Belson v. Dix Hills Air Conditioning, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2014
• Citation: 990 N.Y.S.2d 49,119 A.D.3d 623,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05144
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: Mark BELSON, respondent, v. DIX HILLS AIR CONDITIONING, INC., et al., appellants.

119 A.D.3d 623

990 N.Y.S.2d 49

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05144

Mark BELSON, respondent,

v.DIX HILLS AIR CONDITIONING, INC., et al., appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

July 9, 2014.

John L. Juliano, P.C., East Northport, N.Y., for appellants.

Karpf, Karpf & Cerutti, P.C., Astoria, N.Y. (Adam C. Lease of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for unlawful termination of employment and discrimination in employment on the basis of disability in violation of Executive Law § 296, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), dated April 23, 2012, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute the action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Where, as here, a plaintiff has been served with a 90–day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3), that plaintiff must comply with the demand by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, either to vacate the demand or to extend the 90–day period ( see Griffith v. Wray, 109 A.D.3d 512, 970 N.Y.S.2d 458;Cope v. Barakaat, 89 A.D.3d 670, 671, 931 N.Y.S.2d 910;Gagnon v. Campbell, 86 A.D.3d 623, 624, 927 N.Y.S.2d 602;Sanchez v. Serje, 78 A.D.3d 1155, 1156, 913 N.Y.S.2d 919). Here, the plaintiff failed to do either within the 90–day period. Therefore, in order to excuse his default, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for his failure to timely file the note of issue or move to either vacate the demand or extend the 90–day period, as well as a potentially meritorious cause of action ( see Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 655 N.Y.S.2d 848, 678 N.E.2d 460;Furrukh v. Forest Hills Hosp., 107 A.D.3d 668, 966 N.Y.S.2d 497;Jedraszak v. County of Westchester, 102 A.D.3d 924, 958 N.Y.S.2d 490;Davies v. Baranovich, 87 A.D.3d 1049, 1049, 929 N.Y.S.2d 758). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the discretion of the motion court ( see Santiago v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 393, 394, 780 N.Y.S.2d 764;Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568, 569, 657 N.Y.S.2d 66;Grutman v. Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners' Assn., 207 A.D.2d 526, 527, 616 N.Y.S.2d 68).

Nevertheless, CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” (Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d at 503, 655 N.Y.S.2d 848, 678 N.E.2d 460), in that it “never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff's action based on the plaintiff's unreasonable neglect to proceed” ( Davis v. Goodsell, 6 A.D.3d 382, 383, 774 N.Y.S.2d 568;see Di Simone v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 N.Y.2d 632, 633, 768 N.Y.S.2d 735, 800 N.E.2d 1102;Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d at 504–505, 655 N.Y.S.2d 848, 678 N.E.2d 460;Atterberry v. Serlin & Serlin, 85 A.D.3d 949, 925 N.Y.S.2d 860). Thus, “the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay, and potentially a meritorious cause of action” ( Kadyimov v. Mackinnon, 82 A.D.3d 938, 938, 918 N.Y.S.2d 770), but depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff is not always required to establish both a justifiable excuse and a potentially meritorious cause of action to avoid such a dismissal ( see Davis v. Goodsell, 6 A.D.3d at 383–384, 774 N.Y.S.2d 568).

In this case, the plaintiff demonstrated that he did not intend to abandon the action and that there were ongoing discovery...