Bell v. Hart
| Decision Date | 06 August 1920 |
| Citation | 223 S.W. 996 |
| Parties | BELL v. HART. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; F. H. Heiskell, Chancellor.
Action between Ernest S. Bell and Lillian Hart. From decree rendered, the former appeals. Affirmed.
E. Gates, of Memphis, for appellant.
W. C. Dewey and A. B. Knipmeyer, both of Memphis, for appellee.
The validity of chapter 126 of the Acts of 1919 is attacked in this case on the ground that the act contains two subjects in violation of section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution.
The title of the act is:
"An act to remove disabilities of coverture from married women, and to extend to them the statutes of limitation and to exempt to them a homestead."
Without undertaking to quote the entire statute, it may be said that by section 1, all the common-law disabilities of married women are removed, and by section 4 it is provided that a homestead of real estate in the possession of a married woman shall be exempt from execution to her, and shall inure at her death to the benefit of her minor children. Other sections of the statute are not material to this investigation.
It is urged that the act undertakes to legislate respecting married women and also respecting homestead, and it is said that these are distinct subjects in the law, and therefore the attempted legislation is upon distinct subjects in contravention of the section of the Constitution above mentioned.
We do not think this act can be successfully impeached on this theory.
The two-subject clause of the Constitution was intended to prevent a combination in the same act of laws upon wholly different subjects; to avoid the union of incongruous matters in one statute; to secure unity of purpose in legislative enactments. State v. Lasater, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 584; State ex rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 71 Tenn. (3 Lea) 79; Garvin v. State, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 162; Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 178, 16 S. W. 559; State v. Brown, 103 Tenn. 449, 53 S. W. 727; Railroad v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S. W. 460; Kizer v. State, 140 Tenn. 582, 205 S. W. 423.
In these cases and others, statutes have been upheld which upon first inspection appear to have attempted legislation in regard to different matters. Such matters at least were separately mentioned, both in caption and body. An examination of the several statutes, however, disclosed that the matters included in each were related, and that the general purpose of each statute was expressed in its title. It made no difference if such general purpose was expressed in a compound sentence in the caption.
For example, in State ex rel. Morrell v. Fickle, supra, the title of the act under investigation was, "an act to establish a chancery and law court at Bristol in the county of Sullivan." The body of the act then provided for the organization of a chancery court at Bristol, and defined its jurisdiction and also provided for a law court at Bristol and defined its jurisdiction. It was insisted that this act contained two subjects. The court, however, said that a proper construction of the act would be "to hold that the general subject is the...
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