Bell v. State

• Decision Date: 24 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 50382,50382
• Citation: 360 So.2d 1206
• Parties: Charles S. BELL v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1206

360 So.2d 1206

Charles S. BELL v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 50382.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 24, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 1978.

Paul Richard Lambert, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

EN BANC.

WALKER, Justice, for the Court:

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi. Charles S. Bell was indicted for the capital murder of Danny C. Haden pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp.1977). He was afforded a bifurcated trial under the standards announced by this Court in Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1976), conforming to the opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. We the jury, unanimously find that after weighting (sic) the mitigating circumstance and the aggravating circumstance, one against the other, that the mitigating circumstances do not outweight (sic) the aggravating circumstances, and that the defendant should suffer the penalty of death.

2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Thereafter, a separate hearing was conducted on the issue of sentence by the same jury. After deliberation, the jury returned with a written verdict signed by all jurors stating that:

The facts of this case are uncontradicted except for the question of who actually pulled the trigger. Both the defendant, Bell, and his former codefendant, Posey, agreed in their testimony at trial as to what transpired until the very moment the actual shooting took place.

On the night of June 21, 1976, or morning of June 22, 1976, Charles Bell, Bobby McFarland, Caesar Posey and Luther York drove into an Amoco service station in Hattiesburg, Mississippi to purchase gas. Shortly after leaving, McFarland brought up the idea of robbing the service station. All agreed, and armed with three shotguns and one .22 rifle, they returned to the station.

Upon the approach of the attendant, McFarland held a shotgun up to the window and relieved the attendant of his money. He then ordered the attendant to get into the car. While driving in the car, the attendant was searched and relieved of other personal items by Bell and York. After passing through the small town of Petal, Mississippi, McFarland, then driver of the car, stopped it in a wooded area and ordered the attendant, Danny Haden to get out.

Thereafter, Bell, McFarland and York took the victim into the woods. Posey remained in the car. After traveling a short distance into the woods, the victim was summarily executed, suffering a shotgun blast to the neck which decapitated him, and a blast from another shotgun in the back.

It is uncontradicted that all three participants in the final execution were armed when they left the car and when they returned. There is, however, a conflict in testimony as to who was armed with what and who actually fired the shots that murdered the victim.

Posey, who remained in the car, testified that throughout, Bell and McFarland were armed with shotguns while York was armed with a .22 rifle. He further testified that upon returning to the car, Bell told him that McFarland had shot the victim in the neck and he (Bell) had shot the victim in the back. This was corroborated by the testimony of another witness, Aubrey Wayne Evans, a cell mate of Bell's while Bell was held pending trial. Evans testified that in a conversation Bell said in reference to the service station attendant, "We shot him," and, "As he fell I (Bell) shot him again." Bell testified that he saw McFarland "blow his head off," but alleged that York fired the shot to the back.

I.

THE INDICTMENT

Bell alleges the failure of the court to grant his motion to quash the indictment was error. His contention is based upon the argument that the indictment was fatally defective because it did not specifically and particularly describe and define the offenses charged therein.

Although Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-7-21 (1972) requires objection to an indictment with error appearing on its face to be raised by demurrer to the indictment, nevertheless, defendant's argument also fails on substantive grounds. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-20 (Supp.1977) requires that an indictment charging (T)hat Charles Sylvester Bell and Caesar Posey, in conjunction with each other, on the 22nd day of June, 1976, in Forrest County aforesaid: did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously, with malice aforethought, kill and murder one D. C. Haden, a human being, while engaged in the commission of the crimes of armed robbery and kidnapping upon him, in violation of Section 97-3-19(2)(e) (See appendix) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as Amended, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

capital murder specifically cite the section and subsection of the Code relied on to constitute the offense. The indictment, as amended, charged:

In Bell v. State, 353 So.2d 1141 (Miss.1977), we considered an indictment containing virtually identical wording and upheld it. As we pointed out then, the statutory language adequately defines the offense. Here, the indictment as written was sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the crime charged in clear and intelligible language. Varnado v. State, 338 So.2d 1239 (Miss.1976); Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss.1971).

II.

THE PETITION FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION

Defendant argues the court's refusal to have him committed for psychiatric examination prior to trial was reversible error. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-13-11 (1972) states that the trial judge may order a mental examination, where " . . . the mental condition of a person indicted for a felony is in question . . . ." In McLeod v. State, 229 So.2d 557 (Miss.1969), where the Court construed Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated section 2575.5 (Supp.1968), which is identical to the present section 99-13-11, we stated:

It is the purpose of this statute to assure that a defendant is mentally capable of standing trial and is able to confer intelligently with his attorney in the preparation of his defense. Evidence of the probability that the accused is unable to assist in his own defense must be presented. (Citation omitted). The trial judge has reasonable discretion in determining whether the accused should be examined by a psychiatrist. (Citation omitted). (229 So.2d at 559).

At the hearing on Bell's petition for a psychiatric examination, the only evidence offered by petitioner was his own testimony. Bell testified that he "had been having problems with my head lately" and that he had headaches for the past five or six months. On the other hand, he testified that he was able to and had cooperated with his attorney in preparation for trial, and that he did not think he was "crazy" or a "psychopath." On this evidence, it cannot be said the trial judge was incorrect in denying a psychiatric examination.

III.

THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT

Prior to trial the defendant made a motion to suppress a statement given to investigators while he was incarcerated pending a trial on other charges. The grounds for suppression were that the statement given was in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion.

Specifically, Bell contended that his written statement (1) was not voluntarily given; (2) was given in the absence of effective Miranda warnings and without an effective waiver; and (3) was not substantially recorded in the words he used.

The statement in question was given by Bell on January 15, 1977. This was the same day the body of Danny Haden was located, after having been missing for some six or seven months. The statement in its entirety was subsequently introduced into evidence. The statement was preceded by a written waiver of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and was essentially At the pre-trial suppression hearing, Detective Sergeant Gerald Rice of the Hattiesburg Police Department testified that he was present when the statement was made, and that it was freely and voluntarily given without coercion or promises on the part of the law enforcement officials. The statement itself was introduced into evidence. The statement was preceded by a written waiver of rights signed by Bell and witnessed by Arlon Moulds and Gerald Rice as was the statement.

identical to defendant's testimony at trial, except that in the statement he denied having gone into the woods with the victim and McFarland.

During the hearing, Bell, on cross-examination, testified himself that (1) he signed the statement; (2) he understood his rights at the time; (3) the persons present did not physically abuse him, nor coerce him, nor promise any reward; and (4) he gave and signed the statement freely and voluntarily.

Based on his own testimony, there can be no doubt that the statement as given was given voluntarily and with full knowledge of his rights at that time.

Bell also contended at the pre-trial hearing that the statement was not couched in his language, but in that of the investigating officers. The only evidence presented at the hearing on that issue was the testimony of the defendant. He testified that he did not use the word "Hercules" in his statement and that he did not know where the City of Laurel was located. Within the statement was the sentence, "So they changed places again and Bobby drove past the Hercules going like to town. . . . " Another sentence stated "then Bobby drove on up through Laurel and later we came back to...