Belden v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 07 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. L 83-119.,L 83-119.
• Citation: 586 F. Supp. 628
• Parties: Molder M. BELDEN, Plaintiff, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

586 F. Supp. 628

Molder M. BELDEN, Plaintiff, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. L 83-119.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

May 7, 1984.

Donald K. Blair, Monticello, Ind., for plaintiff.

R. Lawrence Steele, Jr., U.S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., Christina McKee, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

This is an action for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Secretary of Health and Human Services determining that plaintiff is no longer entitled to a period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act or disability insurance benefits, as provided by Section 223 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i); 42 U.S.C. § 423.

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on September 26, 1969 (Tr. 99-102), alleging that he became unable to work on November 11, 1968, at age 27.¹ A period of disability was established for plaintiff, but plaintiff was notified that recent evidence made it appear that he was no longer under a disability as of December 1981 (Tr. 18, 170). He received a Social Security Termination notice dated March 26, 1982, advising him that he was last entitled to benefits in February 1982 (Tr. 18, 111, 113). Upon reconsideration, that determination was affirmed (Tr. 167), after the Indiana State Agency, upon evaluation of the evidence by a physician and a disability examiner, had found that plaintiff was no longer under a disability. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), before whom plaintiff and his attorney appeared considered the case de novo, and on June 23, 1983, found that plaintiff was no longer under a disability (Tr. 9-19). The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services when the Appeals Council approved that decision on August 29, 1983 (Tr. 5). This case was filed October 23, 1983. The defendant Secretary filed for summary judgment on March 19, 1984 and the plaintiff did so on April 30, 1984.

This subject program of terminating disability benefits is presently a matter of great concern both inside the Federal Judiciary and out. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.1984). The Secretary has also publicly announced the cessation of the program excepting cases, such as this one, still pending in the United States Courts.

To qualify for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, an individual must meet the insured status requirements of these Sections, be under age 65, file an application for disability insurance benefits and a period of disability, and be under a "disability" as defined in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i); 42 U.S.C. § 423.

In order to qualify for SSI benefits on the basis of disability under Section 1602 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381a, an individual must file an application for SSI benefits based on disability, and he must be an "eligible individual" as defined in the Act.

With respect to the present action, the term "eligible individual" is defined in Section 1611(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a), as follows:

(1) Each ... disabled individual who does not have an eligible spouse and —

(A) whose income, other than income excluded pursuant to Section 1612(b), is at a rate of not more than $1,752 (or if greater, the amount determined under Section 1617) for the calendar year 1974 or any calendar year thereafter, and

(B) whose resources, other than resources excluded pursuant to Section 1613(a), are not more than (i) in case such individual has a spouse with whom he is living, $2,250, or (ii) in case such individual has no spouse with whom he is living, $1,500,

shall be an eligible individual for purposes of this title.

The term "disabled individual" as used in Section 1611(a) of the Act is defined in Section 1614(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a), as follows

(1) For purposes of this title, the term "... disabled individual" means an individual who —

(A) ... is disabled (as determined under paragraph (3)), and

(B) is a resident of the United States, and is either (i) a citizen or (ii) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law (including any alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the provisions of section 203(a)(7) or section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

* * * * * *

(3)(A) An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this title if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months....

(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

(C) For purposes of this paragraph, a physical or mental impairment is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

The only issue before the court in this action is whether the final decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence.

The basic findings of the ALJ are found at Tr. 18 as follows:

1. The claimant was found to be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act beginning November 11, 1969, and he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since that date.

2. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has a lower back condition, post multiple discectomies and spinal fusions, but that at least since December 1981, he has not had an impairment of combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.

3. The claimant's subjective complaints of disabling pain and functional limitations are disproportionate to the objective findings in the medical record, manipulative on the claimant's part, and not fully credible.

4. Although the claimant does experience some pain and functional limitations as a result of his condition, as of December 1981, he had regained the functional capacity to perform work which did not require prolonged standing or walking or lifting of over 10 pounds (20 CFR 404.1545).

5. The claimant is unable to perform his past relevant unskilled, medium to heavy work in construction and factory labor.

6. Beginning December 1981, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work (20 CFR 404.1567).

7. The claimant has been an younger individual for purposes of Social Security Disability Evaluation at all times here pertinent (20 CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has a marginal sixth grade education, can read only a very little, and cannot write.

9. The claimant has a history of unskilled work activities.

10. Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Rules 201.23 and 201.24 of Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, direct a conclusion that, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, he is not longer disabled.

11. The claimant's disability ceased on December 8, 1981 (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

Establishment of a disability which would entitle plaintiff to benefits under the Social Security Act is a two-step process. First, there must be a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and second, there must be a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), (B); Lieberman v. Califano, 592 F.2d 986 (7th Cir.1979).

It is settled law that the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff to establish entitlement to disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Johnson v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.1975).

Plaintiff, who was born on November 13, 1941, completed the sixth grade and has worked as a general laborer (Tr. 99, 45, 47-52, 58). He alleges disability as of November 11, 1968 due to "back injury" (Tr. 99). Plaintiff received disability benefits until February 1982, the second month from the month in which the Administration determined his disability had ceased, i.e., December 1981. Plaintiff is unable to return to his former work.

On November 11, 1968, plaintiff fell about four feet at work and injured the cervical dorsal area of his back (Tr. 174). On February 5, 1969, E.T. Stahl, M.D., described plaintiff as a "healthy appearing man." Plaintiff's head, neck, cardio-vascular system, abdomen, and lower extremities were normal. Plaintiff complained of indefinite numbness in his arms (Tr. 175). On March 13, 1969, plaintiff underwent a disc removal and fusion (Tr. 179).

Dr. Stahl examined plaintiff on April 24, 1972. Plaintiff's head, neck, arms, chest, heart, and abdomen were normal. His legs functioned normally. He had acute tenderness on pressure and to motion over L4 ...