Bellinger v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 29 August 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. JKB–17–0068
• Citation: 577 B.R. 193
• Parties: Joseph J. BELLINGER, Appellant, v. Joyce E. BUCKLEY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

577 B.R. 193

Joseph J. BELLINGER, Appellant,

v.Joyce E. BUCKLEY, Appellee.

CIVIL NO. JKB–17–0068

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed August 29, 2017

Gregory P. Johnson, Silver Spring, MD, James Martin Hoffman, Offit Kurman PA, Bethesda, MD, for Appellant.

Robert Miles Stahl, IV, Law Offices of Robert M. Stahl, Lutherville, MD, for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM

James K. Bredar, United States District Judge

This is an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. The appeal has been briefed (ECF Nos. 5 & 6), and no oral argument is necessary, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below, the decision of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.

I. Procedural History

On June 10, 2016, Appellee Joyce Buckley filed a Chapter 7 voluntary petition (the "Petition") in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. In re Buckley, No. 16–17946 (Bankr. D. Md.), ECF No. 1. Immediately before filing the Petition, Appellee held an interest in real property located at 3611 Coronado Road, Windsor Mill, Maryland, 21244 (the "Property"), with her husband as tenants by the entireties. In the Petition, Appellee claimed as exempt her entire interest in the Property as to nonjoint creditors only, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B), which allows a debtor to exempt from her bankruptcy estate "any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety ... to the extent that such interest ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). By July 26, 2016, the deadline set by the trustee for filing claims, six unsecured, nonpriority claims, totaling $30,876.88, had been filed solely against Appellee (i.e., there were no joint creditors).

Less than one month after Appellee filed the Petition, her husband died. Appellant Joseph Bellinger, the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding, subsequently filed an objection to Appellee's exemption, arguing that the death of Appellee's spouse had extinguished the tenancy by the entireties, as well as the corresponding exemption, and that sole ownership of the property had reverted to the bankruptcy estate. No. 16–17946 ECF No. 17. On September 6, 2016, Appellee filed a response. Id. ECF No. 20. Following a hearing, the bankruptcy court rejected the trustee's objection and entered an Order and Memorandum Overruling Trustee's Objection to the Debtor's Claim of Exemption. Id. ECF Nos. 26 & 27. On January 10, 2017, the trustee filed the instant appeal.

The Court preliminarily notes that the bankruptcy court's order addressed only Appellee's entitlement to an exemption following the death of her spouse. That said, the inescapable consequence of its conclusion that Appellee's exemption survived the death of her spouse is that her interest in the Property did not reenter the bankruptcy estate. In other words, Appellee's entitlement to the exemption is relevant only because of its impact on the ultimate issue in dispute between the parties: whether Appellee's interest in the Property is part of the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, Appellant argued as much in his objection to the exemption, the bankruptcy court addressed this issue in its memorandum accompanying the order, and Appellant appeals from both the order and the memorandum, (ECF No. 1 ). Moreover, both parties have fully briefed the issue of the bankruptcy estate's entitlement to Appellee's interest in the Property. Thus, the Court reaches this ultimate issue to affirm the decision, despite finding that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the exemption survived the death of Appellee's spouse.

II. Standard of Review

In an appeal from the bankruptcy court, this Court reviews factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Gold v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Taneja), 743 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2014). The bankruptcy court's order and memorandum overruling the trustee's objection rested solely on legal conclusions, therefore, this Court will review the decision de novo."Moreover, the decision of a bankruptcy court ‘must be affirmed if the result is correct’ even if the lower court relied upon ‘a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’ " Okoro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 567 B.R. 267, 271 (D. Md. 2017) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) ). Thus, this Court may "affirm the bankruptcy court on any ground supported by the record." LeCann v. Cobham (In re Cobham), 551 B.R. 181, 189 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 669 Fed.Appx. 171 (4th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied(Nov. 29, 2016).

III. Question Presented

The sole issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that Appellee's interest in the Property did not reenter her bankruptcy estate following the death of her husband.¹

IV. Analysis

The bankruptcy court held that Appellee's claimed exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) survived the postpetition death of her spouse, and therefore her interest in the Property is not part of her bankruptcy estate. Appellant contends that this holding is at odds with controlling Fourth Circuit precedent. More specifically, Appellant argues that when a tenancy by the entirety interest in property is extinguished postpetition (e.g., due to divorce or the death of one spouse), a § 522(b)(3)(B) exemption based on that interest also is extinguished. The Court agrees with this initial proposition. To the extent that the bankruptcy court's decision relied on a contrary holding, it was erroneous. The Court's analysis does not end here, however.

Under controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, Appellee acquired a new "interest" in property—as that term is used in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) —when her tenancy by the entirety was extinguished. Cordova v. Mayer (In re Cordova), 73 F.3d 38, 42–43 (4th Cir. 1996). That postpetition interest must be captured by the bankruptcy estate pursuant to some statutory mechanism. Appellant suggests that Appellee's interest in the Property reentered the bankruptcy estate postpetition, either by operation of Maryland law or via § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Both of these contentions are meritless. While state law determines the "particular features" of a debtor's interest in property, federal law "defines the property interests included in the bankruptcy estate." Fairfield v. United States (In re Ballard), 65 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 1995). In other words, state law determines the existence (including the nature and scope) of a debtor's interest in property, but no more. In re Greer, 242 B.R. 389, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) ). Here, it is undisputed that Appellee held a fee simple interest as a tenant by the entirety in the Property under Maryland law, but the Court must look to federal law to determine whether that interest is part of her bankruptcy estate. It is here that Appellant's second argument fails: § 541(a)(1) applies only to a debtor's interest in property "as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). An interest in property acquired postpetition, on the other hand, is generally not part of the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 case. Moreover, none of the narrow exceptions to this general rule apply here. Thus, Appellee's interest in the Property, which she acquired after the commencement of her case, is not part of her bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, the decision of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.

A. Appellee's Entireties Interest Was Exempted From Her Bankruptcy Estate

A debtor's filing of a Chapter 7 petition creates a bankruptcy estate "comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) ; Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 150 (4th Cir. 2002). " Section 541 includes in the bankruptcy estate a debtor's interest in entireties property" held at the commencement of the case. In re Cordova, 73 F.3d at 40 ; accord In re Bunker, 312 F.3d at 150.

After a bankruptcy estate is created, a debtor may exempt certain property from the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (allowing debtor to claim exemptions provided by state or federal law). The bankruptcy trustee, as well as creditors, may file objections to a debtor's claimed exemptions. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b). Unless a party objects "within 30 days after the meeting of creditors held under § 341(a) is concluded," Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b)(1), "the property claimed as exempt ... is exempt." 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (emphasis added); see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). Exempted property is not property of the bankruptcy estate, and therefore it is not available to satisfy the debtor's obligations. In re Bunker, 312 F.3d at 151 ; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (absent special circumstances, exempted property "is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case"). Rather, "[i]t is widely accepted that property deemed exempt from a debtor's bankruptcy estate revests in the debtor." In re Smith, 235 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991) (noting that an exempted interest in property is "withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor").

Generally, a debtor may elect one of two alternative schemes of exemption: (1) the debtor may claim the specific federal exemptions listed in § 522(d), or (2) the debtor may claim "the exemptions permitted under (i) state law, (ii) general (nonbankruptcy) federal law, and (iii) § 522(b) ( [3] )(B)," In re Bunker, 312 F.3d at 151. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)–(3). States, however, may opt out of the specific federal exemptions provided in the first alternative. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) ; see, e.g., Schlossberg v. Barney, ...