Bell v. State

• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011–355–Appeal.,2011–355–Appeal.
• Citation: 71 A.3d 458
• Parties: Michael BELL v. STATE of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

71 A.3d 458

Michael BELL

v.STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2011–355–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 18, 2013.

Katherine Godin, Esq., for Applicant.

Aaron L. Weisman, Esq., Department of the Attorney General, for State.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.

On a summer's evening in June 2007, a group of young people assembled at Murphy Field in the City of Newport, not to play baseball, but to watch a fist fight. The pugilists were two young men, one from the City of Newport, and the other from the Town of Middletown. Michael Bell (applicant) was a spectator, along with several of his friends. A brawl broke out among the onlookers. Mr. Bell armed himself with a baseball bat, allegedly to defend a female friend who he thought was being threatened. In the aftermath of this melee, Bell was charged with and later convicted of felony assault.

The applicant appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. Specifically, the applicant argues that the trial justice erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by giving him “incorrect legal advice” that “ultimately deprived [him] of the opportunity to consider and accept a favorable plea offer.” For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

Among the group that Bell claims was threatening his female friend was one Ian Kerr. Although Bell concedes that Kerr did not physically touch either him or his female friend, Bell struck Kerr in the side of the head with the baseball bat with sufficient force to fracture Kerr's skull.

On October 18, 2007, Bell was arraigned in Newport Superior Court on an information alleging one count of felony assault. Bell was represented by defense attorneys Kevin Dwyer (counsel) and Rebecca Clarke.¹ A bench trial commenced on March 23, 2009 in the Superior Court. At that time, Dwyer discovered that the state intended to call two witnesses whose identities had not been disclosed to him. Attorney Dwyer sought and received a continuance in order to prepare for these new witnesses. The trial justice also ordered that the state obtain written witness statements from the two new witnesses, and continued the trial for nearly two months.

On May 18, 2009, trial resumed and, upon cross-examining one of the new witnesses, Dwyer learned for the first time that the witness had been arrested for vandalizing Bell's truck on the night of the incident. Attorney Dwyer then moved for a mistrial on the basis of this newly discovered evidence. The trial justice ruled that the juvenile records of the witnesses were discoverable, and allowed a further continuance. Trial resumed on June 15, 2009, at which time counsel withdrew his motion for a mistrial.

Attorney Dwyer presented two affirmative defenses on Bell's behalf: self-defense and defense of others. On July 1, 2009, the trial justice found Bell guilty of felony assault. Bell's present counsel entered her appearance on his behalf on July 22, 2009, and on July 27, 2009, Dwyer withdrew from the case. On September 10, 2009, Bell was sentenced to fifteen years, with four to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions, eleven years suspended and eleven years probation. Bell initially appealed this decision, but later withdrew that appeal.²

On February 24, 2010, Bell filed an application for postconviction relief. A hearing was held on November 8 and December16, 2010 before the same justice as had presided over the trial. Bell, his mother, and Dwyer were the only witnesses who testified. On May 10, 2011, the trial justice filed a written decision denying Bell's application for postconviction relief. On May 20, 2011, applicant filed a notice of appeal. Final judgment was entered by the court on September 21, 2011.³

IIStandard of Review

In Rhode Island, “post-conviction relief is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction or sentence violated rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him.” Chapdelaine v. State, 32 A.3d 937, 941 (R.I.2011) (quoting Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473 (R.I.2011)). This Court has previously stated that we “will not disturb a trial justice's factual findings made on an application for post-conviction relief absent clear error or a showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at those findings.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 18 A.3d at 473). We will, however, “review de novo any post-conviction relief decision involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant's constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 18 A.3d at 473).

In evaluating an application for postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]his Court adheres to the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984).” Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d at 941 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 941 A.2d 158, 162 (R.I.2008)). To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner must satisfy the two prongs of the Strickland test: “[f]irst, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, to the point that the errors were so serious that trial counsel did not function at the level guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162). “This prong can be satisfied only by a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162). The second prong of Strickland “requires the applicant to demonstrate prejudice emanating from the attorney's deficient performance such as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant's right to a fair trial.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162). “This prong is satisfied only when an applicant demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 941–42 (quoting Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162).

IIIDiscussion

The applicant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because his attorney gave him “incorrect legal advice,” which robbed him of the opportunity to consider and accept a plea offer. The state counters that applicant cannot show that the prosecution ever made a plea offer, much less that he would have accepted it, given his stated desire to join the military. Further, the state contends that the trial justice would not have accepted a less than jail disposition because the sentencingbenchmarks would assign some jail time.

An applicant bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can prevail only if he or she can meet both prongs of the test articulated in Strickland. See Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 14 n. 7 (R.I.2012). Accordingly, we will address each prong separately.

AObjective Standard of Reasonableness

Under the first prong of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, “the [applicant] must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” “[T]he [applicant] must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This Court has stated that applicants seeking postconviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel are “saddled with a ‘heavy burden,’ in that there exists ‘a strong presumption [recognized by this Court] that an attorney's performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance and sound strategy * * *.’ ” Rice, 38 A.3d at 17 (quoting Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1138–39 (R.I.2001)).

On appeal, Bell argues that counsel gave him “inaccurate advice” by telling him he had a “clear-cut” case of defense of another and that he “would not serve jail time.” The applicant asserts that, because of that advice, he did not have the opportunity to entertain a favorable plea agreement. Bell does not appear to argue that counsel's trial performance amounted to ineffective assistance but, rather, that counsel's understatement of the risks involved in going to trial prevented him from making an informed decision at the outset to avoid trial by entering a plea agreement.⁴

Bell argues that his decision to go to trial was based on “incorrect advice”; however, at his postconviction-relief hearing he admitted that, from the beginning, he did not want to “take any offer” because he wanted to join the military.⁵ Attorney Dwyer testified that his client wanted to go “to trial because he wanted to go into the military, he wanted to clear his name, and he felt that his actions were justified under the circumstances, and I agreed with him.”

Unlike the cases upon which applicant relies, in which either a plea offer was not conveyed to the defendant, or its merits were not adequately discussed, in this case, there is no evidence that any plea arrangement was even offered. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012); Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (1978). On the contrary, counsel testified that he did not actively pursue a plea disposition “because [he] was told in no uncertain terms [that they were] going to trial, so [he] remember[ed] being in chambers * * * and [he] remember[ed] saying something to the effect that, ‘Let's not even talk about a plea deal because he's not taking a deal. He wants to go to trial.’ ”

Pursuant to Article V, Rule 1.2(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, “[i]n a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by a client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury...