Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., Civ. A. No. 77-595.

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
• Writing for the Court: FOGEL
• Citation: 448 F. Supp. 133
• Parties: Joseph S. BELL v. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., Charles Kern, Peter B. Russell and James Johnson.
• Decision Date: 13 April 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-595.

448 F. Supp. 133

Joseph S. BELL
v.
WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., Charles Kern, Peter B. Russell and James Johnson.

Civ. A. No. 77-595.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

March 27, 1978.

As Corrected April 13, 1978.

448 F. Supp. 134

Nicholas J. Nastasi, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Edward W. Madeira, Jr., Murray S. Levin, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FOGEL, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff, Joseph S. Bell, ("Bell"), alleges that his discharge by defendant, Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., ("Wyeth"), was a result of unlawful sex discrimination. Asserting a variety of federal claims, as well as claims grounded in state law,¹ Bell invokes our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and under principles of pendent jurisdiction.

The defendants have moved for the dismissal of all claims, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b). Subsequent to the filing of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of all claims, other than plaintiff's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Wyeth and the individual defendants Kern, Russell, and Johnson.² The only matter which remains pending, at this juncture, is defendants' Motion to Dismiss those Title VII claims.

With respect to the Title VII claims, defendants contend that we lack subject matter jurisdiction, due to plaintiff's failure to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites which act as conditions precedent to filing a Title VII action in the district court. This contention is two-fold: first, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to comply with the deferral provisions of § 706(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, As Amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); and second, they argue that plaintiff failed to file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as required by § 706(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Thus, an issue with which we are squarely faced, is whether Bell's failure to present his claim of sex discrimination to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission deprives us of jurisdiction to entertain this action under Title VII in this court.

Section 706(c) of the Act, the so-called "deferral provision," provides in pertinent part as follows:

In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and

448 F. Supp. 135

establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).³ Pennsylvania has a statute prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex and establishing the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission to enforce that statute, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.

The legislative history of § 706(c)—as gleaned from the 1964 legislative debates— demonstrates a Congressional concern that Title VII, as originally drafted, might bypass efforts at the state and local level to deal with discriminatory employment practices. Accordingly, the bill was amended so as to guarantee the States the opportunity to bring their expertise and experience to bear, without premature interference by the Federal Government. See, Humphrey Explanation of Titles VII and XI, Legislative History of Title VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, page 3008. Senator Humphrey introduced the § 706 amendment with the following explanation:

If the practice complained of occurs in a State or locality which has a law prohibiting such practices

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