Belanger v. Warren Consol. School Dist., Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 27 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 80714,80714 |
| Citation | 432 Mich. 575,443 N.W.2d 372 |
| Parties | , 55 Ed. Law Rep. 273 Patricia BELANGER, Helen Hanley, Bonnie Zervas and Norma Stanbury, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WARREN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
This Court granted leave to appeal to address the issue whether school counselors qualify for position-specific tenure under the teacher tenure act, 1 and thus are protected during layoffs at the expense of other qualified and more senior tenured teachers.
It is apparent from a reading of art. 3, Sec. 1 2 within the context of the entire act that the Legislature intended that a school district have discretion to deny or grant tenure only with respect to persons employed as administrators.
The decision of the Court of Appeals that a school district has the power to create a separate tenure status for teachers assigned to certain positions would subject teachers to, rather than protect them from, political and arbitrary interferences with the type of job security envisioned by the tenure act.
Therefore, we hold that persons employed as teachers acquire teacher tenure, regardless of the positions to which they are assigned within the school district, and it is only tenured teachers employed as administrators who are eligible for, or can be denied, tenure in an administrative position.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Michigan Tenure Commission that the plaintiffs hired as teachers and assigned counselor positions were properly laid off and replaced by tenured teachers with greater seniority.
The plaintiffs in this case are tenured teachers who possessed valid Michigan teaching certificates with counselor endorsements during the times relevant to this discussion. In June, 1981, they each were notified they would be laid off due to a necessary reduction in personnel. At that time, one plaintiff was assigned a split counselor/teacher position, 3 and the others were assigned full-time counselor positions. 4 Their positions were subsequently filled by three tenured teachers who had greater seniority and counseling endorsements but had not been assigned previously as counselors.
Approximately two years after their layoff and after the Tenure Commission's decision in Leonard v. Center Line Bd. of Ed., 5 the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Tenure Commission. 6 In Leonard, supra, the commission held that the plaintiff was employed in a nonclassroom position as a school counselor on the basis of the types of duties she performed in that capacity, which were administrative. It then found the school district's failure to include language in the plaintiff's employment contract specifically excluding tenure resulted in the acquisition of tenure during the time plaintiff was a counselor.
In the instant case, the Tenure Commission decided, first, that neither Leonard, supra, nor the prior case law 7 upon which it relied fully addressed whether a counseling position is a classroom or nonclassroom position within the meaning of art. 3, Sec. 1, and, second, that whether counselors hold nonclassroom or classroom positions depends upon the duties commonly associated with the position. The commission found that a person whose primary duties involve instruction or guidance of students is a "classroom teacher" within the meaning of art. 3, Sec. 1. 8 Thus, the plaintiffs, who acquired tenure only as classroom teachers, were properly laid off and replaced by tenured teachers with greater seniority.
The circuit court reversed the decision on the basis that a teacher is "one that teaches or instructs," 9 and since the primary duty of counselors is not teaching, 10 the plaintiffs were entitled to tenure as counselors, absent a specific exclusion to that effect in their employment contracts.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case to the commission with instructions that the term "classroom teacher" must be given its ordinary meaning which does not include a teacher who acts as a counselor offering guidance to students. 11 Although the panel was not persuaded that counselors are "classroom teachers" for purposes of the statute and technically are not administrators since their positions are not policymaking positions, they held that the determination as to whether to allow administrative tenure to a teacher employed as a counselor was to be governed by the contract between the teacher and the school board. This Court granted leave to address the issue whether school counselors qualify for position-specific tenure under M.C.L. Sec. 38.91; M.S.A. Sec. 15.1991. 12
To determine whether teachers acquire administrative tenure as counselors, we must first look to art. 3, Sec. 1, of the teacher tenure act, which provides in part:
"If the controlling board shall provide in a contract of employment of any teacher employed other than as a classroom teacher, including but not limited to, a superintendent, assistant superintendent, principal, department head or director of curriculum, made with such teacher after the completion of the probationary period, that such teacher shall not be deemed to be granted continuing tenure in such capacity by virtue of such contract of employment, then such teacher shall not be granted tenure in such capacity, but shall be deemed to have been granted continuing tenure as an active classroom teacher in such school district." M.C.L. Sec. 38.91; M.S.A. Sec. 15.1991.
More specifically, the Court must determine what is meant by "employment of any teacher employed other than as a classroom teacher, including but not limited to, a superintendent, assistant superintendent, principal, department head or director of curriculum," for purposes of, and within the context of, art. 3, Sec. 1, the tenure act.
While "classroom teacher" is not defined in the act, the dissent's literal definition of a teacher as one who "teaches or instructs" ignores altogether that "teacher" is defined as "all certificated persons employed for a full school year by any board of education or controlling board of any public educational institution." 13 Just as "teacher" is not used literally in the act, neither must "classroom," and there is no support for the adoption by the Court of a literal definition of "classroom teacher," as one who "teach[es] or provide[s] instruction in a classroom setting."
Instead, both the language of the act and the history of its enactment support substituting a functional definition for a literal definition of "classroom teacher." That "classroom teacher" is used in contrast to one whose primary duties do not involve instruction or guidance of students is evidenced by the fact that the general term "other than as a classroom teacher" is followed by the specific, "including but not limited to, a superintendent, assistant superintendent, principal, department head or director of curriculum...." Where specific words follow general ones, the doctrine of ejusdem generis restricts application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated:
"The rule 'accomplishes the purpose of giving effect to both the particular and the general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class, and the general words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named by the particular words.'
"The resolution of this conflict by allowing the specific words to identify the class and by restricting the meaning of general words to things within the class is justified on the ground that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have made no mention of the particular words." 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.), Sec. 47.17, p. 166.
If the general term were given its full and natural meaning, it would include the objects designated by the specific words, making the latter superfluous. 14
The phrase "other than as a classroom teacher" would, at first blush, seem broad enough to include counselors, librarians, and essentially any teacher whose primary duty did not involve "teach[ing] or provid[ing] instruction in a classroom setting." It is apparent, however, from a reading of the entire provision that the term "classroom teacher" is used in contrast to the term "administrator," i.e., a person whose duties do not ordinarily involve actual work with students which are positions similar to those enumerated in the statute.
Further, a review of the history and purpose of the tenure act 15 also supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended 16 that a school district have flexibility in establishing only which administrative positions should carry tenure status. As enacted in 1937, art. 3, 17 Sec. 1, of the tenure act provided:
"After the satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a teacher shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the probationary period has been completed, and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act." 1937 (Ex.Sess.) P.A. 4.
Because there is no requirement in the act that the person so employed must, in fact, teach, 18 all teaching personnel, including those in administrative capacities, may acquire tenure after completion of a probationary period. 19 In addition, tenure cannot be waived once acquired, 20 nor can a school district discharge or demote a tenured teacher except for reasonable and just cause. 21
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