Bell v. Board of Educ. of County of Fayette

Decision Date10 November 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 5:03-0334.,CIV.A. 5:03-0334.
Citation290 F.Supp.2d 701
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
PartiesRoy Edward BELL, Co-Administrator of the Estate of Jeremy Edward Bell, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE COUNTY OF FAYETTE, John Cavalier, George Matthew Edwards, L.A. Coleman, Douglas Leon Kincaid, Sr., K.R. Carson, Edgar W. Friedrichs, Jr., John Doe, and Jane Doe, Defendants.

Wayne D. Inge, Esq., Roanoke, VA, Thomas B. Canterbury, II, Esq., Beckley, WV, Richard A. Peterson, Esq., Peterson & Gula, Greeenville, PA, Timothy P. O'Brien, Esq., Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Eric A. Collins, Esq., Mary Beth Chapman, Esq., Pullin Fowler & Flanagan, Beckley, WV, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, District Judge.

Pending is the motion of all Defendants except Edgar W. Friedrichs, Jr. (Friedrichs) to dismiss this action because its claims are time-barred and because it fails to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, Roy Edward Bell (Bell), is the co-administrator of the estate of his minor son Jeremy Edward Bell (Jeremy), whom he alleges was killed by Defendant Friedrichs on November 8, 1997. According to the Complaint there were "numerous incidents of unlawful assaults upon Jeremy Edward Bell, including, but not limited to, secret druggings, indecent touchings, and sexual molestation, on various dates preceding the date of his death." (Compl. ¶ 1.) Friedrichs was a school teacher and principal employed by the Defendant Fayette County Board of Education (Board) and supervised by Defendants Cavalier, Edwards, Coleman, Kincaid, and Carson, as well as the Jane and John Doe Defendants.1 The Complaint alleges the supervising Defendants had knowledge that Friedrichs was a pedophile and sexual predator, but failed to take any precautions or actions to protect young male elementary students in the school system and that this conduct constituted a policy, custom or practice of deliberate indifference to the students' welfare.

According to the Complaint, on November 7, 1997 Jeremy's mother Kimberly Ann Ball, entrusted her son to Friedrichs for an overnight camping trip. It is also alleged that "[a]t all times relevant hereto, Friedrichs' contacts, relationships, and/or interactions with Jeremy Edward Bell arose from Friedrichs' position as a teacher and/or principal within the Fayette County School system." (Compl. ¶ 12.) Further it is alleged Friedrichs administered amitriptyline and/or chloroform to Jeremy to render him incapable of resistance and then sexually and physically assaulted him. Jeremy died, according to the Complaint, either as a result of head injuries inflicted by Friedrichs and/or as a result of aspiration of his own gastric contents induced by the amitriptyline or chloroform. This action, filed April 15, 2003, is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated Jeremy's constitutional rights, and under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), et seq. (Title IX).

Defendants move to dismiss because 1) the civil rights action is barred by a two-year state statute of limitations2 and 2) Plaintiff has not alleged an affirmative causal link between the supervisors' inaction and either his constitutional or statutory injury.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

Our Court of Appeals has often stated the settled standard governing the disposition of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

In general, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief. In considering a motion to dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996); Gardner v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 939 F.Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.W.Va.1996). It is through this analytical prism the Court evaluates Defendants' motion.

B. Title IX Claim

Under Title IX:

No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Although Congress only provided for administrative enforcement of Title IX's prohibition against discrimination, the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), that Title IX is also enforceable through an implied private right of action. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), the Court held that monetary damages can be recovered in a private action under Title IX. It is well-established that sexual contact by a teacher with a student constitutes discrimination based on sex under Title IX. Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir.1997); see also Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039 (1997).

Title IX prohibits discrimination occurring under any educational program or activity. "Program or activity" is defined to include "all operations of a local educational agency ... or other school system." 20 U.S.C. § 1687. "Local educational agency" includes "a public board of education". 20 U.S.C. § 8801.

In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998), the Supreme Court established the parameters of supervisory liability for such discrimination. The Court rejected employer liability based upon principles of agency that apply in suits for sexual harassment under Title VII, that is, respondeat superior or constructive notice. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Instead, the Court determined that there is no liability on the part of a school district in the absence of actual notice on the part of a school district official having, at a minimum, the authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf. As the Court later explained, "The high standard imposed in Gebser sought to eliminate any risk that the [funding recipient] would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead for its employees' independent actions." Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91, 118 S.Ct. 1989).

Citing Davis, our Court of Appeals explained Title IX liability attaches only where an appropriate official "remains deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge." Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 238 (4th Cir.2001)(citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 642, 119 S.Ct. 1661)(emphasis added in Baynard). The actual knowledge need not be "that a particular student was being abused," but could be satisfied by knowledge that the teacher was "currently abusing one of his students, even without any indication of which student was being abused." Id. at 238 n. 9. This is a high standard, that requires actual knowledge of current abuse by the teacher.

In this case, there is no doubt the Board is an authority invested with the power to take corrective action.3 The Complaint alleges: "the Board and Supervising Defendants had knowledge that Friedrichs ... was a pedophile and a sexual predator with a reported history of sexual abuse of young, male elementary school children enrolled in the Fayette County School system and elsewhere." (Compl. ¶ 6.) The allegation of knowledge Friedrichs was a pedophile and sexual predator is repeated elsewhere in the Complaint, but there are no allegations of knowledge of current abuse. In his response memorandum Plaintiff discusses other evidence he offers to put forward in the event the Complaint's allegations are found insufficient. According to the response, all the Board defendants had either actual or constructive notice that Friedrichs sexually molested one of his students at Powellton Elementary School some time in 1983-84.4 During the time frame closer to or contemporaneous with Jeremy's alleged abuse, Bell also claims there is evidence Friedrichs physically assaulted one of his students at Falls View Elementary School some time in 1995, breaking some of the child's ribs, and all Board Defendants employed at that time had either actual or constructive knowledge. Physical assault is not based on sex, however, so to constitute a Title IX violation. None of the allegations, actual or proffered, is sufficient to state a claim under Title IX in this circuit because there is no claim any Defendants had actual knowledge of current sexual abuse and, accordingly, Plaintiff's Title IX claim must be DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal constitution or laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wrongful death violates the constitutional proviso that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Sexual molestation of a student by a teacher is also a constitutional injury. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 235 n. 4. Bell seeks to hold Friedrichs' supervisors liable for failing to protect Jeremy.

Defendants contend these claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations and that, in any case, Bell has not alleged an affirmative causal link required to state a...

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