Bell v. Haley
| Decision Date | 25 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A.2:95CV913-T.,Civ.A.2:95CV913-T. |
| Citation | 437 F.Supp.2d 1278 |
| Parties | Randy Turpin BELL, Petitioner, v. Michael HALEY, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Wolfe, Washington, DC, C. Stuart Magargee, Deborah P. Nason, Keith Edeard Smith, Otis Daniel Ansa, Piper, Marbury, Rudnick & Wolfe, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.
Jack W. Willis, George A. Martin, Jr., Beth Jackson Hughes, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Respondents.
In this habeas proceeding bought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, petitioner Randy Turpin Bell challenges his conviction and death sentence in an Alabama state court for capital murder. An evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases was held and evidence was taken on the claims that had not been defaulted or already denied on the merits. Bell v. Haley, 2001 WL 1772140 (M.D.Ala.2001). Bell now maintains four related grounds for relief based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Specifically, Bell asserts these claims: (1) the State improperly suppressed a pretrial statement by Joseph C. Austin, Jr.; (2) the State improperly failed to disclose a deal with Austin for his testimony at trial; (3) the State failed to correct Austin's perjurious or misleading testimony; and (4) the State failed to disclose a deal with Michael Joe Hubbard for his testimony at Bell's trial. For the reasons that follow, the court finds that Bell is entitled to relief as to his death sentence but not as to his conviction.
This opinion will proceed as follows. First, the court will set forth the procedural background of the case and the governing legal standard. Then the court will describe the factual background of the investigation into Bell's trial and conviction. Next, the court will make factual findings relevant to Bell's claims. Finally, the court will analyze Bell's claims in light of its factual findings.
The procedural history of this case is recounted in the court's prior opinion, Bell v. Haley, 2001 WL 1772140 (M.D.Ala. 2001), and will be simply summarized here. Bell was convicted on May 5, 1983, of capital murder, namely murder during the commission of robbery in the first degree, for the death of Charles Mims in violation of 1975 Ala.Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2). The jury recommended by a vote of ten-to-two that Bell be sentenced to die, and the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation.
On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Bell's conviction and death sentence, Bell v. State, 475 So.2d 601 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), as did the Alabama Supreme Court. Ex parte Bell, 475 So.2d 609 (Ala.1985). After the denial of his direct appeal, Bell petitioned the state court for a writ of error coram nobis. The writ was denied by the trial court, and the denial was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Bell v. State, 518 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari, Bell v. State, No. 87-296 (Ala.1988), as did the United States Supreme Court. Bell v. Alabama, 486 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 2024, 100 L.Ed.2d 611 (1988).
In 1990, Bell filed two new petitions for collateral relief in state court. Both petitions were denied by the trial court, and both denials were upheld by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Bell v. State, 565 So.2d 1244 (Ala.Crim.App.1990); Bell v. State, 593 So.2d 123 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991). The Alabama Supreme Court denied review in both cases.
After exhausting his state remedies, Bell filed this suit in federal court on July 7 1995, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. During stage I of the proceedings, the court determined which of Bell's claims could be heard on the merits. Bell v. Haley, 2000 WL 33682804 (M.D.Ala.2000). In stage II the court reached the merits of many of those claims, and set an evidentiary hearing to hear additional evidence on Bell's Brady/Giglio claims. Bell v. Haley, 2001 WL 1772140 (M.D.Ala.2001). The court will now decide the merits of those claims.
This court's habeas review of state-court proceedings is governed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). In its earlier opinions, the court held that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which placed significant restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus relief, did not apply to this case because it was filed before April 24, 1996, when AEDPA was enacted. Bell, 2001 WL 1772140, *2; Bell, 2000 WL 33682804, *2. This holding was based on Supreme Court's opinion in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), which held that chapter 153 of AEDPA, which includes § 2254, the provision at issue in this case, applied only to cases filed after AEDPA's effective date.
On July 23, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in Kelley v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2962, 162 L.Ed.2d 906, 73 U.S.L.W. 3540 (2005) The Kelley court stated that a district court was wrong to assume that AEDPA did not apply retroactively to a habeas petition filed in a capital case before AEDPA was passed. Id. at 1340-1341. While chapter 153 is nonretroactive, the court said, parts of § 2254 might apply retroactively through AEDPA's chapter 154, which is retroactive and which incorporates some parts of chapter 153 by reference. Id. at 1339-1340. Chapter 154 applies only if the State that sentenced the petitioner meets the so-called "opt-in" criteria of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261(b) and (c) by establishing a mechanism for the appointment and payment of competent counsel in State post-conviction hearings for prisoners under capital sentences. Id.
In light of this holding, this court asked the parties for additional briefing on the question of whether Alabama has satisfied the opt-in provisions of § 2261(b) and (c) such that AEDPA might apply retroactively to this case. The State responded in its brief that because "no court has ruled that Alabama has satisfied the opt-in provisions", . . . "AEDPA . . . cannot apply retroactively to the instant case."
Thus, § 2254, as it was before it was amended by AEDPA, governs this case.1 Under this standard, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct unless one of the eight enumerated exceptions in § 2254(d) applies.2 However where one of these exceptions does apply, the state court's factfinding is not presumed correct, and the petitioner must establish "the facts necessary to support his claim by only a preponderance of the evidence." Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1335. Questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, in contrast, are subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 861 (11th Cir.1999). Nonetheless, when a mixed question of law and fact turns on a fact found by the state court, the finding of the state court deserves deference. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
Charles Mims, of Clanton in Chilton County, Alabama, disappeared on December 14, 1981, and has not been heard from since; his body has never been found; the weapon allegedly used to kill him has not been found; and no forensic physical evidence has been found that would reveal that he is dead or how he died. Randy Bell, a.k.a. Randy Cole, was convicted of Mims's murder based mainly on the testimony of two witnesses: Michael Joe Hubbard, who testified that he saw Bell rob and kill Mims and that he himself was un unwilling participant in the murder; and Joseph C. Austin, Jr., who testified that, on the night of the murder, Bell told him that he and Hubbard had robbed Mims and showed him the proceeds of the robbery. At the time he testified in the Bell case, Hubbard was represented by attorney Robert Bowers, Sr. in another, unrelated case.3
The primary investigators into the disappearance of Charles Mims were Benny Mims, an investigator for the Chilton County Sheriffs Department, and John Perdue, an agent with the Alabama Bureau of Investigation (ABI).4 The prosecutors on the case were Janice Clardy and William R. Hill, Jr.5 Clardy was the Chief Assistant District Attorney of the 19th Judicial District of Alabama, which encompasses Chilton County; Hill was the District Attorney for the neighboring 18th Judicial District in Alabama.
At Bell's trial, Hubbard testified that Bell asked him to call Charles Mims on December 14, 1981, because Bell had a television and some firearms to sell to Mims. At that time, Hubbard was 18 years old, and Bell was 26 years old. Mims had purchased stolen property from Hubbard in the past. Early in December 1981, Hubbard testified, Mims had refused to buy some stolen goods that Bell had tried to sell him. Hubbard also testified that Bell had commented about the fact that Mims often carried large amounts of money.
Hubbard contacted Charles Mims around dusk on December 14 and arranged a meeting at the West End Washeteria in Clanton. Mims was at a grocery store when he received the call from Hubbard. Helen Smith, the grocery store owner, testified that Mims received a call and then told her he was going to meet the "cowman" 30 minutes later to discuss buying a television and some guns. Smith said she knew that the "cowman" meant two African-American men who drive a green-and-white Cadillac. Bell and Hubbard are both African-American, and Bell drove a green-and-white Cadillac. Smith also testified that, before he left the store, Mims took a wad of money out of his wallet, and Smith estimated that he had about $ 600 or $ 700.
Hubbard testified that he and Bell...
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...that she did not disclose the true facts to the prosecution, her knowledge of this evidence was imputed to the prosecutor. See Bell v. Haley, 437 F.Supp.2d 1278 1307 (M.D.Ala.2005) (finding that “[e]ven when evidence known to police is never turned over to the prosecutors, knowledge of the ......