Bellinger v. Int'l Precast Sols.
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 354666 |
| Parties | KEVIN LAMONT BELLINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL PRECAST SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-014988-NZ
Before: Murray, C.J., and Jansen and Riordan, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), and defendant cross-appeals the same order denying defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), in this action involving the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. We conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary disposition; however, the court should have determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissed the case under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Because the trial court reached the right result, however, we affirm. See Lewis v Farmers Ins Exch, 315 Mich.App 202, 216; 888 N.W.2d 916 (2016) ().
Plaintiff was severely injured while working for defendant. Plaintiff alleged that he had been cleaning a "cement machine," which had an auger that rotated to keep the cement from coagulating. A lever on the machine controlled the motion of the auger. Unless the lever was pulled, the auger would remain motionless. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had instructed its employees to wrap a wire around the lever to keep it in the "on" position, thus keeping the auger turning while employees cleaned the machine. Plaintiff followed this instruction. While he was cleaning the machine, his clothes became entangled in the auger, and plaintiff was dragged into the machine, which amputated his legs.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant "took the position that [plaintiff] was engaged in 'misconduct, '" under MCL 418.305 to avoid paying plaintiff worker's compensation benefits even though defendant knew it had instructed plaintiff to keep the auger turning while he cleaned the machine. According to plaintiff, defendant lied to police and state inspectors investigating the accident. Defendant allegedly "hid" the wires used to hold the auger levers, and told inspectors that plaintiff had been in violation of company policy when cleaning the machine. By trying to avoid paying plaintiff workers' compensation benefits in this way, plaintiff opined that defendant committed intentional infliction of emotional distress, and filed a complaint. Specifically, because of defendant's alleged extreme and outrageous conduct, plaintiff contended that he suffered psychological trauma from fear that he would have no income, and from defendant's betrayal of trust.
Plaintiff amended his original complaint to add another allegation of putatively outrageous conduct on the part of defendant. Plaintiff alleged that a supervisor, Mark Miller, had issued a "Notice of Discipline" to plaintiff, under which plaintiff was suspended for three days. The notice "accused the plaintiff of bypassing 'a safety system by using tie wire to engage the auger lever in the on position and then accessing the tucker chute (5'-6" off the ground) while the auger was running and one chute cover was open exposing the running auger.' "
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (C)(7), and (C)(8). First, defendant argued the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Citing MCL 418.841, defendant contended that only the Michigan Workers' Compensation Agency (WCA) had jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim because both wrongful acts alleged by plaintiff, the manner in which defendant defended against plaintiff s worker's compensation claim and defendant's Notice of Discipline, occurred in the context of plaintiff s employment with defendant. Second, defendant argued that it was immune to suit, reasoning that worker's compensation benefits were plaintiffs exclusive remedy under MCL 418.131. Both wrongful acts alleged by plaintiff occurred in the scope of judicial proceedings, so defendant was shielded by the judicial proceedings privilege. Third, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because defendant's assertion of a legal defense could not be considered outrageous or extreme conduct.
Plaintiff answered that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the intentional tort exception to the WDCA applied. Plaintiff argued that he stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because defendant lying about plaintiff being injured through his own misconduct would be so extreme or outrageous as to form the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lastly, the judicial proceedings privilege was inapplicable because plaintiff was suing defendant for defendant's statements. He was not suing defendant's lawyer.
Defendant filed a reply to plaintiffs response, raising no new arguments. Instead, defendant submitted twelve exhibits purportedly refuting many of the allegations in plaintiffs complaint. Notably, defendant submitted plaintiffs deposition in which plaintiff testified: (1) he was oiling the cement machine, not cleaning it, when he was injured; (2) defendant never instructed him to run the auger while oiling the machine; (3) he could not remember if anyone told him that defendant tried to hide the wires from state inspectors after the accident; and (4) defendant had trained plaintiff on company "lockout tagout" procedures, which required employees to shut down machines when servicing them. Defendant attached an acknowledgment signed by plaintiff which stated,
Defendant also submitted an affidavit from Joseph Clifford, the primary administrator of the Associated Builders and Contractors Self Insured Workers' Compensation Fund (ABC Fund). Clifford attested that defendant was a member of the ABC Fund. Whenever anyone asserted a workers' compensation claim against one of the ABC Fund's members, ABC would assign a third-party administrator to manage the claim. These third-party administrators "are professional service companies that specialize in the evaluation and management of workers' compensation claims, and are not affiliated with any Fund Member." The third-party administrators retained complete control over whether to pay or deny worker's compensation claims. Defendant had no discretion over whether a worker's compensation claim should be paid or denied: "[i]ndividual members of the Fund, such as International Precast Solutions, LLC, are not allowed or permitted to . . . direct or control decisions relative to how workers' compensation claims against Fund members are managed, adjusted, paid or denied and defended."
Defendant also attached excerpts from the depositions of defendant's employees, Mark Miller and Don Little. In his deposition, Miller acknowledged that he issued the Notice of Discipline and three-day suspension to plaintiff, but he did so at the behest of the third-party administrator tasked with managing plaintiff's worker's compensation claim. He had no choice in the matter. Similarly, Little testified that defendant had no discretion over whether to grant or deny plaintiff's worker's compensation claim.
Ultimately, the trial court denied defendant's motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), but granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). The trial court first determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's claim. Citing Broaddus v Ferndale Fastner Div, 84 Mich.App. 593; 269 N.W.2d 689 (1978), the trial court reasoned that "[s]uch allegedly nonphysical injury and damages do not arise out of and in the course of employment[, ]" and so it could consider plaintiff's claim for emotional injuries resulting from intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding it had subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court ruled that defendant was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). Defendant was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because defendant's conduct was shielded by the judicial proceedings privilege. The trial court reasoned that the judicial proceedings privilege extends to every step in a judicial proceeding, and was broad enough to cover anything said in relation to the worker's compensation proceeding, including defendant arguing that plaintiff had engaged in misconduct and defendant issuing the Notice of Discipline. And, even if defendant was not protected by the judicial proceedings privilege, the trial court determined that defendant was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because defendant's alleged conduct could not be considered so outrageous and extreme as to form the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff appealed, and defendant cross-appealed.
As an initial matter, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by considering the evidence attached to defendant's reply brief in answer to plaintiff's response to summary disposition. He argues that the trial court's consideration of this evidence violated his right to due process because he did not have an opportunity to respond to the evidence. Therefore, he asks this Court to strike this evidence from the record and vacate the trial court's order. Seeing no error, we decline.
This Court reviews de novo questions involving the interpretation of court rules...
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