Belcher v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 28 April 1999
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:98-0114.
• Citation: 56 F.Supp.2d 662
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Douglas G. BELCHER, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

56 F.Supp.2d 662

Douglas G. BELCHER, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:98-0114.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.

April 28, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Derrick Lefler, Princeton, WV, for plaintiff.

Stephen Horn, Charleston, WV, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEINBERG, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is an action seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. This case is presently pending before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Both parties have consented in writing to a decision by the United States Magistrate Judge.

The Plaintiff, Douglas Belcher (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant"), filed an application for DIB on January 21, 1994, alleging disability as of September 15, 1987, due to nerves, and eyesight and hearing problems. (Tr. at 28, 76.) The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. at 35, 62.) On March 6, 1995, Claimant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. at 67.) The hearing was held on May 7, 1996 before the Honorable Thomas R. King, Jr. (Tr. at 246.) By decision dated October 21, 1996, the ALJ determined that Claimant was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. at 20.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on January 4, 1998, when the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review. (Tr. at 4.) On February 10, 1998, Claimant brought the present action seeking judicial review of the administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Social Security Regulations establish a "sequential evaluation" for the adjudication of disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1998). If an individual is found "not disabled" at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. at § 404.1520(a). The first inquiry under the sequence is whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. Id. at § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is not, the second inquiry is whether claimant suffers from a severe impairment. Id. at § 404.1520(c). If a severe impairment is present, the third inquiry is whether such impairment meets or equals any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Administrative Regulations No. 4. Id. at § 404.1520(d). If it does, the claimant is found disabled and awarded benefits. Id. If it does not, the fourth inquiry is whether the claimant's impairments prevent the performance of past relevant work. Id. at § 404.1520(e). By satisfying inquiry four, the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability. Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.1981). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner, McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir.1983), and leads to the fifth and final inquiry: whether the claimant is able to perform other forms of substantial gainful activity, considering claimant's remaining physical and mental capacities and claimant's age, education and prior work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1998). The Commissioner must show two things: (1) that the claimant, considering claimant's age, education, work experience, skills and physical shortcomings, has the capacity to perform an alternative job, and (2) that this specific job exists in the national economy. McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574 (4th Cir.1976).

In this particular case, the ALJ determined that a denial of benefits could not be based on the first inquiry in the sequential analysis. (Tr. at 16.) Under the second inquiry, the ALJ found that Claimant suffered only from the severe impairment of alcoholism prior to the expiration of his disability insured status on March 31, 1991. (Id.) At the third inquiry, the ALJ concluded that Claimant's impairment does not meet or equal the level of severity of any listing in Appendix 1. (Tr. at 17.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ observed that § 12.09 of the listings exists now as a reference only because substance addiction disorders are no longer recognized as a basis for disability. The ALJ found that Claimant's alcoholism did not result in any other listed impairment. Because the only impairment which Claimant had, apart from alcoholism, was non-severe hypertension, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had a residual functional capacity for the full range of work prior to the expiration of his disability insured status. (Tr. at 18.) In the absence of a severe impairment other than alcoholism, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled prior to the expiration of his disability insured status. (Tr. at 19.) On this basis, benefits were denied. (Id.)

Scope of Review

The sole issue before this court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner denying the claim is supported by substantial evidence. In Blalock v. Richardson, substantial evidence was defined as:

"evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is `substantial evidence.'"

Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir.1972) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.1966)). Additionally, the Commissioner, not the court, is charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Nevertheless, the courts "must not abdicate their traditional functions; they cannot escape their duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational." Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir.1974).

A careful review of the record reveals the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

Claimant's Background

Claimant was born on February 11, 1945 and was fifty-one years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. at 250.) He completed the seventh grade in school. (Tr. at 251.)

By all accounts, Claimant was an alcoholic on March 31, 1991, the day his disability insured status expired. (Tr. at 16.) Subsequently, on April 19, 1994, Claimant suffered a heart attack. (Tr. at 176-77.) Dr. Phillip Peterson recommended a coronary bypass. (Id.) Claimant finally had the surgery on March 8, 1995. (Tr. at 202.)

The ALJ conceded at the administrative hearing that Claimant is currently disabled by heart problems. (Tr. at 249.) Nevertheless, the ALJ denied benefits because this impairment did not become disabling until after the expiration of Claimant's disability insured status. (Tr. at 16, 149.) Claimant does not challenge this finding but rather asserts that the ALJ should not have applied the March 29, 1996 amendment to the Social Security Act to this case.

Amendment of the Social Security Act

In 1996, Congress amended the Social Security Act to preclude individuals suffering from alcoholism from receiving benefits. Specifically, "[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled ... in alcoholism ... would ... be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). The corresponding regulations state that alcoholism is a contributing factor if the claimant would not be disabled if he stopped using alcohol. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b) (1998). The amendment ("Amendment") applies to all cases which were not "finally adjudicated by the Commissioner" prior to March 29, 1996. Pub.L. 104-121, § 105(a)(5)(A), 110 Stat. 847, 853 (1996). Claimants whose cases were finally adjudicated prior to March 29, 1996 continued receiving benefits until January 1, 1997. Id.

The Amendment and the social security regulations set up a two-step analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a) (1998). If the ALJ does conclude that the claimant is disabled, he must then ask whether alcoholism is a contributing factor to claimant's disability. See id. Alcoholism is a contributing factor if the claimant would not be disabled if he stopped drinking. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1) (1998).

Claimant's Challenge to the Commissioner's Decision

Claimant asserts that the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ incorrectly applied the statutory exclusion of alcoholism to a disability which existed prior to the effective date of the statute. Defendant maintains that the statutory exclusion was correctly applied.

The facts of this case are not in contention. The only question is whether the law has been correctly applied. Prior to March 31, 1991, Claimant was disabled by alcoholism as that impairment was defined before the March 29, 1996 effective date of the Amendment. In the time period between the expiration of Claimant's disability insured status and the enactment of the Amendment, Claimant became disabled by heart problems and ceased to be disabled by alcoholism. Nevertheless, because Claimant's heart problems did not become disabling prior to the expiration of his disability insure status, the Commissioner denied benefits. Claimant contends that because he was, at any given time, disabled by an impairment recognized by the law existing at the time of the impairment, he was under a continuing disability and is now entitled to benefits.¹ After careful consideration of Claimant's argument, this court cannot agree.

The Disability Insurance Statutory Scheme

This case requires an understanding of the DIB statutory scheme. The social security system provides two types of benefits based on an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. The first type, supplemental security income, provides benefits to disabled individuals who meet low-income requirements regardless of whether the individuals have ever...