Beisel v. Gerlach
| Decision Date | 11 May 1908 |
| Docket Number | 109 |
| Parties | Beisel v. Gerlach, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 9, 1908
Appeal, No. 109, Jan. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Northampton Co., Sept. Term, 1905, No. 71, on verdict for plaintiff in case of George W. Beisel, by his next friend, John Beisel, v. E. J. Gerlach. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for alienation of wife's affections. Before SCOTT, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.
Defendant presented these points:
1. There being no evidence in the cause that defendant made any false and malicious statements of and concerning the plaintiff to his wife, under the pleadings there can be no recovery by the plaintiff. Answer: Refused. [10]
2. There being no evidence in the case that defendant encouraged and compelled plaintiff's wife to receive the attentions of other men, and no evidence that he promised to secure a divorce for her from plaintiff, so that she could marry another man, under the pleading there can be no recovery. Answer: Refused. [10]
3. The proof and testimony in the case do not support the allegations of plaintiff's pleadings, and there can be no recovery by him. Answer: Refused. [10]
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned among others was (10) answers to defendant's points, quoting them.
Judgment reversed and is here entered for defendant.
W. E Doster, for appellant, cited: Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233; Reading v. Gazzam, 200 Pa. 70.
James T. Woodring, for appellee.
Before FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER and ELKIN, JJ.
This is an important case in the sense that it has to do with the rights, duties and liabilities of a parent in dealing with a married child. The action is brought by a son-in-law against his father-in-law to recover damages for the alienation of the affection of the wife of the former and daughter of the latter. At the old common law it is doubtful whether the alleged alienation of the affection of a child by a parent under such circumstances was actionable, and while the courts in more recent years have opened the door to this class of cases by recognizing the right to maintain such an action under certain circumstances, it should be borne in mind that the reciprocal obligations and affections of parent and child last through life, before and after marriage, and in the trial of such causes the greatest care should be exercised, so that the assertion of a supposed right of action may not be based upon a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness of the child. Almost a hundred years ago it was said by Chancellor KENT that
In actions of this character the question is whether the father was moved by malice and without justification, or by a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness of his child. There can be no law to restrain a father from honestly and properly endeavoring to protect his daughter, by means of counsel and advice concerning her marital relations, so long as he in good faith advises what he believes to be right and proper under the circumstances.
There is a wide and essential difference between the rights and privileges of a parent in such cases and those of an intermeddling stranger. In all such cases the motives of the parent are presumed good until the contrary is made to appear. It is true a father has no right to restrain his daughter from returning to her husband if she desires to do so. On the other hand, he may lawfully give counsel and advice for her own good and shelter her in his own house, if she chooses to remain with him, without making himself liable in an action of damages. The law recognizes the right of a father to advise his daughter about her domestic affairs without incurring liability for alienation, if the advice be given in good faith and prompted by worthy motives, even if such advice influenced the daughter in making up her mind to separate from her husband. In other words, there can be no recovery against the father unless it clearly appears that he acted maliciously, without justification, and from unworthy motives. This is substantially the rule recognized in all jurisdictions: Burnett v. Burkhead, 21 Ark. 77; Nevins v. Nevins, 68 Kan. 410; Zimmerman v. Whiteley, 134 Mich. 39; Payne v. Williams, 63 Tenn. 583; Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93; Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. Appeal, 317; Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. (N.Y.) 439; Young v. Young, 35 Pac. Repr. 592; Huling v. Huling, 32 Ill.App. 519; Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19.
In the present case the amended statement of claim alleges that the defendant did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause his daughter to separate from her husband and that he encouraged her to receive the attentions of other men under a promise that he would procure a divorce for her so that she could remarry, by reason of which acts and promises the affection of the wife for her husband was alienated. These allegations were evidently made in the amended statement because the averments of the original declaration were not deemed sufficient to sustain the action against the father under the rule...
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