Belton v. Singer
| Decision Date | 08 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10-6462 (SDW) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | JAMAL BELTON, Plaintiff, v. MARK SINGER, et al., Defendants. |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OPINIONAPPEARANCES:
JAMAL BELTON, Plaintiff pro se
East Jersey State Prison, Special Treatment Unit
CN 905, 8 Production Way
Avenel, New Jersey 07001
Plaintiff, Jamal Belton, an involuntarily committed person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24, et seq., seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), to determine whether the action should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeksmonetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff, Jamal Belton ("Belton"), brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following defendants: Mark Singer, Deputy Attorney General for the State of New Jersey; David L. DaCosta, Deputy Attorney General for the State of New Jersey; John Main, Chief Director of the New Jersey Department of Human Services ("NJDHS") at the Ann Klein Forensic Center in Trenton, New Jersey; Dr. Merril Main, Clinical Director at East Jersey State Prison-Special Treatment Unit ("EJSP-STU"); Jennifer Velez, Commissioner of the NJDHS; Steve Johnson, Assistant Superintendent at EJSP-STU; Shantay Brame Adams, Assistant Unit Director at the EJSP-STU; and Brian Friedman, Director of Psychology at the EJSP-STU. (Complaint, Caption and 55 4b-4i). The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of plaintiff's allegations.
This is the second Complaint Belton has filed with respect to the same and/or similar claims. His first action, Belton v. Sharpe, et al., Civil No. 10-3071 (SDW), was dismissed without prejudice in an Opinion and Order entered by this Court onNovember 29, 2010. The instant Complaint was filed on or about December 13, 2010.
In this Complaint, Belton alleges that defendants, Mark Singer and Jennifer Velez, have overlooked and disregarded that plaintiff is a civilly committed person being housed on prison grounds and subjected to prison policies and treatment conducted or facilitated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC") rather than the NJDHS. (Compl., ¶¶ 4b, 4h). Plaintiff complains that David L. DaCosta failed to oversee and correct the conditions of the EJSP-STU and overlooked plaintiff's complaints that the correctional staff is "mentally humiliating" plaintiff because of his crime and life gender. (Compl., ¶ 4c).
Next, Belton alleges that John Main has failed to correct the conditions of the facility, namely, leaking ceilings, toilets and water that gives a rash. He also alleges that Main has not corrected the problem of having NJDOC staff conduct "treatment movements" that cancels groups when they are still in session. (Compl., ¶ 4d). Belton states that defendant Merril Main has authorized the NJDOC to limit group sessions and segregate population causing plaintiff to be taken out of his former groups without regard to his therapy needs by submitting plaintiff's name to a test called the "hair scope psychopathy test." (Compl., ¶ 4e).
Belton further alleges that defendant Johnson has placed plaintiff under prison policy, rules and regulations, which has caused Belton to be "mentally harassed and degraded" by correctional staff and to be taken out of recommended therapy groups by enforcing a segregation policy. (Compl., ¶ 4f). Defendant Adams allegedly has authorized and approved the NJDOC to harass and confiscate plaintiff's personal belongings, and has overlooked correctional staff canceling or interfering with therapy groups when the session is not over. (Compl., ¶ 4g). Finally, as to defendant Friedman, Belton complains that Friedman also has overlooked the mental harassment by correctional staff when they conduct the running of therapy sessions. (Compl., ¶ 4i)¶
Specifically, Belton alleges that, on May 19, 2010, he observed the NJDHS staff psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers moving their office supplies off grounds to a location in Edison, New Jersey, leaving plaintiff with no on-site psychiatrist after 4:00 p.m. (Compl., ¶ 6). He further alleges that he has received two memos giving different addresses for mailing and receipt of mail other than the EJSP-STU location where he is housed. (Id.).
On October 8, 2010, a bed bug exterminator came to the EJSP-STU, and came every weekday to fumigate the units for bed bug infestation. Belton alleges that the correctional staffconstantly cancels therapy sessions, conducts unit searches, and interferes with the "running of groups." He states that, on October 21, 2010, he overheard Sgt. Smith telling another officer that "that's what happens when a celebrity is on the unit." Belton brought this to defendant Adams attention, but she merely stated that this is NJDOC policy. (Id.).
On November 1, 2010, Belton states that he received a memo that his electronics would no longer be permitted. He states that he was told that if he complained, his electronic equipment would be confiscated for a year with an appeal. He provides a copy of the memo, which includes memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives, detachable or external drives, data storage devices, X-Box Elite, PS 3 (Play Station 3), Wii, and remote controls with digital read-out or viewing screens. The memo states that these electronic devices compromise the security and orderly running of the institution. The memo further states that any resident who "attempts to circumvent the electronics policy ... will lose electronic privileges permanently with an appeal after one year." (See November 1, 2010 Interoffice Communication Memo attached to Complaint). Belton alleges that this memo shows that he is being placed under full prison policies and guidelines disregarding the fact that he is not serving a prison term. Further, Belton alleges that he was told by Johnson that residents at EJSP-STU are under the "10A- Code" instead of thecivilly committed act, causing the residents to be subjected to strip searches, cell searches and random shakedowns, and the confiscation of electronic equipment. (Compl., ¶ 6).
Belton also makes general allegations that therapy groups are conducted by the NJDOC "movements", causing plaintiff to be taken out of therapy groups that he had attended previously, or causing the session to be cancelled before it is over. He states that on November 23, 2010, he "constantly complain[ed]" about this problem but never receives a response to his grievances. (Id.).
On September 16, 2010, Belton alleges that Friedman admitted that plaintiff is in an "untherapeutic environment" and that treatment is "futile" because of the prison setting and because the NJDHS does not have the money to give proper treatment and housing. (Id.).
On November 27, Belton complains that he was strip searched after his "p.m. visits." (Id.).
Belton asks to be placed in a federally funded treatment facility. He also seeks monetary compensation for being placed in a prison environment where he has suffered mental anguish, harassment, and discrimination. (Compl., ¶ 7).
A district court is required to review a complaint in a civil action where the litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis. Specifically, the court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, because Belton is proceeding in forma pauperis in this matter, this action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). See also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Id.
A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989) (). The standard for evaluating whether a complaint is "frivolous" is an objective one. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears "'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). See also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94 ().
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard for summary dismissal of a...
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