Belov v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-1529 (JEB) |
| Parties | ELENA A. BELOV, Plaintiff, v. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Elena A. Belov worked for Defendant World Wildlife Fund, Inc. from 2012 until 2020, when WWF declined to renew her limited-term employment. Belov gave birth twice during her employment, taking maternity leave each time. She alleges that, over the span of several years, her supervisor made a series of negative comments about pregnant and nursing women and that she gave Belov difficulty during her leaves and return to work. After WWF terminated Plaintiff, allegedly for a lack of funding, she filed this suit. Belov alleges that her discharge constituted unlawful sex and pregnancy discrimination, as well as retaliation under Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Defendant now moves to dismiss. The Court will deny the Motion in part and grant it in part, allowing the wrongful-discharge claim to proceed, but dismissing the retaliation counts.
According to Plaintiff's Complaint, which the Court must credit at this juncture, she began working at WWF in November 2012 as a Senior Shipping Officer for the U.S. Arctic Program. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 5. Although WWF's U.S. operations are based in Washington, Belov worked remotely from New York. Id., ¶¶ 3-4; see ECF No. 7 (Pl Opp.) at 9-10. Plaintiff was hired as a “limited term employee, ” meaning that her employment was for only a set term unless renewed. See Compl., ¶ 6. Her term ended up being renewed nine times between November 2012 and June 2020, or approximately once a year. Id. Throughout Belov's employment, her supervisor was Margaret Williams, Managing Director of WWF's Arctic Program. Id., ¶ 7.
Plaintiff gave birth to her first child in April 2016. Id. ¶ 9. While the Complaint is not entirely clear on the matter, it indicates that she took leave then, but was Id. After experiencing issues with breastfeeding and childcare, Belov asked Williams if she could work part time for several months once she returned. Id., ¶ 10. Williams told her that if she could not be full time upon returning, then she “should resign.” Id. Eventually, however, Williams permitted Belov to work part time before resuming full-time employment in 2017. Id., ¶ 11.
In Spring 2018, Plaintiff informed Williams that she was pregnant again. Id., ¶ 12. Williams “reacted negatively about the impact that Plaintiff's maternity leave would have on Defendant.” Id. Belov gave birth in October 2018 and again took maternity leave. Id., ¶ 13. In January 2019, she emailed Williams several times about extending her leave, but Williams did not respond. Id., ¶ 15. After Plaintiff contacted Human Resources about Williams's silence and alerted it to New York State's Family and Medical Leave Act, Defendant allowed her “to take an additional eight weeks of maternity leave.” Id., ¶ 16.
Once Plaintiff returned to work in April 2019, she had several disputes with Williams about supposedly essential business travel, which posed a challenged for Belov and her young children. Id., ¶ 18. WWF's Vice President of Human Resources eventually facilitated a call between Belov and Williams, and they determined that none of the trips Williams proposed was essential and that WWF would revisit Plaintiff's travel schedule periodically. Id., ¶ 19. In October 2019, when Belov had a business trip to Iceland planned, Williams advised her against bringing her daughter because doing so would interfere with her ability to “fully participate” in the trip. Id., ¶ 22. Plaintiff “responded that she had a legal right to nurse her daughter every three to four hours, ” to which Williams responded by warning Belov not to use “legal language.” Id., ¶ 23. Also in October, WWF's Human Resources got involved after Williams attempted to force Plaintiff to travel to Alaska for a meeting. Id., ¶ 24. According to Belov, Williams responded by falsely reporting issues with her job performance. Id.
On April 22, 2020, Defendant told Plaintiff that her position was not being renewed for lack of funding. Id., ¶ 25. It then terminated her employment on June 30. Id. After filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving a right-to-sue letter, Belov filed this lawsuit in June 2021. Id., ¶¶ 29-30. She brings three counts, alleging that WWF: (1) discriminatorily discharged her; (2) unlawfully retaliated against her under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; and (3) retaliated against her under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Id., ¶¶ 31-45. Defendant now moves to dismiss. See ECF No. 6 (Def. MTD).
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In evaluating Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
III. Analysis
In seeking dismissal, Defendant contends that each count in Plaintiff's Complaint is deficient on its face. The Court considers them in turn.
WWF first argues that Belov's wrongful-discharge claim must be dismissed because she pled no facts plausibly suggesting that she was not renewed because of her membership in a protected class. See Def. MTD at 4-6. Given the low motion-to-dismiss bar and the particulars of Defendant's argument, the Court disagrees and will allow Plaintiff to proceed.
Under Title VII, a covered employer may not “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII, as relevant here, to make clear that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex' or ‘on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015). Belov contends that she was terminated because of her sex, particularly her pregnancies and nursing upon returning to work. See Pl. Opp. at 5-6. “Although the D.C. Circuit has yet to address” whether “lactation” is a medical condition related to childbirth for purposes of the PDA, a number of courts have concluded that it is. See Allen-Brown v. D.C., 174 F.Supp.3d 463, 478 & n.9 (D.D.C. 2016) (collecting cases). The EEOC, moreover, “has also adopted the position that lactation is protected by the PDA in its enforcement guidance.” Id. at 479 (citing EEOC Guidance No. 915.003, Pregnancy and Related Issues (June 25, 2015), 2015 WL 4162723). In light of those persuasive authorities - as well as Defendant's lack of challenge on this question, see Def. MTD at 4-6 - the Court will presume that a discrimination claim based on lactation is available to Plaintiff.
As for proof such discrimination, Belov appears to contend that the statements made by Williams constitute direct evidence. See Pl. Opp. at 6. That argument, however, does not mature past its infancy. “To qualify as direct evidence, a statement or remark must ‘itself show[] . . . bias in the employment decision.'” Conn v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 149 F.Supp.3d 136, 146 (D.D.C. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Wilson v. Cox, 753 F.3d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). “Direct evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace, even if made by decision-makers, where the remarks are unrelated to the decisional process itself.” Crawford v. Barr, No. 17-798, 2020 WL 7051554, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2020) (quoting Beeck v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 81 F.Supp.2d 48, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2000)). While Belov has pled facts indicating bias on the part of Williams against pregnant and nursing women, she alleges no facts expressly linking her comments to the ultimate discharge decision. See Compl., ¶¶ 9-25.
“Absent direct evidence, discrimination claims proceed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Smith v. Blinken, No. 18-3065, 2021 WL 3737455, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021). ...
To continue reading
Request your trial