Belfi v. Prendergast

Decision Date01 August 1998
Docket NumberDocket No. 98-9002
Citation191 F.3d 129
Parties(2nd Cir. 1999) SUSAN BELFI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS F. PRENDERGAST, as President of the LIRR, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (MTA), E. VIRGIL CONWAY, as Chairman of MTA, Defendants, LONG ISLAND RAILROAD, Defendant-Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

MERCEDES M. MALDONADO, New York, New York (Carl Rachlin, O'Donnell, Schwartz, Glanstein & Rosen, New York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

RICHARD J. BERKA, Jamaica, New York (Michael R. Ambrecht, Jamaica Station - Law Dept. 1143, Jamaica, New York, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CARDAMONE, STRAUB, and KEITH*, Circuit Judges

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

On this appeal we deal with an employer long on salary policies, but short on reasons justifying their application to plaintiff, a female employee whose salary for the same work was less than those of her male peers. Susan Belfi (plaintiff or appellant) appeals from a judgment entered March 26, 1998 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ward, J.), granting defendant the Long Island Railroad's motion for summary judgment on Belfi's Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims and dismissing her complaint in its entirety. On appeal, Belfi contends that the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to her as the non-movant, and simply accepted the nondiscriminatory explanations proffered by the Long Island Railroad for the salary disparity between her and male employees holding the same position.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired originally by the Long Island Railroad (LIRR, railroad, or defendant) in 1973 as a stenotypist and held that position for 15 years. In 1989 she became a payroll clerk, earning $34,000 per year under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between her union and the LIRR. Subsequently, she was promoted to the position of Office Engineer-Communications on a temporary basis, at which time her salary was increased to $39,508, the minimum salary for that position. On January 1, 1990 the minimum salary for the Office Engineer position was increased by a little over $1,000, to $40,691. But Belfi did not then receive an increase in her salary.

On July 16, 1990 plaintiff received a permanent appointment to her current position of Office Engineer-Signal in the Signal Department. Her starting salary at the permanent position remained the minimum, $40,691 per year while the salaries of her two male peers - Office Engineer-Communications and Office Engineer-Electric Traction - were $52,794 and $53,046 respectively.

A. Salary Scheme

The LIRR employs three individuals who hold the title of office engineer, one each for the Signal Department, the Communications Department, and the Electric Traction Department. The position of office engineer is clerical in nature and is represented by the National Transportation Supervisors' Association (NTSA). Although the position is union-represented, in 1986 the NTSA entered into an agreement with the LIRR that placed NTSA members under the Salary Administration Plan (Salary Plan) applicable to LIRR managerial employees. Thus, wage adjustments after 1986 were determined by the railroad under an annual evaluation plan rather than under the collective bargaining agreement with the NTSA.

Under the Salary Plan, a position is evaluated using the "Hay Method" to determine salary: A Hay point value is assigned depending on the skills and talents needed to perform the job, and a minimum, midpoint, and maximum salary range for the position is established. All three office engineer positions are assigned the same number of Hay points and have the same minimum, midpoint, and maximum salaries. The Salary Plan specifies that a newly promoted employee should be paid the minimum salary for the position. If the employee's former salary was already within the range of the new position, the railroad would give that employee a salary increase either up to 10 percent of the current salary or up to 112 percent of the midpoint salary, whichever is less.

Dan Hughes, Gerald Fishman, and Ray Rinfret held the three office engineer positions when those positions underwent the 1986 salary restructuring to the Hay method. Rinfret had been an office engineer for six years; Fishman had been one for four years and four months; and Hughes had held the title for one year and eight months. Upon the transition to the Salary Plan, all were paid the same annual salary of $46,936.

When Belfi received a temporary promotion in November, 1989 at a salary of $39,508, Hughes was earning $52,794 and Fishman was earning $53,046. One year later, Belfi's salary was $43,132; Hughes' was $55,038, and Fishman's was $55,168. In 1991 and 1992 none of the three received an increase in salary, although 85 employees under the Salary Plan received promotional increases between 1991 and 1992, 35 of which were based on either inequity increases or compression increases. In 1993 the LIRR Salary Plan provided a 4 percent merit increase for all employees covered by the plan, rather than individual assessments of merit. Hence, Belfi's salary was increased to $44,857, and Hughes' was increased to $57,240. Fishman was not included because of his anticipated retirement.

On June 15, 1994 the railroad hired Gary Barnett as the Office Engineer-Electric Traction to replace Fishman, who had retired. Barnett was hired at a salary of $51,249, $6,000 more than Belfi's salary and $8,931 more than the minimum for the position. Barnett had been an acting office engineer since November 15, 1993, although he formally held the title of third railman, a position represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

B. Procedural History

In October 1992 Belfi first became aware that the salaries of the two male office engineers at that time, Fishman and Hughes, were substantially higher than her salary. Plaintiff later also discovered a substantial disparity between her salary and that of Gary Barnett, the office engineer hired to replace Fishman. Throughout this period, she communicated with her union representative, who filed grievances on her behalf.

In response to plaintiff's 1992 grievance, the supervisor of the office engineers explained that the "time spent in the position by each of the incumbents" was the reason for the disparity in salary between the office engineers. When the NSTA again brought the disparity to the attention of the LIRR, Rein Olvet, the Director of Labor Relations, explained that the 1986 transition of the office engineer positions to the Salary Plan, which resulted in Hughes, Fishman and Rinfret all receiving the same salary of $46,936, caused the disparity. Olvet concluded that because the disparity was attributable to the 1986 transition salary increase, an increase for Belfi was not warranted. The LIRR never attempted to equalize plaintiff's salary with that of Fishman and Hughes.

Before selecting Barnett for the position of Office Engineer-Electric Traction, the railroad interviewed nine people. Defendant asserts that it was necessary to pay Barnett $51,249 to induce him to accept the position. An administrator described defendant's policy as follows: "In order to attract union employees to management, LIRR has found it necessary to consider W-2 earnings, which include overtime, in applying the ten percent (10%) promotional increase in accordance with its policy."

Four months after Barnett's promotion, Steve LaRocco, the supervisor of the office engineers at that time, sent a memorandum to Tom Waring, the Vice President for Customer Services, stating that Barnett had been promoted to a rate higher than Belfi's salary. LaRocco requested authorization to adjust Belfi's salary to $54,200, which would have equitably positioned her salary between Hughes' salary of $57,240 and Barnett's of $51,249. The LIRR refused this request declaring that it was not in accordance with the LIRR salary policy relating to inequity increases. However, because of the disparity, the LIRR eventually consented to bring Belfi's salary up to Barnett's, stating that such an increase was allowed by the inequity increase policy. This increase became effective in November or December, 1995 and was made retroactive to January 1, 1995. Yet, Belfi's salary for the period from June 15, 1994 to January 1, 1995 was significantly less than Barnett's.

As a result of the salary disparity, Belfi filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 12, 1995. The Civil Rights Division did not file suit on Belfi's behalf, but by letter notified her that she had the right to sue the LIRR within a specified time. On March 1, 1996 Belfi timely filed suit in the Southern District of New York against the LIRR, Thomas Prendergast as president of the LIRR, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of the State of New York (MTA), and E. Virgil Conway as chairman of the MTA. The disparity between plaintiff's salary and those of Fishman, Hughes, and Barnett formed the basis of her claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and state law. According to plaintiff, she was underpaid from 1989 to 1996, when she received an...

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