it was held that the scheme of the act was simply to secure safe structures, as a police measure for the general safety, not to create any duty which could be made the subject of an action by individuals, and that no remedy in favor of individuals, beyond what is expressly given in the act, should be implied for neglect to perform the duties created by the act. Baker v. Power Co., Id. 531, was brought under Pub. St. R. I. c. 204, § 21, which gives an action for injury caused by the commission of a crime or offense, the offense charged being a violation of the building act. It was held that an action under that statute could not be maintained until after a complaint bad been made for the crime or offense and process issued. In Maker v. Power Co., 15 R. I. 112, 23 Atl. 63, this condition of a criminal complaint was met; but the court held that the terms of the act were too indefinite and uncertain to impose a...