Bell v. F.J. Boutell Driveaway Co.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1985
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 71697,71834
• Citation: 141 Mich.App. 802,369 N.W.2d 231
• Parties: William BELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. F.J. BOUTELL DRIVEAWAY CO., a corporation, and Old Republic Insurance Co., a foreign corp., Defendants-Appellants. Carl JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANR FREIGHT SYSTEM and Associated Truck Lines, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 231

369 N.W.2d 231

141 Mich.App. 802

William BELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. F.J. BOUTELL DRIVEAWAY CO., a corporation, and Old Republic

Insurance Co., a foreign corp., Defendants-Appellants.

Carl JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANR FREIGHT SYSTEM and Associated Truck Lines, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Docket Nos. 71697, 71834.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 10, 1984.

Decided April 15, 1985.

Released for Publication June 19, 1985.

[141 Mich.App. 803] Marshall Lasser, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Dice, Sweeney, Sullivan, Feikens, Hurbis & Foster, P.C. by Jack E. Vander Male, Detroit, for defendants-appellants ANR Freight System and Associated Truck Lines, Inc.

James R. Stegman, P.C. by James R. Stegman, Southfield, for defendants-appellants F.J. Boutell Driveaway Co. and Old Republic Ins. Co.

Before HOOD, P.J., and BEASLEY and MARUTIAK ^*, JJ.

HOOD, Presiding Judge.

Defendants appeal by leave granted in these consolidated no-fault insurance cases. Defendants F.J. Boutell Driveaway Co., and Old Republic Insurance Company appeal from a May 31, 1983, order denying their motion for summary judgment. ANA Freight Systems and Associated Truck Lines (ATL) appeal from a June 1, 1983, order granting plaintiff Carl Jones's motion for reconsideration.

The question presented in these cases is the interpretation of an amendment to the parked vehicle provision in the no-fault act, M.C.L. § 500.3106; M.S.A. § 24.13106. The amended provision states (the pertinent amendatory language is emphasized:

"(1) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any of the following occur:

"(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.

"(b) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was a direct result of physical contact with the equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used or property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.

"(c) Except as provided in subsection (2) for an injury sustained in the course of employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle, the injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.

"(2) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle if benefits under the worker's disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Complied Laws, are available to an employee who sustains the injury in the course of his or her employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle unless the injury arose from the use or operation of another vehicle."

Defendants argue that the terms loading and unloading in subsection (2) should be interpreted broadly to include activity that is preparatory to the actual lifting or lowering of goods. Plaintiffs argue that the terms loading and unloading in subsection (2) should be interpreted narrowly to exclude activity preparatory to the actual lifting or lowering of goods.

We conclude that the terms loading and unloading in subsection (2) should be interpreted to encompass the activities at issue in these cases: activity that was preparatory to the actual lifting or lowering of goods.

I

Plaintiff Bell hauled and delivered new cars as a truckdriver-employee of F.J. Boutell. Old Republic insured Boutell for Michigan no-fault benefits.

On June 23, 1982, Bell drove a load of cars to a car dealership. He began to lower a portion of his tractor-trailer in preparation for unloading the cars he was delivering. Bell removed chains securing a car to the trailer and was walking on the trailer to another location to remove the chains on the other axle of the car when he slipped and fell on hydraulic fluid leaking from the trailer.

Bell was injured from his fall and received workers' compensation benefits for the period of time he was disabled from the injury. On October 6, 1982, Bell requested no-fault benefits. Old Republic denied him those benefits, stating that subsection 3106(2) precluded them. Republic asserted that Bell was injured while performing activities for which he received Michigan workers' compensation benefits within the meaning of that section.

Bell filed his action for no-fault benefits on March 16, 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment, again relying on subsection 3106(2). The trial court denied the motion because it found that a material question of fact remained regarding whether Bell was unloading within the meaning of subsection 2 when he suffered his injury.

