Belson v. Dix Hills Air Conditioning, Inc.

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: PETER B. SKELOS
• Citation: 990 N.Y.S.2d 49,119 A.D.3d 623,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05144
• Parties: Mark BELSON, respondent, v. DIX HILLS AIR CONDITIONING, INC., et al., appellants.
• Decision Date: 09 July 2014

119 A.D.3d 623
990 N.Y.S.2d 49
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05144

Mark BELSON, respondent,
v.
DIX HILLS AIR CONDITIONING, INC., et al., appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

July 9, 2014.

[990 N.Y.S.2d 50]

John L. Juliano, P.C., East Northport, N.Y., for appellants.

Karpf, Karpf & Cerutti, P.C., Astoria, N.Y. (Adam C. Lease of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for unlawful termination of employment and discrimination in employment on the basis of disability in violation of Executive Law § 296, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), dated April 23, 2012, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute the action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Where, as here, a plaintiff has been served with a 90–day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3), that plaintiff must comply with the demand by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, either to vacate the demand or to extend the 90–day period ( see Griffith v. Wray, 109 A.D.3d 512, 970 N.Y.S.2d 458;Cope v. Barakaat, 89 A.D.3d 670, 671, 931 N.Y.S.2d 910;Gagnon v. Campbell, 86 A.D.3d 623, 624, 927 N.Y.S.2d 602;Sanchez v. Serje, 78 A.D.3d 1155, 1156, 913 N.Y.S.2d 919). Here, the plaintiff failed to do either within the 90–day period. Therefore, in order to excuse his default, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for his failure to timely file the note of issue or move to either vacate the demand or extend the 90–day period, as well as a potentially meritorious cause of action ( see

[990 N.Y.S.2d 51]

Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 655 N.Y.S.2d 848, 678 N.E.2d 460;Furrukh v. Forest Hills Hosp., 107 A.D.3d 668, 966 N.Y.S.2d 497;Jedraszak v. County of Westchester, 102 A.D.3d 924, 958 N.Y.S.2d 490;Davies v. Baranovich, 87 A.D.3d 1049, 1049, 929 N.Y.S.2d 758). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the discretion of the motion court ( see Santiago v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 393, 394, 780 N.Y.S.2d 764;Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568, 569, 657 N.Y.S.2d 66;Grutman v. Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners' Assn., 207 A.D.2d 526, 527, 616 N.Y.S.2d 68).

Nevertheless, CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” (Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d at 503, ...