Bell v. Bauman

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 5:13-CV-11212
• Parties: JOIE RAYSHAWN BELL, Petitioner, v. CATHERINE BAUMAN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

JOIE RAYSHAWN BELL, Petitioner, v. CATHERINE BAUMAN, Respondent.

Civil No. 5:13-CV-11212

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

February 11, 2016

HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Joie Rayshawn Bell, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Kinross Correctional Facility, in Kincheloe, Michigan, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his convictions of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316, felon in possession of a firearm (felon in possession), M.C.L.A. 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), M.C.L.A. 750.227b. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

Here, the evidence included that defendant knocked on the victim's door and, when the door was opened about a foot, defendant pushed into the room brandishing a gun while wearing a bandanna over his face. Defendant's friend, "Coach," then entered the house brandishing a gun and physically attacked the victim in the kitchen while defendant stood in the doorway with his gun aimed at the victim's girlfriend and their children, as well as a friend. After these people were ordered into a back bedroom, a gunshot was heard and then the victim came into the back bedroom covered in blood. A witness, who personally knew both defendant and Coach, saw them leaving the scene of the shooting on foot and then they entered into a vehicle and drove away. After his arrest, defendant admitted to going with Coach to the victim's house for the purpose of beating the victim up for selling drugs to one of Coach's customers. They both had guns.

People v. Bell, No. 305103, 2012 WL 4093757, at * 1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed. Id., lv. den. 493 Mich. 930 (2013).

Petitioner seeks habeas relief on seven grounds:

I. The prosecutor failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Appellant was guilty as an aider and abettor to felony murder.

II. Giving a flight instruction was plain error and denied Mr. Bell a fair trial, where the inference that Appellant fled from the house to avoid detection or because of consciousness of guilt.

III. Mr. Bell was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial, confrontation and effective assistance of counsel, who failed to move for a mistrial after the officer in charge of the case stated hearsay that he received an anonymous tip implicating Mr. Bell from an unidentified unproduced informant.

IV. Due process requires dismissal of the charges, or at the minimum an evidentiary hearing, where the police acted in bad faith by failing to preserve known potentially exculpatory evidence, thus denying Mr. Bell his right to a fair trial.

V. Substantial prosecutorial misconduct denied Mr. Bell a fair trial.

VI. The judge denied Mr. Bell a fair and impartial trial when he manipulated the second degree murder instruction which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict.

VII. Mr. Bell was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his counsel's egregious and prejudicial errors.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in itsindependent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11. "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).

III. Discussion

A. Claim # 1 . The sufficiency of the evidence claim.

Petitioner first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt as an aider and abettor of felony murder because there was insufficient evidence of malice.

It is beyond question that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). But the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is, "whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This inquiry, however, does not require a court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19(internal citation and footnote omitted)(emphasis in the original). Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to supporta conviction, and it is not necessary for the evidence at trial to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F. 3d 987, 992 (6th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted).

More importantly, a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court decision that rejects a sufficiency of the evidence claim simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court's resolution of that claim. Instead, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was an objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). "Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold." Id. For a federal habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a state court conviction, "the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality." Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012).

Under Michigan law, the elements of first-degree felony murder are:

(1) the killing of a human being;

(2) with an intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm is the probable result (i.e., malice);

(3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in the felony murder statute.

Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 789 (6th Cir. 2003)(citing People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 759; 597 N.W. 2d 130 (1999)).

The Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that "[A] jury can properly infermalice from evidence that a defendant set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm." People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 729; 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980); see also Carines, 460 Mich. at 759 (internal citation omitted). "Malice may also be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon." Carines, 460 Mich. at 759.

To support a finding under Michigan law that a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of a crime, the prosecutor must show that:

1. the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person;

2. the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime; and

3. the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement.

Riley v. Berghuis, 481 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2007)(citing Carines, 460 Mich. at 757-58).

Under Michigan law, to convict a defendant of felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must show that someone killed the victim during the underlying predicate felony, that the defendant assisted that person in killing the victim, and that the defendant either intended to commit the crime or he knew when he gave the assistance that the other person intended to commit the crime. See Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(citing People v. Smielewski, 235 Mich. App. 196, 207; 596 N.W. 2d 636, 642 (1999)).

In the present case, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of...