Plaintiff Jones worked as a truckdriver for ANR Freight and ATL. On March 2, 1982, he drove a truck to a location in Ohio to make a delivery. Jones injured himself when he pushed or pulled some freight from the middle of the tractor-trailer to the rear in order to position it for a dockworker to lower the freight with a fork-lift. Jones, a resident of Ohio, received Ohio workers' compensation benefits while he was disabled from the injury. ATL, the owner of the tractor-trailer, was a self-insurer providing Michigan no-fault coverage.

After ATL's no-fault insurer denied benefits to Jones, he filed this action for Michigan no-fault benefits. ATL answered that Jones was not entitled to those benefits

because subsection 3106(2) prohibited them. On December 14, 1982, ATL moved for an order to compel Jones to file a claim for Michigan workers' compensation benefits so that the Michigan Workers' Compensation Bureau could determine whether Jones's claim was compensable in Michigan. The trial court granted the [141 Mich.App. 807] motion and entered an order on April 4, 1983, requiring Jones to file a Michigan workers' compensation claim. On April 28, 1983, Jones moved for reconsideration, arguing that, whether or not he could receive Michigan workers' compensation benefits, he was entitled to no-fault benefits because he was not "unloading" within the meaning of subsection 3106(2) when he was injured. The trial court agreed.

II

Prior to January 1, 1982, § 3106 stated, in pertinent part:

"Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any of the following occur:

* * *

* * *

"(b) The injury was a direct result of physical contact with * * * property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.

"(c) The injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into or alighting from the vehicle."

Had the above statute been in effect at the time of plaintiffs' injuries they would have been entitled to workers' compensation benefits pursuant to subsection (c). Plaintiffs attempted to avoid what appears to be the consequences of the new subsection 2, see Bauman v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 133 Mich.App. 101, 103, fn. 1, 348 N.W.2d 49 (1984), by asking this Court to interpret "loading" or "unloading" in that subsection to mean that part of the unloading process during which claimants are in physical contact with property being lifted onto or lowered from the insured vehicle. We decline to so limit the terms "loading" and "unloading" in subsection 3106(2).

In Dembinski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 76 Mich.App. 181, 256 N.W.2d 69 (1977), this Court recognized that the terms "loading" and "unloading" in motor vehicle insurance contracts have been broadly construed to encompass the period during which an object was removed from its place of rest and was carried to and placed in a vehicle. Id., p. 183, 256 N.W.2d 69, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F.Supp. 893 (E.D.Mich.1961). However, the contract language at issue in Dembinski was similar to that found in subsection 3106(1)(b) of the no-fault act. Dembinski found that language to limit loading and unloading to actual physical contact with property. In cases interpreting former subsection 3106(1)(b), panels of this Court have relied upon Dembinski for interpretation of that statutory proviso. See Block v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 111 Mich.App. 106, 109, 314 N.W.2d 536 (1981), and Royston v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 130 Mich.App. 602, 344 N.W.2d 14 (1983), lv. den. 419 Mich. 867 (1984). Because Dembinski, Block, and Royston address language that is found in subsection 3106(1)(b), "property being lifted onto or lowered in the loading or unloading process", those cases do not address interpretation of the general terms "loading" and "unloading" unembellished by the limiting language found in subsection (1)(b). Therefore, despite plaintiff's argument contrariwise, those cases are not dispositive.

Nevertheless, as the Court in Dembinski recognized, the general terms "loading" and "unloading" as they appear in insurance contracts have been interpreted by federal courts as meaning the complete operation of loading or unloading, or the entire process of loading and unloading. This broad interpretation encompasses activities preparatory to the actual loading or unloading or delivery. See Valdez, supra, Selective Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 213 F.Supp. 3 (E.D.Mich.1963), St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 215 F.Supp. 709 (W.D.Mich.1963), aff'd 336 We decide to interpret the terms "loading" and "unloading" in subsection 3106(2) broadly because we find that the Legislature intended that interpretation. The fundamental goal of interpreting statutory language is to identify and give effect to legislative intent. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co. v. Grand Ledge Mobile Home Park, 400 Mich. 184, 253 N.W.2d 646 (1977). The first step in ascertaining that intent is to review the language in the statute itself. Spears v. City of Hazel Park, 131 Mich.App. 457, 461, 346 N.W.2d 340 ...