Bell v. Conopco

Decision Date22 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-3730,98-3730
Citation186 F.3d 1099
Parties(8th Cir. 1999) DeAudra Bell, Appellant, v. Conopco, Inc., Appellee. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD AND WOLLMAN,1 Circuit Judges, and WOLLE,2 District Judge.

WOLLE, District Judge.

In this employment discrimination lawsuit, the employer contends an earlier arbitration decision in its favor entitles it to summary judgment against its employee. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding the arbitration decision highly persuasive. We reverse and remand, concluding that evidence in the summary judgment record, believed by a jury, might properly lead to a decision different than the arbitration award that favored the employer.

I.

Conopco, Inc., d/b/a Thomas J. Lipton Company (Lipton), discharged its employee DeAudra Bell by following the grievance procedure set forth in a collective bargaining agreement between Lipton and Local 838 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Union). The Union grieved the discharge on behalf of Bell, but an arbitrator decided that Lipton had not violated the collective bargaining agreement. One issue before the arbitrator was whether Lipton had violated the non-discrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement that stated: " There shall be no discrimination . . . with respect to promotion, discharge, or in any other respect because of color [or] race . . . ."3 After the Union's federal lawsuit failed to overturn the arbitrator's decision, Bell filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Missouri Commission on Human Rights, alleging race and retaliation discrimination. Receiving no relief in administrative proceedings, Bell commenced this lawsuit alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), R.S. Mo. 213.010, et seq.

With discovery completed, Lipton filed its motion for summary judgment emphasizing the arbitrator's decision that Lipton had not violated the nondiscrimination clause in discharging Bell. Ruling on the motion, the district court first decided that the arbitral decision did not foreclose Bell from filing her discrimination lawsuit. But the district court then stated it found the arbitrator 's decision "highly persuasive" because evidence supporting Bell's claim had been "actually presented through live testimony at the arbitration hearing," and the court concluded: "Considering the arbitrator's. conclusion that plaintiff had not proven any unlawful discrimination and the weak evidence supporting plaintiff's case, the court deems summary judgment appropriate under these facts."

II.

Lipton first contends the district court need not have reached the merits of this case because the voluntary submission of the discrimination issue to an arbitrator precludes relitigation of that issue in this lawsuit. The district court found otherwise, relying on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (prior arbitral decision regarding a question of discrimination does not foreclose an individual's right to sue under Title VII). We agree the arbitration decision did not bar Bell's Title VII and Missouri Human Rights Act discrimination claims.

Lipton relies primarily on Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Gilmer, however, involved enforceability of arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements, not the question here concerning whether an arbitration decision concerning non-discrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements bars subsequent statutory discrimination lawsuits. Id. at 35. The district court correctly followed Gardner-Denver's holding that Title VII claims are not barred by arbitration decisions. See Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding absolute right to adjudicate suits under Title VII despite binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement).

III.

Lipton next contends we should affirm because Bell generated no genuine issue of fact to prove its reasons for discharging Bell were pretextual and the firing was racially motivated. Bell's federal and state racial discrimination claims both implicate the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 1998); McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 1995).

Summary judgment is warranted when there remain no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review de novo the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Bell to determine whether or not a reasonable person could make inferences supporting plaintiff's claims. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 1995). But neither the district court's function nor ours is to weigh evidence in the summary judgment record to determine the truth of any factual issue; we merely determine whether there is evidence...

To continue reading

Request your trial
136 cases
  • Hall v. Hormel Foods Corporation, 8:98CV304 (D. Neb. 2000)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • March 1, 2000
    ...Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). See also Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (court's function is not to weigh the evidence to determine truth of any factual A genuine issue of material fact exists if: ......
  • Miller v. Wells Dairy, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • March 25, 2003
    ...the truth of any factual issue; we merely determine whether there is evidence creating a genuine issue for trial." Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir.1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). According to Rul......
  • Habben v. City of Fort Dodge
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • January 29, 2007
    ......," E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341; Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir.1999)), and because "intent" is generally a central issue in employment discrimination cases. Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hote......
  • Parada v. Great Plains Intern. of Sioux City, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • April 11, 2007
    .......," E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341; Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir.1999)), and because "intent" is generally a central issue in employment discrimination cases. Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hot......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT