Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A.
| Decision Date | 23 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-462 |
| Citation | 285 A.3d 505 |
| Parties | Ma Shun BELL, Appellant, v. WEINSTOCK, FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, P.A., Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Radi Dennis for appellant.
David M. Ross, with whom Kevin P. Farrell was on the brief, Washington, for appellee.
Before McLeese and Deahl, Associate Judges, and McLean, Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.*
On January 9, 2020, Ms. Bell filed her First Amended Class and Individual Claims for Damages and Incidental Relief, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, against Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A. ("appellee").1 The complaint alleges violations of the District of Columbia Automobile Financing and Repossession Act ("AFRA"), violations of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act ("CPPA"), violations of the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law ("DCL"), and abuse of process. On April 6, 2020, the Superior Court granted appellee's Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata /claim preclusion. This appeal followed. For the reasons below, we reverse the Superior Court ruling and remand.
In 2012, Ms. Bell purchased a vehicle through a Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC"). At some point in 2016, Ms. Bell did not make payments on the vehicle, and it was repossessed in November or December 2016. On March 29, 2017, First Investors Servicing Corporation ("FISC"), by and through its counsel, appellee Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A., filed suit in the Small Claims Branch of the District of Columbia Superior Court seeking a deficiency amount of $8,271.40 (Docket No. 2017 SC3 001636). On May 17, 2017, Ms. Bell signed a one-page settlement agreement with FISC in which Ms. Bell agreed to pay FISC a total of $8,271.41 in set monthly installments. The agreement further provided that FISC would dismiss the matter with prejudice if Ms. Bell timely made all payments. However, if Ms. Bell defaulted on the agreement, FISC was entitled to apply for entry of default judgment for the outstanding balance. Ms. Bell eventually defaulted on the agreement, and, on August 8, 2018, the Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of FISC for $6,822.97. After FISC sought enforcement through wage garnishment, Ms. Bell filed a motion to set aside the judgment on December 26, 2018, and a motion for judicial review on February 28, 2019; the Superior Court denied the motions by orders dated February 21, 2019, and April 1, 2019, respectively. On November 7, 2019, FISC filed a Praecipe of Satisfaction that dismissed the matter with prejudice as "paid and satisfied in full."
Ms. Bell filed a separate lawsuit against FISC on January 9, 2020, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, for class and individual claims for violations of AFRA; class and individual claims for violations of CPPA; an individual claim for violations of DCL; and an individual claim for abuse of process. The trial court dismissed Ms. Bell's claims based on claim preclusion. See March 16, 2020, order. Ms. Bell appealed the dismissal. In Bell v. First Investors Servicing Corp . (" Bell I "), this court affirmed the dismissal of Ms. Bell's third, fourth, and fifth claims, reversed the dismissal of her first and second causes of action, and remanded for further proceedings. Bell I , 256 A.3d 246, 259 (D.C. 2021). This court found that the first and second causes of action were partially precluded because success on the claims that rested on allegations that "in essence assert that FISC was not entitled to collect the deficiency amount reflected in the 2018 judgment, and thus challenge FISC's right to the funds the court awarded ... would nullify the judgment in favor of FISC." Id. at 256.
On November 12, 2021, after FISC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court dismissed the remainder of Ms. Bell's claims for failure to assert a claim upon which relief could be granted. See November 12, 2021, order. Ms. Bell appealed that order on December 3, 2021. We recently reversed that order and remanded for further proceedings. Bell v. First Investors Servicing Corp. , Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. Nov. 9, 2022).
Ms. Bell filed her complaint in this matter with claims regarding AFRA violations, CPPA violations, DCL violations, and abuse of process on January 9, 2020. Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on January 22, 2020. Ms. Bell filed an Opposition on February 17, 2020, and appellee filed a Reply in Support on February 27, 2020. On April 6, 2020, the Superior Court granted appellee's Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata (claim preclusion) finding that (1) "the facts alleged in this matter are based on the common nucleus of facts brought forward in the Small Claims action which was fully adjudicated on the merits, and that Ms. Bell could have brought these claims in the earlier proceeding," and (2) that appellee and FISC are in privity because "[t]he actions she alleges that [appellee] took relate directly to actions [appellee] did in its role of attorney-agent to FISC." April 6, 2020, order at 7-8. The trial court also found that Ms. Bell's claims were barred because they could have been brought as permissive counterclaims in the action against FISC. See id. at 7.
Ms. Bell filed an Opposed Motion for Reconsideration on May 5, 2020, to which appellee filed an Opposition on May 18, 2020. On July 2, 2020, the Superior Court denied Ms. Bell's motion. See July 2, 2020, order at 3 ().
Ms. Bell filed this appeal on July 24, 2020.
In Appellant's Opening Brief, Ms. Bell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint based on res judicata because (1) the trial court failed to apply the nullification/impairment analysis described in Smith v. Greenway Apartments, LP , 150 A.3d 1265 (D.C. 2016) ; (2) Ms. Bell's success on these claims would not nullify the small claims judgment; and (3) there is no identity of parties as appellee was not party to the small claims action nor is appellee in privity with FISC for the small claims action. In discussing policy considerations, Ms. Bell further argues that the application of res judicata in these circumstances (1) violates due process because it deprives her of a full and fair opportunity to pursue her claims against appellee and (2) weakens state and federal consumer protection and debt collection laws.
Appellee argues that the trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Bell's claims based on res judicata because (1) her claims are precluded under the nullification/impairment test since success on the claims would threaten FISC's judgment and (2) appellee is in privity with FISC. Appellee further argues that Ms. Bell's status as a pro se litigant in the small claims action is not a basis to fail to apply res judicata .
The court will analyze these arguments in detail below to the extent they relate to the trial court's decision.3
This court "reviews de novo the application of the doctrine of res judicata ." Calomiris v. Calomiris , 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010) (citation omitted). Res judicata (claim preclusion) dictates that "a final judgment on the merits of a claim bars relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of the same claim between the same parties or their privies." Patton v. Klein , 746 A.2d 866, 869 (D.C. 1999) ; see also Carr v. Rose , 701 A.2d 1065, 1070 (D.C. 1997). "A privy is one so identified in interest with a party to the former litigation that he or she represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter of the case." Patton , 746 A.2d at 870 (citation omitted).
Appellee contends that they are in privity with FISC because—as attorneys for FISC—they controlled the small claims action, and the current claims are based on actions they took as agents of FISC during the small claims action. The trial court found that appellee was in privity with FISC because attorneys are agents for their clients, "agents and principals are in privity for res judicata purposes if the prior action concerned a matter within the agency," and the actions appellee took were within the scope of their agency.4 April 6, 2020, order at 8 (internal citations omitted).
This court has previously issued opinions that support the position that an attorney may act as an agent of a client. See, e.g. , Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C. , 110 A.3d 575, 583-84 (D.C. 2015) . That said, "[a]gents and principals... are not ordinarily in privity with each other." D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency v. Dowdey , 618 A.2d 153, 163 (D.C. 1992) (citation omitted). "[A] decision on the merits in an action against the principal is res judicata in a later action against the agent only ‘if the prior action concerned a matter within the agency.’ " Major v. Inner City Prop. Mgmt., Inc. , 653 A.2d 379, 381 (D.C. 1995) (citing Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. , 637 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1986). "Where privity exists and the issue to be tried is identical as against both principal and agent, the doctrine of res judicata applies to bar subsequent litigation." Dowdey, 618 A.2d at 164.
This court has previously found an attorney in privity with a client for purposes of res judicata where he was a limited partner with the client in the business at issue in the litigation. See Smith v. Jenkins , 562 A.2d 610, 616 (D.C. 1989).5 But this court has not directly addressed...
To continue reading
Request your trial