Bell v. McDonald
| Decision Date | 27 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:14CV188 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | TEMPIE ANN BELL, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. |
Presently before this court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting Memorandum. (Docs. 26, 27.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. 32), and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 38). This court has carefully reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Plaintiff's Response, and Defendant's Reply. For the reasons stated below, this court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In light of this finding, Defendant's motion to withdraw and motion to continue (Doc. 44) will be denied as moot.
Plaintiff Tempie Ann Bell ("Plaintiff") commenced this action by filing a Complaint with this court on March 4, 2014, against Defendant Robert A. McDonald, Secretary of Department of Veterans Affairs ("Defendant"). (Complaint (Doc. 1).) Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint on June 10, 2014. (Doc. 5.) This court granted Plaintiff's motion on September 29, 2014. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on October 11, 2014. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted four causes of action: (1) wrongful discrimination and harassment because of a disability, (2) retaliation, (3) breach of contract based on Defendant's alleged violation of a Settlement Agreement, and (4) a request to enjoin Defendant from collecting any tuition assistance money from Plaintiff. (Id. at 7-9.)
While Plaintiff's motion to amend was pending, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of action with supporting Memorandum. (Docs. 6, 7.) Per this court's September 29, 2014 Order (Doc. 10)), and subsequent to the filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 11), Defendant filed a Notice to the court (Doc. 13) requesting that this court rule on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) as if it had been filed subsequent to the Amended Complaint.
On June 1, 2015, this court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order and granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff'sThird and Fourth Cause[s] of Action, but allowed Plaintiff the right to file, within ten days from the entry of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, an amended complaint for the limited purpose of waiving all damages in excess of $10,000 in Plaintiff's third cause of action. (Doc. 15 at 17.) This court further ordered that if Plaintiff did not amend her complaint, the third cause of action would be dismissed without prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Notice of Election and chose not to amend her complaint. (Doc. 16.)
As such, only two of Plaintiff's claims remain: (1) discrimination and harassment based on disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and (2) retaliation. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶¶ 22-27). Defendant has moved for summary judgment on both remaining claims. (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff has responded. (Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Resp.") (Doc. 32); and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 38).
Viewed in light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence shows the following:
Plaintiff was an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"), with her primary place of employment at the VAMedical Center in Durham, North Carolina ("DVAMC"). (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 2.) Plaintiff worked as a Staff Nurse, an Assistant Nurse Manager, and a Lead Charge Nurse for a number of years at DVAMC. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") (Doc. 27) at 3; Ex. C ("Resume") (Doc. 27-4) at 3-4.)
As a result of an earlier discrimination suit in this district, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") in 2005.1 (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 4.) Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff was assigned a new position at DVAMC as a diabetes educator. (Def.'s Br., Ex. E (Doc. 27-7).) This new position was created for Plaintiff. (Id., Ex. D1 ("Pl.'s Dep.") (Doc. 27-5) at 21.)2 The Agreement required Plaintiff to obtain certification as a Diabetes Educator from the National Certification Board for Diabetes Education ("NCBDE") by May 31, 2006.3 (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 6; Agreement (Doc. 27-7) ¶ 5(c).) Plaintiff understood that if she did not obtain the certification, Defendant was permitted to reassignPlaintiff from diabetes educator to a different position within the DVAMC. (Agreement (Doc. 27-7) ¶ 5(c); Pl.'s Dep. (Doc. 27-5) at 44-45.)
As a result of several conversations in 2007 and 2009 with her DVAMC supervisor, Gwen Waddell-Schultz ("Ms. Waddell-Schultz"), Plaintiff believed that if she was pursuing a Master's Degree, she need "not worry about" getting the diabetes certification. (Pl.'s Dep. (Doc. 27-5) at 35-36.) However, in March 2009, a Proficiency Report signed by Ms. Waddell-Schultz and Plaintiff listed "[t]o become certified in diabetes education" as one of Plaintiff's "2009 Nursing Goals." (Def.'s Br., Ex. G-1 (Doc. 28-2) at 5-6.)
