Bell v. Schell

• Decision Date: 02 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04-1, No. 03-241
• Parties: TERRY BELL, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CHRIS J. SCHELL, state trooper for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; DAVE FERGUSON, Northern Zone Commander for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; GARY MARSDEN, Operations Commander for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; and JOHN COX, Administrator for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol, Appellees (Defendants). ANITA CLARK, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. QUINCE OLSEN and THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

2004 WY 153

101 P.3d 465

TERRY BELL, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CHRIS J. SCHELL, state trooper for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; DAVE FERGUSON, Northern Zone Commander for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; GARY MARSDEN, Operations Commander for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol; and JOHN COX, Administrator for the Wyoming State Highway Patrol, Appellees (Defendants).

ANITA CLARK, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. QUINCE OLSEN and THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Appellees (Defendants).

Nos. 03-241, 04-1

Supreme Court of Wyoming. OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2004.

December 2, 2004

Representing Appellant Terry Bell in Case No. 03-241: John H. Robinson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellant Anita Clark in Case No. 04-1: Todd Hambrick and Stephanie Hambrick of Krampner, Fuller & Hambrick, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees in Case No. 03-241: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and Craig E. Kirkwood, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees in Case No. 04-1: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General, John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and Misha E. Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶1] These unrelated cases were consolidated for argument on appeal because they involve the same legal issue: the requirements for a valid notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (the WGCA). In both cases, we affirm the granting of summary judgment to the defendants.

FACTS

Case No. 03-241

[¶2] On September 22, 2000, Terry Bell (Bell) was involved in the third of a series of car accidents caused by poor weather conditions. Bell was asked by a responding Wyoming state trooper to sit in a patrol vehicle at the scene. The patrol vehicle was subsequently struck by another oncoming vehicle, causing the injuries claimed by Bell in this case.

[¶3] On November 20, 2001, Bell presented to the State a notice of claim seeking compensation as a result of the collision. The claim was denied and Bell filed suit in federal district court. That suit was later dismissed without prejudice and, on March 20, 2003, Bell filed a complaint in state district court.

[¶4] In their answer to the latter complaint, the State alleged that Bell's notice of claim failed to comply with Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 and, therefore, failed to comply with the WGCA. The State also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The gravamen of the State's argument was that the notice of claim was not signed by Bell, but by his attorney, and it was not certified under penalty of perjury. The district court heard and begrudgingly granted the State's motion:

While this judge has some significant reservations concerning the legal analysis supporting the Beaulieu [v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 15, 17, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo.2001)] ruling, it appears that the mandates of that decision are clear. Applying those mandates to the matter at hand, it is necessary to conclude that the initial claim submitted on behalf of Bell does not comply with the requirements that it be signed by the claimant, and that it be certified under penalty of perjury.

The district court refers to the "initial" claim because, on December 7, 2002, while the matter was pending in federal court, Bell presented and served on the State a document entitled "Certification Under Wyo. Const. Art. 16 § 7," in which he certified to the truth and accuracy of the notice of claim, under penalty of perjury, and certified that his attorney signed the notice of claim with Bell's knowledge and authority.

Case No. 04-1

[¶5] On June 3, 1999, Anita Clark (Clark) was driving a vehicle that collided with a vehicle being driven by Quince Olsen, an employee of the State Department of Agriculture. On May 10, 2001, Clark presented to the State a notice of claim based upon the accident. Upon receiving no response to the notice of claim, Clark filed a complaint in state district court on May 1, 2002.

[¶6] The State responded to Clark's complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The basis for the motion was the fact that the notice of claim was not certified under penalty of perjury, as required by the WGCA, by Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, and by Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu I). Clark then immediately filed in the district court a document entitled "Certification Under Wyo. Const. Art. 16 § 7," in which she certified under penalty of perjury that the notice of claim was true and accurate and that it had been signed by her attorney with her knowledge and authority. After a hearing, the district court denied the State's motion to dismiss. The district court's findings and conclusions were (1) it had subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the notice of claim contained all required information; and (3) based on Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 1990), overruled by Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II)

. Clark's failure to certify the initial notice of claim under penalty of perjury was not fatal to the claim.

[¶7] Following the district court's ruling on its motion to dismiss, the State answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment asked the district court to look once again at Beaulieu I and to reconsider its conclusion that Clark's initial notice of claim was valid. The State argued that Beaulieu I clearly mandated that, to be valid, a notice of claim must meet the requirements of both the WGCA and Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, meaning that Clark's initial notice of claim was not valid because it did not meet the constitutional signature and certification requirements. Further, the State contended that Clark's belated attempt to cure that defect failed because it was done after the statutory period for filing a notice of claim had expired. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment.

ISSUES

[¶8] We will restate the issues as follows:

1. Were the initial notices of claim invalid because they were neither signed by the claimants nor certified under penalty of perjury?

2. If the initial notices of claim were invalid, was that invalidity overcome by application of Wyoming's savings statute?

3. If the initial notices of claim were invalid, was that invalidity cured by later signature by the claimant certified under penalty of perjury?

4. Should the State be equitably estopped from raising the constitutional signature and certification requirements as a defense?

5. Do the district court's rulings violate public policy?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] Our standard for reviewing summary judgments was set forth in Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 8-10, 20 P.3d at 525-26, and need not be repeated herein.

DISCUSSION

Validity of the Initial Claims

[¶10] Beaulieu I did not create new law. Rather, Beaulieu I clarified that it has always been the law that governmental claims must meet the requirements not just of the WGCA, but also of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 13, 15-17, 20 P.3d at 526-27. See also Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶¶ 5-9,

86 P.3d at 865-66 and Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004). A claim that has not been signed by the claimant and certified under penalty of perjury is not a valid claim. Neither the Bell notice of claim nor the Clark notice of claim was valid, and the filing of an invalid claim is the same as the filing of no claim at all. That was the lesson of Beaulieu I.

[¶11] The direct effect of the holding in Beaulieu I was to save the plaintiffs' cause of action from a statute of limitations attack. This Court reversed the district court's application of the one-year period for filing an action based upon a governmental claim because no valid governmental claim had yet been presented. Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 15-17, 20 P.3d at 527. Certainly, having said that a defendant may not rely upon an invalid claim—that is, one that has not met the constitutional signature and certification requirements—in arguing in favor of application of the one-year period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 (LexisNexis 2003), we cannot now say that a plaintiff may, to the contrary, rely upon a similarly invalid claim in arguing that he or she has met the two-year period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2003).¹ To repeat what we said in Beaulieu I, Beaulieu II, and Yoak, no governmental claim has been presented² under the WGCA until a claim meeting the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 has been presented.

The Savings Statute

[¶12] It is difficult to address this issue because the parties' arguments in regard to it are "like ships passing in the night" and because the district court did not consider the savings statute in its decision in either case.³ We will begin our discussion by reciting the statute:

If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the cause of action survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year after the date of the failure or reversal. This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2003).

[¶13] In their answer to Bell's state district court complaint, the State defendants alleged that the complaint was untimely in that it had not been "commenced in accordance with" the savings statute. Bell's responsive motion to strike contended that his state court complaint was timely filed after his federal court complaint was...