Bell v. McAdory
| Decision Date | 11 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No.: 12-3138-CSB-DGB,: 12-3138-CSB-DGB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
| Parties | TIMOTHY BELL, Plaintiff, v. EUGENE MCADORY and TARRY WILLIAMS, Defendants. |
TIMOTHY BELL, Plaintiff,
v.
EUGENE MCADORY and TARRY WILLIAMS, Defendants.
No.: 12-3138-CSB-DGB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
August 11, 2014
ORDER
COLIN S. BRUCE, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court on Defendants Eugene McAdory and Tarry Williams' motion for summary judgment. As explained more fully infra, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact that must be determined by a trier of fact and because Defendants have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the three claims asserted against them by Plaintiff Timothy Bell.
Plaintiff Timothy Bell is, and was at all relevant times, a civil detainee currently housed at the Treatment and Detention Facility operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services in Rushville, Illinois ("Rushville"). From June 4, 2010, through July 1, 2010, Defendant Tarry Williams was a Security Therapy Aide IV at Rushville, and he served as a zone supervisor of Rushville's Special Management Unit and infirmary. Defendant Eugene McAdory was Rushville's Security Director from June 4, 2010, through July 1, 201.
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On June 4, 2010, Bell returned to Rushville after serving a four-year sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") for aggravated battery after he assaulted a security aide at Rushville. After returning to Rushville, Bell, like all other residents at Rushville, was required to participate in an initial seventy-two hour intake process. During the intake process, a new or returning resident would be assigned a room in the Special Management Unit and given few amenities. In addition, new or returning residents would be interviewed by security and treatment staff. If the resident were non-cooperative during the initial intake process or if the resident posed a threat to himself, security personnel, or other residents, the Security Director or the Program Director could order that resident to remain in the Special Management Unit until he no longer presented a threat and was cooperative. McAdory developed this intake immersion process based upon his experience as the Security Director at Rushville and based upon his experience with IDOC.
Upon his return to Rushville, Bell was placed in a room in the Special Management Unit where he had clothes, a bed, bed sheets, a blanket, a toilet, a sink, and personal hygiene products. However, Bell refused to participate in the intake process.1 Specifically, Bell refused to be interviewed by staff, and he displayed hostility toward the staff, including making threats against the staff.
Accordingly, McAdory ordered Bell to remain in the Special Management Unit until he no longer presented a threat to himself or to others. Nevertheless, Bell's hostility continued. On June 8 and again on June 23, 2010, Bell refused to have his photograph taken for identification purposes. In response to the directive to have his photograph taken, Bell threatened to harm
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Williams. On June 23, 2010, staff reported that Bell had flooded his room.2 In addition, Bell placed paper over the observation window in his room so that staff could not see him.
In response to Bell's actions, McAdory ordered Bell be removed from the Special Management Unit and that he be placed in the infirmary so that he could more easily be observed through the larger observation windows in the infirmary. When the extraction team arrived at his room, Bell refused to comply with the team's order that he place his hands in the chuckhole to his room so that he could be placed in restraints. Accordingly, the extraction team forcibly removed Bell from his room and transported him to the infirmary. McAdory ordered that Bell have no clothing or other property while he was in the infirmary to prevent Bell from covering the observation windows and to prevent Bell from harming himself or others.
On July 1, 2010, Bell agreed to follow Rushville's rules and agreed to participate in Rushville's intake procedures. Thereafter, Bell was given clothing and was transferred to a new room.
On May 28, 2012, Bell filed the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that McAdory and Williams violated his constitutionally protected rights. On June 28, 2012, the Court determined, after conducting a merit review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that Bell's Complaint stated three causes of action: (1) a claim that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based upon the conditions of his confinement; (2) a claim that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based upon his extended stay in the Special Management Unit and his placement in segregation in the infirmary; and (3) a claim that Defendants exercised excessive force against him in violation of
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his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when he was forcibly removed from his room.
Defendants have now filed the instant motion arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact that need to be decided by the trier of fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bell responds by arguing that Defendants have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Instead, Bell asks the Court to enter judgment on the pleadings in his favor.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995). The moving party has the burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). "[A] party moving for summary judgment can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on which that party has the burden of proof." Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish
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that there is a genuine triable issue; he "'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 25657 (1986)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is not sufficient to oppose successfully a summary judgment motion; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
A. Defendants did not violate Bell's due process rights based upon the conditions of his confinement.
Bell asserts three ways or manner in which Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as they relate to the conditions of his confinement. First, Bell complains that being placed in the Special Management Unit for seventy-two hours upon his return to Rushville was unconstitutional. In fact, Bell contends that the entire intake procedures developed by McAdory are unlawful in that the Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the procedures that must be employed when a new resident arrives at Rushville, not McAdory's self-determined intake procedures. Second, Bell claims that Defendants' decision to use an extraction team to remove him from his room on June 23, 2010, violated his due process rights. Third, Bell asserts that the extreme cold in the infirmary, especially given the fact that he was totally naked while there, violated his due process rights and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
As for his claim regarding the extraction team, that claim will be discussed more fully infra. However, the Court finds that the use of an extraction team to remove Bell from his room
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did not violate his due process rights in light of his admission that he was being belligerent and was threatening staff.
As for his claim that his placement in the Special Management Unit for seventy-two hours failed to comply with Illinois law and, therefore, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, Bell is simply incorrect as a matter of law that Defendants' alleged violations of the Illinois Administrative Code establishes his case....
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