Bell v. Adams, 41143

• Decision Date: 30 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 41143,41143,3
• Citation: Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga.App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. App. 1965)
• Parties: Doris G. BELL v. H. L. ADAMS
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 413

143 S.E.2d 413

111 Ga.App. 819

Doris G. BELL v. H. L. ADAMS.

No. 41143.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

April 30, 1965.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Liability of a parent for the tort of his child in directly inflicting injury on the person of another is governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of his agent or a master for his servant. Liability does not arise out of a mere relationship of parent and child.

2. The liability of a parent for the tort of his child as provided in Code Ann. § 105-113 applies only to acts of the child directed to the damaging of property and to injuries to the person resulting naturally and proximately from those acts. It does not apply to the child's intentional shooting and killing of another.

Doris Gunter Bell sued H. L. Adams to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's minor son, David Bell. The petition alleged: Defendant is the father of Scott Adams, a minor son under the age of seventeen. On July 10, 1962, Scott Adams shot and killed David Bell with one shot from a .22 caliber rifle belonging to defendant. Plaintiff charges that defendant was negligent in 'leaving and possessing a .22 caliber rifle in such manner and condition as to allow the same to come into the possession and control of his minor son' and in 'failing to prevent him minor son from inflicting fatal injuries to petitioner's minor son.' Conclusionary allegations of the petition show that the killing was intentional.

Defendant interposed a demurrer to the petition upon general and special grounds. After hearing, the trial judge entered judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer and dismissing the petition.

Plaintiff excepts to the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing her petition.

G. Hughel Harrison, Lawrenceville, for plaintiff in error.

Merritt & Pruitt, Glyndon, C. Pruitt, Buford, for defendant in error.

BELL, Presiding Judge.

1. 'Liability of a parent for the tort of a child is governed by the ordinary principles of liability of a principal for the acts of his agent, or a master for his servant. It does not arise out of a mere relation of parent and child.' Chastain v. Johns, 120 Ga. 977, 978-979, 48 S.E. 343, 344. This rule still obtains except as modified by Code Ann. § 105-113. This action, however, does not seek to recover against defendant for negligence of his son for which defendant might be liable under agency principles. Instead, it is based upon charges of negligence committed by defendant himself.

Under appropriate construction of the petition and upon the premises of plaintiff's argument to establish liability under Code Ann. § 105-113, the shooting of plaintiff's son was a third person's independent criminal act intervening between defendant's alleged negligence and plaintiff's injury. In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a third person which could not have been reasonably forseen by the defendant, and which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer. Andrews & Company v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300; Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, Inc., 189 Ga. 601, 605, 7 S.E.2d 174, 127 A.L.R. 217; Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga.App. 73, 75, 47 S.E.2d 774; Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga.App. 880, 884, 57 S.E.2d 694.

The latter rule apparently would not apply if the petition had disclosed that the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that the criminal act would be committed. See Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 338, 26 S.E.2d 698. However, the petition contains no averments showing that defendant had any reason to anticipate his son's act of shooting another. This case is controlled adversely to plaintiff by the above authorities and by Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga.App. 455, 161 S.E. 664, in which are discussed issues involved here. See, also, the cases denying parental liability which are mentioned by Judge Eberhardt in Herrin v. Lamber, 106 Ga.App. 91, 93(2), 126 S.E.2d 454, and see...