Plaintiff completed her Master's Degree in August 2009. (Resume (Doc. 27-4) at 2.) In September 2009, Ms. Waddell-Schultz sent Plaintiff a notice reminding her of the certification obligation and advising her to complete the exam by November 2009, and to be in compliance with the Agreement by December 20, 2009. (Def.'s Br., Ex. G-2 (Doc. 28-3).) Plaintiff never obtained the NCBDE certification. (See Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 8). Effective January 25, 2010, Plaintiff was reassigned from her position in diabetes education to a ward nursing position. (See Def.'s Br. Ex. G-4 ("Notice of Reassignment")(Doc. 28-5); see also Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 9.) The reassignment did not change Plaintiff's job title as Staff Nurse or result in the reduction of rank, salary, benefits, or potential for promotion. (Def.'s Br., Ex. G ("Waddell Decl.") (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff suffers from chronic back pain that limits her ability to work. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 7.) Plaintiff provided her DVAMC supervisors a letter from a physician outlining Plaintiff's permanent restrictions and providing guidelines for how Plaintiff's job duties could meet these restrictions. (Def.'s Br., Ex. I ("Physician Ltr.") (Doc. 29-2) at 2-3.) The restrictions were: (1) a seven-hour work day; (2) daytime work hours (to avoid nighttime driving); (3) no lifting more than 20 pounds; (4) avoidance of extensive bending; and (5) rest from walking/standing as needed. (Id. at 2.) At some point, Plaintiff alleges she was asked to provide additional medical information. (Def.'s Br., Ex. A ("EEOC 1") (Doc. 27-2) at 3.)
Defendant acknowledged the restrictions, advised Plaintiff to follow the restrictions, and concluded that Plaintiff's abilities were within the scope of the ward nursing position. (Notice of Reassignment (Doc. 28-5); Ex. G-5 (Doc. 28-6).) The requirements of the position were also modified to account forPlaintiff's work restrictions. (See Waddell Decl. (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 15; see also Def.'s Br., Ex. J ("Adalam Decl.") (Doc. 29-3) ¶¶ 9, 13.) Additionally, Plaintiff was assigned a preceptor to help with job duties. (Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 2 ("Adalam Dep.") (Doc. 32-3) at 7, 12, 20.) Plaintiff's preceptor felt that it was probably unsafe for Plaintiff to be assigned to a ward with her medical limitations. (Id., Ex. 3 (Doc. 32-4) at 4.) Plaintiff's supervisor, Sampoorna Adalam ("Ms. Adalam"), met with Plaintiff and her preceptor once a week to check on Plaintiff's progress on the ward. (Adalam Dep. (Doc. 32-3) at 7-8.) Despite the modifications, Plaintiff had difficulty with the work assigned. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 11) ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff complained to senior management and protested the reassignment, but was returned to ward nursing duties. (Id. ¶ 9.) From May 3, 2010 to May 7, 2010, Plaintiff submitted four "Assignment Despite Objection" forms claiming she was given assignments that did not meet her medical restrictions. (Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 4 (Doc. 32-5).) Ms. Adalam reviewed one of these objections with Plaintiff and her preceptor and determined that Plaintiff could perform the assignment within her restrictions. (Adalam Decl. (Doc. 29-3) ¶ 14; Adalam Dep. (Doc. 32-3) at 12-14, 18, 27.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that she was allowed to work a seven-hour daytime shift in compliance with the first two restrictions. (Pl.'s Dep. (Doc. 27-5) at 55-56.) Because Plaintiff worked a seven-hour shift, she accumulated one hour each day of leave without pay ("LWOP"), which was an approved leave status, and was required to submit LWOP forms for those hours. (Waddell Decl. (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 17.) However, Plaintiff asserts that she experienced problems staying within the confines of the other three restrictions.
Plaintiff asserts she was given tasks outside the lifting restriction when she was given category 3 and 4 patients who required lifting or moving. (Pl.'s Dep. (Doc. 27-5) at 70.) Plaintiff was instructed to ask other nurses for help if a patient needed lifting. (Id. at 60; Waddell Decl. (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 15; Adalam Decl. (Doc. 29-3) ¶¶ 9, 13.) Plaintiff did not violate her lifting restriction (Pl.'s Dep. (Doc. 27-5) at 65) and was not disciplined for following this restriction. (See Waddell Decl. (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 15; Adalam Decl. (Doc. 29-3) ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff asserts she had to pick things up off of the floor, which conflicted with her avoidance of extensive bending. (See Pl.'s Dep. (Doc 27-5) at 74.) However, Plaintiff acknowledged that she would find alternate ways to accomplishthese tasks or would ask for help. (Id. at 74-75.) Plaintiff was not disciplined for following this restriction. (See Waddell Decl. (Doc. 28-1) ¶ 15; Adalam Decl. (Doc. 29-3) ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff asserts she was allowed to rest in the morning and at lunch but was admonished for resting too much in the afternoon, despite the restriction that she rest from walking or standing as needed. (Pl.'s Dep. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial