Belford v. State
| Decision Date | 17 October 1910 |
| Citation | 131 S.W. 953,96 Ark. 274 |
| Parties | BELFORD v. STATE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clay Circuit Court, Eastern District; Frank Smith Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moore & Bloodworth, for appellant.
1. Since this is a civil action, and both parties reside in the Western District of Clay County, and the cause of action, if any, arose there, the circuit court of Clay County for the Eastern District was without jurisdiction. Acts 1881, p. 21 §§ 3, 5, 6; 1 Words and Phrases, 493; 40 N.Y.S 871-873, 8 A.D. 444; 70 N.C. 137; 51 P. 256; 3 Fed. Cas. 796; 29 Ark. 62.
2. There is no evidence to support the jury's verdict for lying-in expenses and maintenance. There is no evidence that any lying-in expenses were incurred, or that anything was claimed on that account. Kirby's Dig. § 486; 88 Ark. 20 and cases cited; 5 Cyc. 669.
3. The court erred in excluding testimony offered to prove intercourse of prosecutrix with another party besides appellant prior and subsequent to the fall of 1906. Such proof was admissible for the purpose of impeachment, and because, the prior intercourse once proved, the presumption arises that the illicit relation continued during the period in question, while the subsequent intercourse, if proved, strengthens that presumption. 21 N.W. 161; 44 N.W. 824; 124 S.W. 766.
4. Appellant's defense was that he was not the father of the child. In view of the testimony of the witness Compton that he had had intercourse with prosecutrix during the fall of 1906, appellant was entitled to an instruction embodying this defense. 124 S.W. 806. Where a woman has had intercourse with two or more men within the period when, in the ordinary course of nature, the child might have been begotten, she cannot testify who its father is. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L. 882, and note p. 883; 47 Wis. 111.
Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General and William H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee.
1. In bastardy proceedings the general character of the prosecutrix is not in issue; and proof of acts of intercourse, prior to and subsequent to the time of conception is not admissible. 103 Mass. 46; 118 Mass. 602; 61 Ia. 538; 91 Ind. 82; 126 Mass. 176. Acts of intercourse with other men than the defendant are only admissible in evidence when they occurred within the period when the child might have been begotten. 68 Ind. 401.
2. Corroboration of the mother's testimony is not necessary. Kirby's Dig. § 492; Underhill on Crim. Ev. § 529; 5 Cyc. 664; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619; 92 Ark. 200.
3. The court had jurisdiction. The act of February 23, 1881, makes no provision for two county courts, or for any change in the county court, which is held, and has been held since before the passage of the act, in the Eastern District of the county.
This was a proceeding to affiliate a bastard child to the defendant and to secure from the alleged father the lying-in expenses and the support of the child. It was begun in the county court of Clay County, and from an adverse judgment in that court the defendant filed an affidavit and prayer for appeal. The Clay County Court granted the appeal, and directed the clerk of said county court to transmit the papers in the proceedings and copies of the record entries to the circuit court of the Eastern District of Clay County, which was done, and the cause was duly docketed in that court. Thereupon the defendant filed a motion in the circuit court of the Eastern District of Clay County to transfer the cause to the circuit court of the Western District of said county for the reason that the defendant and mother of the child were residents of said Western District of Clay County, and the cause of action, if any, arose in said district. This motion was overruled, and the circuit court of the Eastern District of Clay County proceeded to try the matter, and in pursuance of a verdict of the jury adjudged that the defendant was the father of the child, and should pay the sum of $ 15 for lying-in expenses and three dollars per month for the support of the child.
By an act of the Legislature approved February 23, 1881, entitled "An act to establish separate courts in the county of Clay," it was provided that the county of Clay be divided into two judicial districts, to be called the Eastern District and the Western District; and therein the territory of said county comprising each of said districts was described. It provided that separate circuit, chancery and probate courts should be established in each of said districts. (Acts 1881, p. 21).
By section 3 of said act it was provided that By section 4 of the act it was provided that "the circuit court of the county of Clay, held at the county seat, shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the Eastern District." The act also provided that the circuit court for the Western District of said county should be held at Corning, which is located in said Western District, and that the circuit court for the Eastern District should be held at the county seat of said county, which is located in said Eastern District. The act made no provision, and assumed no power to make any provision, relative to the county court of said county; but by section 16 of said act it was provided "that, as to all matters not within the provisions of this act, the county of Clay shall be one entire and undivided county." And by section 5 of the act it was provided that, "in order to ascertain in which of the respective districts in said county actions in the circuit court shall be returnable and be tried, the said districts for all the purposes of this act shall be considered as separate and distinct counties."
It will thus be seen that the place that had been established by law for the meeting of the Clay County Court prior to and after the passage of this act remained the same; and that was and continued to be at the county seat, which was and is located in the Eastern District of Clay County. A court has been defined to be a place where justice is judicially administered, and in order to constitute a court it must meet at the place that is appointed by law, and the judicial power of such court can be exercised only at such place. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Chaplin v. Holmes, 27 Ark. 414; Graham v. Parham, 32 Ark. 676; Neal v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 227, 4 S.W. 771. So that the county court of Clay County could only exercise the judicial powers confided to its jurisdiction while sitting in the Eastern District of Clay County. The jurisdiction of the Clay County Court extends over the entire territory of Clay County, and by virtue of section 28 of art. 7 of the Constitution it has exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to bastardy in said county, without regard to the district of the county in which the parties might reside or the child be born. Within the territory of the Eastern District of Clay County, therefore, the county court must exercise its original jurisdiction in bastardy matters, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction it takes no note of the districts into which the county is divided; but it has jurisdiction over all bastardy cases arising in any portion of Clay County. By section 489, Kirby's Digest, it is provided that "an appeal will lie from a judgment of the county court to the circuit court in all cases of bastardy, as in cases of appeal from judgments of justices of the peace to circuit courts."
It is to be presumed that a court will exercise no jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits, and so the circuit court of each county will not exercise jurisdiction over matters arising, or over inferior courts established, without the territorial limits of the county. And therefore appeals from the courts of justices of the peace and from county courts lie to the circuit court of the county in which such inferior courts are established and exercise the jurisdiction thereof. Kirby's Digest, §§ 4665, 1310; State v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 66 Ark. 466, 51 S.W. 633.
Now, by section 5 of this act it is provided that in order to ascertain the...
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