Bell v. Dep't of Def.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-02403 (RC) |
| Parties | YOLANDA BELL, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") [ECF No. 9]. In addition to plaintiff's opposition [ECF No. 26] (with a concomitant request for leave to amend), supplemental opposition1 ("Supp. Opp.") [ECF No. 27] to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff has also filed a motion for reconsideration of stay ("Mot. for Recon.") [ECF No. 23], and a motion to clarify ("Mot. to Cl.") [ECF No. 25]. Plaintiff has also filed a self-described "ex parte" letter ("Ex P. Let.") [ECF No. 28] requesting certain accommodations. Lastly, plaintiff has filed another motion to stay and hold in abeyance ("Sec. Mot. to Stay") [ECF No. 33]. For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's motions are denied.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against her former employer, the U.S. Department of Defense ("DOD"). Complaint ("Compl.") at caption. The complaint contains claims for "constructive suspension" under the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") of 1978, race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16), and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.) and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (42 U.S.C. 126 § 12101, et seq.). Compl. at 1 ¶ 1. Plaintiff originally brought claims of age discrimination, however, she has requested to voluntarily dismiss those claims without prejudice, which the court will allow. Supp. Opp. at 3 ¶ 2. Lastly, plaintiff broadly alleges infringement of her due process rights, as well as a conflation of violations of the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) relevant to HIPPA violations.2 Compl. at 1 ¶ 1.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant discriminated against her based on her race and disabilities by denying her certain accommodations, principally the right to exclusively telework. Id. at 6-19; Def.'s Mot. at 6 ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges that she had been teleworking from home since early 2010 with no issues and that defendant began denying her renewed requests without adequate basis. Compl. at 6 ¶ 1. She believes that she has been retaliated against and denied her accommodations because she filed various administrative grievances. Id. at 1 ¶ 1, 2 ¶ 1, 5 ¶ 3; Supp. Opp. at 6 ¶ 4; 7 ¶ 1.
As a result of the purported intentional denial of disability accommodations for full-time telework, plaintiff alleges that she has been unable to work at all and was therefore "constructively suspended." Compl. at 2 ¶ 1; Supp. Opp. at 2 ¶ 3, 3 ¶ 4. She seeks backpay for unpaid leave she believes she was forced to take from 2012 onward, as well as other miscellaneous monetary compensation. Compl. at 22-23. As a result of the alleged constructive suspension, plaintiff statesthat defendant intentionally refused to pay her for hours worked from 2012 through 2014. Id. She also requests correction of her personnel records. Id. at 22 ¶ 4. On February 6, 2015, plaintiff was removed from her job in federal service for being absent without leave ("AWOL") for an extended period of time. Def.'s Mot. at 10 ¶ 2. This case has been pending for nearly two years, and until just recently, plaintiff had expressly stated that she does not seek to litigate her removal as part of this case. Supp. Opp. at 6 ¶ 1; Sec. Mot. to Stay.
Plaintiff has filed several prior complaints with the Equal Opportunity ("EEO") office, the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") and with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ("Eastern District of Virginia" & "Eastern District"). See MSPB, Washington Regional Office, Initial Decision (July 8, 2016) ("Def.'s Ex. 4"); see also Mot. Hrg. Tr., Bell v. Dept. of Defense, No. 14-cv-470 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2014) ("Def.'s Ex. 12"); Order, Bell v. Dept. of Defense, No. 14-cv-470) (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2014) (ECF No. 59) ("Def.'s Ex. 13"). The opinions issued in the first direct MSPB appeal and in the matter filed before the Eastern District of Virginia both contain painstakingly detailed accounts of the factual background of plaintiff's claims which, in addition to the information provided by the parties herein, the Court has closely reviewed. See id. Therefore, this court will provide a more abbreviated account of the relevant factual background.
Plaintiff is a former employee of DOD. Compl. 1 ¶¶ 1, 3. She began her employment on November 21, 2009 as a GS-14 Program Analyst with the Defense Travel System ("DTS"), within the Business Transformation Agency. Id. As part of her job responsibilities, she inspected completed work from government contractors, which sometimes included in-person meetings and travel. Def.'s Ex. 4 at 3 ¶ 1. She also acted as a technical representative for contract administrationand represented defendant in meetings concerning technical issues. Id. She began working with the DOD's Defense Logistics Agency ("DLA") in July 2011 after DTS was absorbed by DLA. Id.; Compl. at 1 ¶ 3.
On December 7, 2009, plaintiff first requested permission to telework twice per week to care for her dependent adult sister. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 22-23. Defendant granted the request on December 14, 2009. Id. In June 2011, plaintiff indicates that she was granted voluntary leave for an undetermined period of time. Id. at 23.
On January 21, 2011, plaintiff submitted another request to telework twice a week. This time, her basis was medical in nature. Additionally, she stated that surrounding office noises caused her anxiety. This request was approved by defendant on January 24, 2011, again allowing her to telework twice per week. On August 31, 2011, she received an updated telework agreement, still allowing her to telework twice a week. However, the agreement stipulated that telework would be terminated if it adversely affected plaintiff's job performance. The agreement also provided that defendant could require plaintiff to work in-office at any time if project needs required it. Id.
On November 25, 2011, plaintiff requested that she be permitted to increase her telework five days per week. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 23; Compl. at 6 ¶ 3. On January 5, 2012, defendant responded by offering four days per week, rather than the requested five. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 24. The telework agreement was set to run from November 2011 through December 2012. Id.
In February 2012, plaintiff received a successful performance evaluation for the year 2011. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 24. Of course, in 2011, plaintiff was primarily teleworking only two days per week, and was in-office three days per week. In March 2012, concerns began to arise regarding plaintiff's performance. Meetings were held in this regard. Id. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff notifieddefendant that she did not feel safe at work, primarily due to coworkers near her work station. An investigation was held, and no safety issues were found. Nonetheless, defendant offered five different alternative work stations, all of which plaintiff rejected. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 24; Compl. at 6 ¶ 3. Plaintiff disagrees that defendant attempted to move her. Compl. at 8-10. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant's EEO office failed to respond to several complaints. Id.
In the summer and early fall of 2012, plaintiff began submitting medical notes regarding her claimed conditions and requests for additional telework. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 25-6. According to defendant, these notes were insufficient and often contained contradictory information regarding plaintiff's ability to work and the accommodation she required. Id. Plaintiff disagrees that the medical notes were insufficient. Compl. at 11. Plaintiff was also placed on intermittent leave during this time period due to illness. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 25-6. In October 2012, plaintiff returned to work in a limited duty capacity, working approximately 20 hours per week from home. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 26 ¶ 5; Compl. at 9 ¶ 12.
In December 2012, plaintiff requested the renewal of her agreement to telework four days per week. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 27 ¶ 3; Compl. at 11 ¶ 24. Defendant informed plaintiff that it would not renew the agreement without sufficient documentation from her medical providers. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 27 ¶ 4. Again, plaintiff disagrees that the information submitted was insufficient. Compl. at 11-12. This cycle continued; plaintiff sporadically provided additional medical notes, and defendant continually responded requesting additional information. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 27; Compl. at 12. Plaintiff admits that she was hesitant to provide additional medical information because of her concerns for personal privacy. Compl. at 11 ¶ 22.
The then-existing telework agreement expired on December 18, 2012. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 27 ¶ 4, 28 ¶ 1. In January 2013, plaintiff requested additional paid leave because she was sick andunable to work. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 27 ¶ 2; Compl. at 10-11. On January 9, 2013, plaintiff was assessed for performance review for the 2012 calendar year. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 28-30; Compl. at 12 ¶ 29. She was given a successful rating; however, it was noted that her performance had been deteriorating since October 2012. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 28-30. Defendant continued to request additional information regarding plaintiff's requests for additional leave and/or telework. Id. at 30. Plaintiff agrees with these stated facts, though she takes issue with defendant's need for additional medical information. Compl. at 12-13. She also believes she was placed on leave without pay during this time as a form of retribution for filing EEO complaint(s). Compl. at 3 ¶ 2, 13 ¶ 31. This cycle continued throughout the winter of 2013. Def.'s Ex. 12 at 30; Compl. at 12-13.
In February 2013, defendant denied plaintiff's request to telework four days per week, again...
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