Belimed, Inc. v. Bleecker
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-00891-DCN |
| Parties | BELIMED, INC., Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY BLEECKER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This matter is before the court on plaintiff Belimed, Inc.'s (“Belimed”) motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion.
Belimed is a leading supplier of medical and surgical instrument sterilization, disinfection, and cleaning products and services used by hospitals, health care systems, and surgical centers across the world. Belimed's U.S. headquarters are in Ladson, South Carolina. Getinge, Inc. (“Getinge”) is one of Belimed's primary competitors. According to Belimed, both Getinge and Belimed provide equipment to surgical teams and surgical departments with functional operating rooms, and as a result, the two companies frequently target the same customers. However Getinge's business extends beyond making infection control equipment, and unlike Belimed, Getinge also plans and designs equipment for operating rooms, including operating room tables and operating room lighting.
From May 4, 2015 to December 31, 2021, Belimed employed defendant Jeffrey Bleecker (“Bleecker”) as a Senior Planning and Design Manager in Belimed's “West Region.” ECF No. 15-2, Bleecker Aff. ¶ 6. In that role, Bleecker assisted Belimed's sales team in the West Region with planning, designing, and implementing Belimed's infection control equipment for hospitals. While Bleecker worked out of Arizona, he covered several western states in his role, including, in his last two years with Belimed, Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.
At the start of his employment, Bleecker entered into a “Non-disclosure, Non-solicitation, and Non-competition Agreement” with Belimed (the “Agreement”). ECF No. 1-1. Under the terms of the Agreement, Bleecker agreed to use his best efforts to protect Belimed's trade secrets and confidential information and agreed that he would not use or disclose Belimed's confidential information for two years following his termination. Id. § 1(f)-(g). The Agreement also contained a non-competition provision that stated that during Bleecker's employment and for one year following his termination, Bleecker could not, without prior written consent, “directly or indirectly, obtain ownership in, work, advise, consult, or volunteer for or with, in any Competitive Capacity, ” either (i) Getinge or Steris Corporation (“Steris”)-another one of Belimed's competitors-or (ii) “any entity that enters the United States market in direct competition with [Belimed] from the date of this Agreement until [Bleecker's] separation of employment.” Id. § 3. Any breach of any of the restrictive covenants entitled Belimed to extend the time periods contained in the covenants. Section 8 of the Agreement further provided that “[a]ll matters affecting this Agreement are to be governed by, interpreted, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of South Carolina.” Id. § 8.
At the end of 2021, Bleecker allegedly represented to Belimed that he was leaving the company to return to his self-owned general contractor business. Prior to his departure, Bleecker allegedly sent several documents to his personal email, including his employment documents and an internal presentation containing allegedly proprietary information about a new web-based application that Belimed was in the process of developing. On or around January 10, 2022, Bleecker began working as a Healthcare Planning and Design Manager for Getinge. Bleecker joined Getinge's Surgical Workflows group, which was responsible for planning and designing operating room equipment and, according to Bleecker, his role at Getinge is thus “unrelated” to the job he performed at Belimed. Bleecker Aff. ¶ 16-17. On the other hand, Belimed alleges that in his new role at Getinge, Bleecker will necessarily interact with many of the same customers, architects, and general contractors that he worked with at Belimed, and it will not be possible for him to perform his new role without drawing upon the confidential information and goodwill that he built for Belimed.
On March 17, 2022, Belimed filed the instant action against Bleecker, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) violation of the South Carolina Trade Secret Act (“SCTSA”), and (3) violation of the Defend Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et. seq. (“DTSA”).
On the same day, March 17, 2022, Belimed filed its motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 4. On March 21, 2022, the court verbally granted the temporary restraining order until further order from the court. See ECF No. 13. Bleecker responded to the motion on March 23, 2022, ECF No. 15, and Belimed replied on March 24, 2022, ECF No. 18. The court held a hearing on the motion on March 25, 2022. ECF No. 24. As such, the motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for review.
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction exists. In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 1997). When the court decides a personal jurisdiction challenge without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). “In considering the challenge on such a record, the court must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction.” In re Celotex, 124 F.3d at 628 (quoting Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). Still, the court need not “credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences.” Masselli & Lane, PC v. Miller & Schuh, PA, 2000 WL 691100, at *1 (4th Cir. May 30, 2000) (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes federal courts to issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 840 F.Supp.2d 898, 914 (D.S.C. 2011) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips in its favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Metro. Reg'l Info. Sys. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “To obtain a preliminary injunction under the Winter test, a movant must make a ‘clear showing' of [the] four requirements.” Alkebulanyahh v. Nettles, 2011 WL 2728453, at *3 (D.S.C. July 13, 2011); see also Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Winter thus requires that a party seeking a preliminary injunction . . . must clearly show that it is likely to succeed on the merits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has noted, a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
As a threshold matter, Bleecker argues that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over Bleecker and, in essence, moves to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Belimed is incorporated under the laws of Florida with a principal place of business in Ladson, South Carolina. Bleecker is a citizen and resident of Peoria, Arizona.
In evaluating a challenge to personal jurisdiction, the court engages in a two-step analysis. Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 1993). First, it must find that the forum state's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction under the facts presented. Id. Second, if the statute does authorize jurisdiction, then the court must determine if its exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Id. South Carolina's long-arm statute extends its reach to the outer limits allowed by the Due Process Clause. Foster v. Arletty 3 Sarl, 278 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2002); Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (S.C. 2005). Consequently, the two-step inquiry compresses into a single question: whether the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Inteplast Corp., 867 F.Supp. 352, 354 (D.S.C. 1994).
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be either specific or general. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997). For an individual defendant, “the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted). There is no dispute that Bleecker is a domiciliary of Arizona, meaning he is not subject to general jurisdiction in South Carolina.
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, arises when a cause of action is related to the defendant's activities within the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). Exercising specific jurisdiction does...
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