Bell v. State, 01–15–00510–CR

• Decision Date: 15 December 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 01–15–00510–CR,01–15–00510–CR
• Citation: 512 S.W.3d 553
• Parties: Kendall BELL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

512 S.W.3d 553

Kendall BELL, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 01–15–00510–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued December 15, 2016

Cheri Duncan, Houston TX, for Appellant.

Devon Anderson, District Attorney, Dan McCrory, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.

OPINION

Rebeca Huddle, Justice

When Kendall Bell was 16, the State filed a petition in a Harris County juvenile court alleging that he had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. On the State's motion, the juvenile court concluded that because of the seriousness of Bell's offense, the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. It therefore waived its jurisdiction and transferred the case to criminal district court, where Bell pleaded guilty without an agreed recommendation, and the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him on community supervision for six years. The State later filed a motion to adjudicate, alleging that Bell had violated the terms of his supervision. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion and sentenced Bell to 20 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, Bell contends that under Moon v. State , 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction without making adequate case-specific findings to support its conclusion that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense. In the alternative, Bell argues that the evidence does not support the district court's finding that he violated the terms of his supervision.

Because we agree that the juvenile court did not provide sufficient case-specific findings to support its waiver of jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment of the criminal district court, dismiss the criminal case, and remand this case to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Juvenile Court's Waiver of Jurisdiction

At the hearing on the State's motion to waive jurisdiction, the juvenile court admitted three exhibits: proof that Bell had been served, a stipulation of Bell's birth date, and a probation report. The juvenile court also heard testimony from three witnesses.

Deputy A. Alanis of the Harris County Sheriff's Office investigated a robbery at a Family Dollar store. Alanis testified that a surveillance video shows four people with handkerchiefs covering their mouths exiting a white truck and entering the store. Alanis testified that one of the four individuals went aisle to aisle with a gun looking for customers, pointed the gun at a woman with a young child, and took her purse. The other three individuals, at least one of whom also had a gun, are seen on the video taking the employees' money and phones and unsuccessfully trying to get the employees to open the register.

Alanis testified that when the four robbers heard police arriving, they ran back to the truck, and a chase ensued. Eventually, the robbers crashed the truck and ran. Three of the robbers were apprehended, and two of them identified Bell as the fourth robber. When Alanis went to Bell's house to interview him, Alanis recognized him as the person on the video who had pointed the gun at the woman.

After the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order reciting its findings and granting the State's motion to waive jurisdiction. After the criminal district court adjudicated Bell guilty, he appealed.

Discussion

In his first issue, Bell argues that we should vacate the criminal district court's judgment and remand the case to the juvenile court because the juvenile court's order waiving jurisdiction does not contain the findings necessary to satisfy Moon .

A. Waiver of jurisdiction under Juvenile Justice Code section 54.02

To waive jurisdiction and transfer a child to the criminal district court, a juvenile court must find: (1) the child was 14 years old or older at the time of the alleged offense; (2) there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense; and (3) because of the seriousness of the alleged offense or the background of the child (or both), "the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings." TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a). In deciding whether the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings, the juvenile court must consider four non-exclusive factors:

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against people;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Id. § 54.02(f). Although all four of the section 54.02(f) factors need not weigh in favor of transfer in order for a juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and the juvenile court is not required to make any specific findings regarding these factors, the order must show that the juvenile court took the section 54.02(f) factors into account. Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 41–42 ("[T]he order should ... expressly recite that the juvenile court actually took the Section 54.02(f) factors into account in making this [waiver] determination, [b]ut it need make no particular findings of fact with respect to those factors[.]").

Importantly, if the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it "shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court[.]" See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(h) ; Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 38. The order must specify which facts the juvenile court relied upon in making its decision that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child (or both), the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings. See Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 47, 50 (statute requires that juvenile court order "state specifically" findings regarding section 54.02(a)(3) basis for waiver).

In Moon , the juvenile, Moon, was charged with murder and the juvenile court waived jurisdiction and transferred him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult. The juvenile court found that because of the seriousness of the offense, the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. But, significantly, it did not find that criminal proceedings were required because of Moon's background. Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 50–51 ; see TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a) (juvenile court may find seriousness of the offense, background of the child, or both, warrants waiver). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense must be supported by express case-specific findings about the offense. Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 50–51.

The juvenile court's order in Moon expressly stated that the court had considered the four section 54.02(f) factors. Id. at 33. The juvenile court also made several express findings pertaining to those factors:

• The offense was against a person;

• Moon was sufficiently sophisticated and mature to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived and to aid in his defense and be responsible for his conduct; and

• That there was little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of Moon by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.

See id. ; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that only the first of these was a case-specific finding about the offense. See Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 50. The rest of the juvenile court's findings were "superfluous" under the circumstances because they were not case-specific findings about the offense and the juvenile court had not relied on Moon's background as a basis for waiver. See id. at 51. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a finding that an offense was against the person of another, without any other findings about the specifics of the offense, is not sufficient to support a conclusion that the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense. See id. at 50. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction. See id.

B. Standard of Review

"[I]n evaluating a juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court should first review the juvenile court's specific findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under ‘traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.’ " Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 47. Under a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence favorable to the challenged finding and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject the evidence. Moon v. State , 410 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff'd , 451 S.W.3d 28. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no-evidence challenge fails. Id. Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence presented to determine if the court's finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id. Notably, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting waiver is limited to the facts the juvenile court expressly relied on in its transfer order. Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 50.

If the findings of the juvenile court are supported by legally and factually sufficient proof, then we review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 47. As with any decision that lies within the discretion of the trial court, the salient question is not whether we might have decided the issue differently. See id. at 49. Instead, we...