Bell v. Ercole

• Decision Date: 21 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 05 CV 4532(ERK),05 CV 4532(ERK)
• Parties: GEORGE BELL, Petitioner, v. ROBERT E. ERCOLE, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

GEORGE BELL, Petitioner,

v. ROBERT E. ERCOLE, Superintendent,Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. 05 CV 4532(ERK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: October 21, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM

KORMAN, District Judge.

In this case, Bell v. Ercole, No. 05-4532, 2008 WL 2484585 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2008), I denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994) with the direction to:

(1) Analyze each of the challenged evidentiary rulings under the analytical framework set forth in Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 242-44 (2d Cir.2006);

(2) Discuss more thoroughly whether the collective impact of the challenged evidentiary rulings considered together with the prosecutor's summation warrants habeas relief; and

(3) Clarify the evidentiary basis for the "confession of an accomplice" it referenced, e.g., 2008 WL 2484585, at *18, as well as the weight this "confession" received in its harmless error analysis.

Bell v. Ercole, No. 08-3539, 2010 WL 726023, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2010).

OVERVIEW

In Hawkins v. Costello, the Second Circuit held that, "[i]n considering whether the exclusion of evidence violated a criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense, we start with the propriety of the trial court's evidentiary ruling." Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (quotations omitted). While Hawkins acknowledged that "habeas corpus relief does not lie forerrors of state law," id. at 244 (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)), including erroneous evidentiary rulings, it held that inquiry into "possible state evidentiary law errors at the trial level assists us in ascertaining whether the appellate division acted within the limits of what is objectively reasonable." Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (quotations omitted). Moreover, "[i]f potentially exculpatory evidence was erroneously excluded, we must look to 'whether the omitted evidence [evaluated in the context of the entire record] creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.'" Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (quoting Justice v. Hoke, 90 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)). On the other hand, if the evidentiary ruling was correct, "[w]e consider whether the evidentiary ruling was arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve." Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). Finally, Hawkins observed that, "even before AEDPA required a more deferential review, the Supreme Court had a 'traditional reluctance to impose constitutional constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts.'" Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has "never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted." Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690).

Unlike Hawkins, which involved the application of a hearsay rule, the present case does not involve the application of a clear rule of law. Instead, the eleven evidentiary rulings challenged turn largely on a broad discretionary rule that depends on an evaluation of whether the exclusion of evidence of varying degrees of relevance constituted an abuse of discretion on the grounds that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect—to use a short hand for the various considerations that are encompassed within the term prejudicial effect, such as"its potential to mislead or distract the jury." Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2011).

Abuse of discretion has been defined variously as "exceeding the bounds of reason or disregard of the rules of principles of law or practice," a decision "no reasonable person" could reach or one that leaves the appellate court with a "definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment." This most lenient oversight is applied to decisions to admit or exclude evidence . . . .

7 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 27.5(e) (3d ed. 2007) (citing cases). Indeed, one of the rulings at issue here involves the exclusion of expert testimony of the kind which the Second Circuit has held "rests soundly within the discretion of the trial court and shall be sustained unless manifestly erroneous." United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).

Judge Lynch, writing for the panel in Watson, explained that in such a case, "the question we must answer to determine if [petitioner] is entitled to habeas relief is not simply whether the trial court abused its discretion." Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d at 508. Rather, the question is "whether the determination of the [state appellate court] that there was no abuse of discretion was an 'unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law.'" Id. (citing Renico v. Lett, __ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, "[w]here state court decisions are guided only by general constitutional standards (as opposed to specific, bright-line rules), the 'unreasonable application' standard is particularly difficult to meet, because such decisions are given a particularly generous benefit of the doubt." Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d 501, 508 (2d Cir. 2011).

Indeed, in Watson, there was a strong suggestion that the trial judge "excluded evidence based on a finding that the cross-examination on the basis of the [evidence at issue] was entirely without probative value." Id. at 511. While the panel in Watson was not persuaded that this wasthe case, Judge Lynch again observed that, "[b]ecause courts have 'considerable leeway' to balance [various] factors in evidentiary decisions, see Gueits v. Kirkpatrick, 612 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2010), and because 'the type of evidentiary ruling challenged in this case is afforded wide latitude by the Constitution,'" Watson, 640 F.3d at 512 (quoting Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2003)), the issue is not "whether we would have pursued the same course" as the trial judge. Watson, 640 F.3d at 512. Instead, "[c]ombining the standard for restricting cross-examination with the AEDPA standard, in order to grant [a petitioner's] habeas petition we would have to conclude not only that the trial court abused its broad discretion by precluding cross-examination . . . about the [the evidence at issue], but also that the Appellate Division could not reasonably have determined that the [evidence] would have been excludable had the trial court properly applied standard rules of evidence' concerning admissibility." Watson, 640 F.3d at 510. Stated another way, in order to grant relief, a habeas court would have to find that the

trial court so clearly abused its discretion that the state appellate court's failure to find an abuse of discretion was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir.2001) ("[I]n making the 'reasonable application' determination, [federal courts] look to the result of a state court's consideration of a criminal defendant's claim . . . . [D]eficient reasoning will not preclude AEDPA deference, . . . at least in the absence of an analysis so flawed as to undermine confidence that the constitutional claim has been fairly adjudicated.").

Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d 501, 512 (2d Cir. 2011). See also Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011).

This standard is particularly pertinent because "Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Confrontation Clause establishes only general rules that give trial judges 'wide latitude' to restrict cross-examination . . . subject only to the equally general requirement that the defense be given a 'meaningful opportunity' to test the credibility of prosecution witnesses." Watson, 640F.3d at 509 (citations omitted). A similar standard applies to the exclusion of evidence, which is rooted, in part, in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). Again, as Hawkins itself observed, the Supreme Court has "never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted." Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690); see also Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (2d Cir. 1993).

Against this backdrop, I turn to the evidentiary rulings the Court of Appeals asked me to reexamine in light of Hawkins. Bell divided these rulings into three categories. At the end of my discussion of the evidentiary issues in my original opinion, I observed that, while the trial judge made a number of evidentiary rulings, none of which, as Bell acknowledged in his Appellate Division brief and his original habeas petition, independently warrant upsetting his conviction, there remains the argument that, taken together, these rulings deprived the defendant of a fair trial. While I acknowledged that this argument was not without some force, I ultimately rejected it because: (1) some of the erroneous rulings were not significant in terms of their impact on the trial; (2) others were harmless because other evidence was admitted that made up for the evidence that was excluded; (3) others were ultimately overcome by the corroboration provided by the cumulative effect of other evidence in the case; and (4) not all of the rulings were erroneous, even though I rejected Bell's arguments on the alternative ground that the errors were harmless. In its order of remand, the Court of Appeals said that it was unable to analyze this conclusion "because of the vagueness of its reasoning."...