Belcher v. Queen
Decision Date | 13 November 2009 |
Docket Number | 1080452. |
Parties | Brent BELCHER and Olon Belcher Properties, Ltd.v.Bettye Jan QUEEN, Beverly Jean Scroggins, and Otha A. Belcher. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Marc James Ayers of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham; Richard M. Kemmer, Jr., of Kemmer & Kemmer, P.C., Centreville; and Rickman E. Williams III of Pitts, Pitts & Williams, Selma, for appellants.
C. Fred Daniels and Sydney F. Frazier, Jr., of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellees.
This is the third time the dispute between these parties has been before this Court. See Ex parte Queen, 959 So.2d 620 (Ala.2006), and Queen v. Belcher, 888 So.2d 472 (Ala.2003). In this latest iteration, Brent Belcher appeals the judgment of the trial court holding that Olon Belcher, the father of the appellant Brent and of the appellees Bettye Jan Queen, Beverly Jean Scroggins, and Otha A. Belcher, was incompetent when he executed: (1) a December 1995 durable power of attorney appointing Brent to be his attorney-in-fact; (2) a December 1995 partnership agreement creating Olon Belcher Properties, Ltd., a partnership between Olon, his wife Hazel Belcher, and Brent; and (3) a March 1998 document creating a revocable trust and naming Brent as the trustee (these documents are hereinafter referred to collectively as “the planning documents”). The trial court accordingly declared each of the planning documents void. Olon Belcher Properties, Ltd., appeals the denial of its motion to intervene, after the trial court entered its judgment declaring the partnership agreement void. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In Queen, Olon's children Queen, Scroggins, and Otha were collectively referred to as “the petitioning children” because they initiated the case by petitioning the Probate Court of Bibb County to appoint a conservator for Olon. 888 So.2d at 474. In Ex parte Queen, they were again referred to collectively as “the petitioning children” because they were petitioning this Court for a writ of mandamus. 959 So.2d at 620. Therefore, in the interest of consistency, they are again referred to as “the petitioning children” in this opinion.1
In Queen, we set forth the facts at the root of this dispute:
888 So.2d at 474-75. We subsequently reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred by considering the affidavits submitted by Brent, which we concluded were hearsay. We remanded the cause for the trial court “to determine whether Olon Belcher was competent to execute the power of attorney and to enter into the partnership agreement and the trust agreement.” 888 So.2d at 478.
On remand, the petitioning children moved the trial court to enter a judgment on Olon's competency based upon the valid evidence it had received at the December 17, 2001, evidentiary hearing; however, after the trial court denied that motion and instead ordered a new evidentiary hearing, the petitioning children sought mandamus relief in this Court. In Ex parte Queen, we granted mandamus relief to the petitioning children and directed the trial court to rule on the competency issue based on the existing evidence. 959 So.2d at 623. On August 8, 2007, the trial court entered the following order deciding the issue:
On September 7, 2007, Brent moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order, arguing that the petitioning children had not met their burden and that, even if they had, the trial court had still erred by declaring the partnership agreement void. That same day, Olon Belcher Properties moved to intervene, arguing that the entire partnership agreement should not be declared void on the basis that one out of the three partners was incompetent at the time the partners entered into the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court denied both the postjudgment and intervention motions. Brent and Olon Belcher Properties then filed this appeal.
In Queen, we applied a de novo standard of review. 888 So.2d at 476. Brent argues that we should again review the trial court's judgment de novo because, he alleges, that judgment was again based almost entirely on the written depositions of Olon's physicians. See Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.1999) (). The petitioning children, however, argue that although we may...
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