la Bell v. Quasdorf

• Decision Date: 13 May 1936
• Docket Number: No. 427.,427.
• Citation: 184 A. 750
• Parties: LA BELL v. QUASDORF et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

184 A. 750

LA BELL

v. QUASDORF et al.

No. 427.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

May 13, 1936.

"Judicial Discretion," see Words &

Phrases.]

Appeal from District Court of City of Passaic.

Action by Jessie LaBell, by her next friend, Sam LaBell, against Max Quasdorf and others. From an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment, Use Quasdorf, by her next friend, Max Quasdorf, appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

Argued October term, 1935, before HEHER and PERSKIE, JJ.

Green & Green, of Newark (Thomas E. Duffy, of Passaic, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Bodner and Feder & Rinzler, all of Passaic, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

Plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been the proximate result of the negligence of the defendant Use Quasdorf, in the operation of an automobile owned by her father and codefendant, Max Quasdorf, and recovered judgment against both defendants. The vehicle collided with a pole located in a public highway; and plaintiff, who was a passenger at the invitation of Use, was injured. The issue was tried by the district court judge, sitting without a jury. The defendants appealed; and this court affirmed the judgment against Use, but reversed as to Max on the ground that there was no evidence that "Use had authority to take any one into the car and make such person an invitee of her father," and there was therefore error in the denial of his motion for a nonsuit. It was found that there was ample basis for the finding of the former's negligence in "the testimony of the excessive speed of the car, together with the evidence of the manner of the happening of the accident." 177 A. 77, 13 N.J.Misc. 183.

After the remittitur had gone down, Use, who was born on July 4, 1915, for the first time pleaded the disability of infancy. By formal petition, filed on April 17, 1935, she averred nonage and the nonappointment of a next friend or guardian ad litem to defend the suit on her behalf, and prayed that her parents be appointed "next friends and guardians" for the purpose of making application to vacate the judgment rendered against her. An order was made designating the parents as her "next friends and guardians" for that purpose; and the plaintiff was ruled to show cause why the judgment should not be vacated. Upon hearing the order to show cause, the court concluded that the infant defendant "was not prejudiced in anywise" by the nonappointment of a next friend to defend the action, and that, in the circumstances, she was "debarred and precluded from asserting the defense of infancy or the nonappointment of next friend"; and an order was entered appointing the infant's father her "next friend * * * nunc pro tunc as of April 5, 1934," and denying the motion to vacate the judgment. From this "judgment and order," the infant by her "next friends and guardians," appeals.

The state of the case settled by the district court judge exhibits the following matters of fact: The action was instituted on May 23, 1933, and there was personal service of the summons and state of demand upon the infant defendant. The trial was held on February 15, 1934, when she was in her nineteenth year. Although she did not testify as a witness, she was present throughout the trial, and was represented by her present counsel, who also appeared for her father. Her parents likewise were in attendance at the trial, and were sworn as witnesses and gave testimony. The pleadings did not exhibit appellant's infancy, nor was there any disclosure of the disability prior to judgment, either by the infant or her counsel; and, in view of her age, it is fairly to be presumed that there was in her appearance no suggestion of minority.

Where, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and acquires jurisdiction of the person of the infant defendant by lawful personal service of process, the judgment rendered against the infant, without the appointment of a guardian ad litem to defend on his behalf, while it may be erroneous, is not void. At the common law, jurisdiction of the person of an infant was acquired by due service of process upon the infant. Thus appellant, in virtue of the personal service of process, became a party to the action, and is bound by the court's judgment, even if tainted with error. The failure to make timely appointment of a guardian ad litem is, at most, error in fact merely; the appointment of such a representative is in no sense jurisdictional. The judgment stands until reversed on appeal, or vacated in a direct proceeding, and is not subject to collateral attack. Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N.J.Law, 207; In re Martin, 86 N.J.Eq. 265, 98 A. 510; Colt v. Colt, 111 U.S. 566, 4 S.Ct. 553, 28 L.Ed. 520; Linn v. Collins, 77 W.Va. 592, 87 S.E. 934, Ann.Cas.19186, 86; Reynolds v. Steel, 170 Ky. 153, 185 S.W. 820; Holloway v. Mcintosh, 7 Kan.App. 34, 51 P. 963; Watson v. Wrightsman, 26 Ind.App. 437, 59 N.E. 1064; 3 Blackstone's Com. (Cooley's 4th Ed.) p. 406; n.; 31 C.J. 1121. And, by the same token, the appointment of a next friend to prosecute an action for an infant plaintiff is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Our court of the last resort has so held. Nitti v. Public Service Railway Co., 104 N.J.Law, 67, 139 A. 62. There is little or no difference of substance in the functions and powers of a prochein ami and a guardian ad litem. Bunting v. Bunting, 87 N.J.Eq. 20, 99 A. 840. Each stands in the place of the minor, and is under a duty to safeguard his interests in all matters pertaining to the action.

It is a corollary of the foregoing that appellant does not have an absolute right to a vacation of the judgment under review. It is not within her power to avoid the judgment by a mere election, as in the case of a contract voidable for incapacity so arising. It was the function of the district court to determine the validity of its judgment. Its exercise was controlled by the duty imposed by law to protect the minor's interests; and, where it is clear that no injustice resulted from the nonappointment of a qualified representative to conduct the litigation on her behalf, there was no obligation to vacate the judgment. The infant has had her day in court, and has suffered no wrong requiring redress. A judgment against one under a disability is not vacated as a matter of right, unless it is void. Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) p. 441.

At the common law, all courts of record possessed an inherent power to vacate their judgments. The recovery of a judgment against an infant for whom a next friend or guardian ad litem had not been designated, on the assumption that he was an adult, was regarded as an error of fact not apparent of record, remediable by the ancient writ of error coram nobis or coram vobis, depending on whether the cause was in the King's Bench or the common picas. 3 Blackstone's Com.(Cooley's 4th Ed.) p. 406 note. The modern method of attack is by summary motion to vacate the judgment; and it is well-settled that such a motion is addressed to the sound...