Belezos v. Bd. of Selectmen of Hingham

• Decision Date: 27 November 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-12570-MBB
• Parties: NICHOLAS G. BELEZOS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN of Hingham, Massachusetts, in their official capacity, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

NICHOLAS G. BELEZOS, on behalf of himselfand all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN of Hingham, Massachusetts,in their official capacity, on behalf of themselvesand all others similarly situated, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-12570-MBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

November 27, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JULY 3, 2019 ORDER

(DOCKET ENTRY # 31)

BOWLER, U.S.M.J.

Defendants Board of Selectmen of the Town of Hingham ("defendants"), sued in their official capacity, seek reconsideration of a July 2019 decision (Docket Entry # 30, pp. 4-9) that, in turn, reconsidered a March 2019 decision (Docket Entry # 22, pp. 17, 26-29) on the third element of claim preclusion, i.e., the existence of a "'prior final judgment on the merits.'" RFF Family P'ship, LP v. Ross, 814 F.3d 520, 531-32 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). They submit the July 2019 decision constitutes "a manifest error of law as well as a manifest injustice" which warrants reconsideration. (Docket Entry # 31, pp. 9-10). Plaintiff maintains that the July 2019 decision is correct, the decision in Springfield Pres. Tr., Inc. v. Springfield Library and Museums Ass'n, Inc., 852 N.E.2d 83 (Mass. 2006) ("Springfield Trust"), is controlling, and defendants are unsuccessfully attempting to raise a new argument that this court deemed waived in the July 2019 decision. (Docket Entry # 32). The relevant procedural background is as follows.

BACKGROUND

In April 2018, defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims in a first amended complaint based, inter alia, on claim preclusion. (Docket Entry ## 8, 13, 14). They asserted that a September 2016 decision and final judgment by the trial court in plaintiff's state court proceeding in Massachusetts Superior Court (Plymouth County) ("the trial court") in Belezos v. Board of Selectmen of the Town of Hingham, Civil Action No. 1483CV01018 ("Belezos") (Docket Entry # 8-7), barred adjudication of the federal and state law claims in this action. (Docket Entry # 8, pp. 16-17) (Docket Entry # 13) (Docket Entry # 14, p. 10). The trial court's decision and judgment in Belezos undeniably reached and rejected the substantive merits of the federal constitutional claims and the ultra vires state law claims in that proceeding. (Docket Entry # 8-7). These federal constitutional and state law claims are substantially the same as the corresponding claims brought in this action. (Docket Entry # 11, 15-1).

Plaintiff opposed the claim preclusion argument because theMassachusetts appeals court ("MAC") in Belezos affirmed the trial court's decision on a different ground without "ruling on the merits." (Docket Entry # 15, p. 22). Specifically, the MAC stated, "It is unnecessary to reach the merits of Belezos's claims because he waived his right to contest the civil motor vehicle infraction . . . by failing to pursue the remedy expressly provided for by the Legislature" in Massachusetts General Laws chapter 90C ("chapter 90C"), section three.¹ Rather, plaintiff paid the speeding ticket he received on Gardner Street which, by statute, "'operate[s] as a final disposition of the matter.'"² (Docket Entry # 8-8, p. 4) (quoting Mass. Gen. Lawsch. 90C, § 3).

The March 2019 decision allowed defendants' motion to dismiss the federal and the state law claims based on claim preclusion.³ (Docket Entry # 22, pp. 15-29, 41). Regarding the third element, this court explained that the trial court decided "the statutory ultra vires and constitutional section 1983 claims on the merits (Docket Entry # 8-7, pp. 2-10) and entered a final judgment on the merits (Docket Entry # 8-7, p. 11)." (Docket Entry # 22, p. 26) (citing In re Sonus Networks, Inc., 499 F.3d 47, 60, n.6 (1st Cir. 2007)). Thereafter, this court addressed plaintiff's argument that the MAC disregarded the merits-based dismissal of the trial court and decided the matter on another ground, i.e., plaintiff's payment of the ticket waived his ability to further contest the matter. Quoting the March 2019 opinion, this court rejected plaintiff's argument because "[c]laim preclusion applies to a final judgment even if it is subject to an appeal" unless "the appeals court reverses" thelower court. (Docket Entry # 22, p. 29) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f (1982)). In full, this court then stated that:

The MAC did not reverse the trial court's judgment. Rather, it affirmed the judgment for a different reason. Moreover, unlike the higher court in Baylis,⁴ which questioned the lower court's alternative ruling, seeIn re Baylis, 217 F.3d at 71, the MAC's decision in Belezos did not question the trial court's ruling.

In sum, claim preclusion bars litigation or relitigation of all of plaintiff's individual claims.

(Docket Entry # 22, p. 29). In making this ruling, this court did not rely on defendants' argument that, "The fact that the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment on other grounds without the need to reach the merits of Judge Muse's decision does not alter the fact that the prior action produced a final judgment on the merits, the parties were the same, and the causes of action were the same." (Docket Entry # 8, p. 17) (Docket Entry # 14, p. 10). Rather, as noted above, this court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f (1982), the fact that the MAC did not reverse the trial court's judgment, and the fact that the trial court's decision and judgment did not involve two alternative grounds to dismiss the claims. (Docket Entry # 22, p. 29).

Two weeks after the March 2019 decision, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the claim preclusion ruling as it applied tothe state law ultra vires claims.⁵ In the July 2019 decision on the motion to reconsider, this court reversed course on the claim preclusion ruling regarding the third element in light of overlooking the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") in Springfield Trust, which adjudicated claim preclusion in the context of an appeal. Like the MAC in Belezos (Docket Entry # 8-8, p. 4), the MAC in the prior case examined for its claim-preclusive effect in Springfield Trust affirmed the trial court based on a ground different from the trial court's substantive merits-based decision.

More specifically, the SJC in Springfield Trust addressed the claim-preclusive effect of the prior case wherein the trial court found an ordinance valid and a 1979 decision by the MAC⁶ on direct appeal affirmed the judgment "on procedural grounds." Springfield Trust, 852 N.E.2d at 91. Notably, the procedural grounds consisted of a failure to join a necessary party and a failure to "notify the Attorney General of the suit, as required" under a state statute. Id. at 91, n.11.⁷ On appeal in the priorcase, the MAC "specifically stated that it did 'not reach the other questions raised.'" Id. at 91 (internal citation omitted). The SJC therefore refused to apply claim preclusion to the trial court's initial decision on the substantive merits because the MAC decided the matter on other grounds that had nothing "to do with the merits[,]" namely, the failure to join a necessary party and the failure to give notice to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth ("the Attorney General") regarding the lawsuit. Id. at 91 n.11. The relevant passage in the SJC's decision reads as follows:

While the lower court had addressed the merits of the trust's claim, the case was ultimately decided on other grounds having nothing to do with the merits (see note 11, supra). "It is settled . . . that no [preclusive] effect can be attributed to a decree dismissing a bill or petition in equity, for want of jurisdiction or any other cause not involving the essential merits of the controversy." Curley v. Curley, 311 Mass. 61, 66, 40 N.E.2d 272 (1942). See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 407 Mass. 23, 29-30, 551 N.E.2d 502 (1990) (rejecting res judicata argument where commissioner was without jurisdiction to hear claims). See also Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 533, 766 N.E.2d 482 (2002).

Id.; see In re Sonus Networks, Inc., 499 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Sonus Networks") (quoting above language in SpringfieldTrust quoting Curley v. Curley, 40 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Mass. 1942)).⁸

In the July 2019 decision, this court analogized the trial court's merits-based decision in Belezos and the MAC's decision "on [the] procedural ground based on a waiver" to the circumstances in Springfield Trust, which refused to apply claim preclusion because the MAC affirmed the trial court "'on procedural grounds'" even though the trial court addressed the merits of the claim. (Docket Entry # 30, pp. 5-7). This court therefore reconsidered the March 2019 decision and refused to apply claim preclusion because the MAC's decision in Belezos, like the MAC's decision reviewed in Springfield Trust, "decided the matter on a procedural ground based on a waiver without reaching the merits (Docket Entry # 8-8)." (Docket Entry # 30, pp. 5-6). Given plaintiff's vigorous argument relying on Springfield Trust (Docket Entry # 26, pp. 5-6), what this court neglected to perform was to analyze and compare the MAC's "procedural grounds" in Springfield Trust (failure to join a necessary party and notify the Attorney General of the suit) to the MAC's grounds in Belezos (statutory waiver by paying the assessment and failing to pursue a chapter 90C appeal). Inseeking reconsideration, defendants identify the error in the analogy. (Docket Entry # 31, pp. 3-4, 6-9). They explicitly and accurately point out that, "The Trust could correct their procedural errors and re-file. Belezos cannot reverse the fact that he waived the right to contest the civil motor vehicle infraction." (Docket Entry # 31, p. 8).

The procedural history leading to the SJC's Springfield Trust decision not to afford the MAC's 1979 decision preclusive effect is instructive.⁹ The MAC's 1979 decision affirmed the trial court...