Belec v. Hayssen Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:94CV1195 CDP.,4:94CV1195 CDP. |
| Parties | Dennis BELEC, Plaintiff, v. HAYSSEN MANUFACTURING CO., William L. Holshouser, and Charles F. Voelkel, Jr., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Richard R. Kordenbrock, Associate, Myers and Kordenbrock, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for plaintiff Dennis Belec.
James P. Lemonds, Partner, Holtkamp and Liese, St. Louis, MO, for defendant Hayssen Mfg. Co.
Ted L. Perryman, Managing Partner, Roberts and Perryman, St. Louis, MO, Dennis E. Rose, Donovan and Rose, Belleville, IL, for defendants Charles F. Voelkel, Jr. and William L. Holshouser.
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, both motions will be granted.
Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that he suffered severe injury to both hands when the molds of an injection molding machine closed on them. He sues the machine's manufacturer, Hayssen Manufacturing Company ("Hayssen"), in Counts I and II for strict liability and failure to warn. In Count III plaintiff sues Hayssen and the individual defendants, Charles F. Voelkel, Jr. and William L. Holshouser, for negligence. Count III alleges that defendant Holshouser, acting at the direction of defendant Voelkel, modified the electrical circuitry to allow the machine to operate in a "semi-automatic mode," rendering the machine's safety mechanisms inoperative.
Hayssen is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that the modification of the machine was the sole cause of plaintiff's injury, and under Missouri law, a manufacturer will not be held liable for injury resulting from even a foreseeable modification where the alteration is the sole cause of plaintiff's injury. Holshouser and Voelkel are entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that they made the modification pursuant to a corporate decision, and their actions were therefore undertaken as part of the employer's non-delegable duty to provide a safe work place.
The essential facts involved in this case are undisputed. On October 12, 1991, plaintiff sustained injuries to both of his hands while working at Semco Plastics, Inc., with an injection molding machine manufactured by Hayssen. At the time of the accident, Voelkel was the production manager and Holshouser was a maintenance manager at Semco. Holshouser, acting at Voelkel's direction, modified the electrical circuitry of a number of the molding machines owned by Semco to allow for operation of the machines in a semiautomatic mode; these modifications rendered ineffective the safety mechanisms intended to prevent the molding casings from closing on the operators' hands.
The undisputed evidence shows that as designed, manufactured, and delivered to Semco, the machines were stopped and restarted each time a product was made. The constant starting and stopping of the machines, while admittedly very safe, caused premature wear and tear on the motors and other parts of the machines. That problem led Semco to seek ways to modify the machines.
Holshouser proposed a modification which called for the removal of one of the three operable safety devices, while adding an additional mechanical safety device that was to be placed inside the machine. Holshouser took this proposal to his supervisor, Voelkel, and Voelkel in turn forwarded the proposal to his supervisor, Semco's general manager. The general manager approved the planned modification, and Holshouser implemented it.
The machine even as modified, was not supposed to cycle when the door was opened. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was reaching into the machine to retrieve a completed piece when, apparently, his body contacted a lower switch, causing the machine to believe the door was closed and allowing it to cycle. It is undisputed that had the machine not been modified, the accident could not have occurred in this way.
Plaintiff's expert testified in his deposition that as originally manufactured and sold to Semco, the machine was reasonably safe and only the modifications rendered it unsafe. He also stated that Hayssen should have foreseen the possibility that the machine would be modified in this manner and should have provided a warning against such modifications. He later filed an affidavit reciting that the machine was unreasonably dangerous in the absence of this warning.
In determining whether summary judgment should issue pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the facts, and the inferences from these facts, are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the burden is placed on the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, however, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit or other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant is unable to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 884, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).
The Court will first address Hayssen's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff concedes that Hayssen "is entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's stated causes of action for strict products liability based upon design defect, and for negligence" (counts I and III), but argues that summary judgment should not be granted with regard to plaintiff's cause of action for strict liability based on failure to warn, as set forth in Count II.
Hayssen contends that when a third party's modification makes a safe product unsafe, the seller is relieved of liability even if the modification is foreseeable, citing Jones v. Ryobi, Ltd., 37 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1994), Gomez v. Clark Equipment Co., 743 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.Ct.App.1987), and Hill v. General Motors Corp., 637 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct.App.1982). Plaintiff argues that the cases Hayssen cites, while applicable to strict liability claims for negligence and design defect, do not mention strict liability for failure to warn and therefore do not preclude this cause of action. The question before the Court therefore is whether a foreseeable, negligent modification of a machine that is the sole cause of a plaintiff's injury is sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding of liability under strict liability for failure to warn. The Court finds that it is not.
In Sutherland v. Elpower Corp., 923 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir.1991), relied on by plaintiff, the court held that Missouri law would impose liability for failure to warn of reasonably foreseeable uses of defendant's product where the modification was not the "sole cause" of plaintiff's injuries. In that case the court found evidence of design defects as well. The Sutherland plaintiff purchased a battery-operated child's riding toy secondhand from his neighbor. The toy was sold to the plaintiff without the battery charger and instructions which came with the toy, and plaintiff purchased an automotive-type battery charger when the batteries needed to be recharged. Plaintiff modified the toy's wiring to accommodate the foreign charger, and while attempting to recharge the battery it exploded, causing injury to plaintiff's eye. Neither the battery charger nor the riding toy had any affixed warnings concerning the dangers of improper charging of a battery, and there was evidence suggesting that this method of charging the battery was a foreseeable misuse and that proper warnings would have enabled the plaintiff to avoid the injury. Id. at 1289.
In Gomez v. Clark Equipment, 743 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.Ct.App.1987), the plaintiff lost several fingers as a result of a collision she had while driving a truck manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiff's employer had modified the truck to include a fuel tank system which reduced the driver's rear visibility. The Gomez court found that there was no evidence of any defect in the truck as it was provided by the manufacturer, that there was no superseding cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that the employer's modification was the "sole cause" of the injury. The court concluded that the manufacturer therefore could not be held liable under strict liability for failure to warn. Gomez, 743 S.W.2d at 432-33. The Sutherland court distinguished Gomez by noting that in Gomez the modification, not the original condition of the truck, was the "sole cause" of the injury, and concluded that plaintiff's reliance on Gomez therefore was misplaced.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Sutherland in that here, as in Gomez, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the modification of the machine was the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Court reads both Sutherland and Gomez as holding that the manufacturer of a machine cannot be held strictly liable for failure to warn if the injuries were caused solely by the modifications made to the machine and not by some superseding or contributory cause. Here, the injuries to plaintiff are alleged to have been caused solely by the negligent modification of the machine. Because the evidence is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of liability against Hayssen, the Court will grant Hayssen's motion for summary judgment.
Voelkel and Holshouser...
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