Beland v. Estey

• Decision Date: 31 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 6593,6593
• Citation: 351 A.2d 62,116 N.H. 8
• Parties: Edmond BELAND et al. v. Bernard ESTEY et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 62

351 A.2d 62

116 N.H. 8

Edmond BELAND et al. v. Bernard ESTEY et al.

No. 6593.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Jan. 31, 1976.

Raymond C. Patryn, Merrimack, and Louis P. Faustini, by brief, for plaintiffs, Edmond and Amelia Beland.

Sweeney, Sweeney & Sullivan, Nashua (Kevin Sullivan, Nashua, orally), for defendants, Bernard and Marie Rose Estey.

LAMPRON, Justice.

Bill in equity by Edmond and Amelia Beland to set aside as fraudulent under RSA ch. 545 a conveyance by Bernard Estey to his wife Marie Rose Estey of their property in Hudson held as joint tenants. After a hearing, the Trial Court (Cann, J.) made certain findings and ruled that the conveyance did not violate the provisions of RSA 545:4 or RSA 545:7 and dismissed plaintiffs' bill. Plaintiffs' exceptions were reserved and transferred.

The plaintiffs maintain on appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find and rule that this conveyance did constitute a fraudulent conveyance within the provisions of RSA ch. 545. In a supplemental brief, defendants' counsel brought to the attention of this court that defendant Bernard Estey had died previous to the date of the arguments on appeal and filed a copy of a certificate attesting to the death of Bernard on August 10, 1974. Counsel then argued that this rendered the present appeal moot.

Plaintiffs became creditors of Bernard Estey within the terms of RSA 545:9 on January 4, 1969, when their property on which Bernard was working was damaged by fire allegedly caused by his negligence. The conveyance in question was made on June 6, 1969, when Bernard conveyed to his wife his interest in their property held in joint tenancy.

If this court should uphold plaintiffs' contention that this conveyance was fraudulent as a matter of law under RSA ch. 545, plaintiffs would be entitled to have it set aside to enable them to levy on Bernard's interest in the property as it stood before the conveyance. Janson v. Schier, 112 N.H. 329, 331, 296 A.2d 12, 14 (1972); Ricker v. Mathews, 94 N.H. 313, 318, 53 A.2d 196, 199-200 (1947). During the joint lives of the defendants Bernard's share was subject to attachment by the plaintiffs. 4A R. Powell, Real Property § 618 (1974). The interest attached is similar to a life estate with a contingent remainder in fee depending upon which joint tenant survived. United States v. Mosolowitz, 269 F.Supp. 12, 15 (D.Conn.1967); Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal.App.2d 217, 220, 126 P.2d 118, 119 (1942). However, to obtain this interest plaintiffs would have had to obtain a judgment, levy thereon and sell Bernard's interest during his lifetime. 4A R. Powell, Real Property § 618 (1974). There is no record that this happened in this case.

As there was no...