Beller v. Beller

Decision Date18 January 1883
Citation50 Mich. 49,14 N.W. 696
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesBELLER v. BELLER.

The facts of this case do not show willful desertion or such extreme cruelty as to entitle either party to a divorce, and the bill and cross-bill must be dismissed, and the husband decreed to pay the wife $500 in lieu of all costs, counsel fees, and alimony.

Appeal from Wayne. Original bill and cross-bill.

George Gartner, for complainant.

Griffin, Dickinson, Thurber & Hosmer, for defendant and appellant.

MARSTON, J.

The defendant Magdelena Beller in February, 1879, while her husband, the complainant, was residing in Detroit, rented a part of Uhlich block in the city of Chicago for a term of five years from March 1, 1879. On the twenty-second of February, 1879, she left the residence of complainant in Detroit, taking her goods and household furniture, and shortly after went to Chicago, there to carry on business in her own name and for her own use and benefit in the premises she had rented. She continued to remain in Chicago and in August, 1881, complainant filed his bill for divorce. An amended bill was afterwards filed charging desertion and extreme cruelty. Defendant answered, and in August of the same year filed a cross-bill, charging desertion and extreme cruelty and praying for a divorce. Answer was filed by her husband and proofs taken.

The fact that defendant Magdelena leased the premises in Chicago and moved there and engaged in business is not disputed. Ordinarily this would be considered sufficient to establish the charge of desertion, as the fact of engaging in business for so long a period at a place distant from the residence of her husband would be wholly inconsistent with the marriage relation. The defendant had however, with her husband's consent, carried on business at the same place in 1864 and subsequently thereto while her husband was living in Rochester, New York, and in Detroit. The complainant Jacob Beller, well knew that his wife was going to leave Detroit in 1879 and engage in business in Chicago, yet he made no effort whatever to have her remain with him, offered or held out no inducements for her to return, but on the contrary appeared to be rejoiced that she had gone away, if indeed he did not hasten her departure. Clearly therefore the desertion, if any, was not against the will of the complainant, and he is not entitled to the relief prayed for on this ground. Cooper v. Cooper, ...

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