Beltran v. City of El Paso

• Decision Date: 14 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-50427.,03-50427.
• Citation: 367 F.3d 299
• Parties: Manuela BELTRAN, Individually and as legal representative on behalf of the heirs of both the Estate of Irene Beltran Garcia, and the Estate of Sonye Leigh Herrera, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The CITY OF EL PASO, et al., Defendants, Sylvia Amador, also known as D590SA, also known as Operator Lewis, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

367 F.3d 299

Manuela BELTRAN, Individually and as legal representative on behalf of the heirs of both the Estate of Irene Beltran Garcia, and the Estate of Sonye Leigh Herrera, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The CITY OF EL PASO, et al., Defendants, Sylvia Amador, also known as D590SA, also known as Operator Lewis, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-50427.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 14, 2004.

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Georgena Marie Palafox (argued), El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Duane Allen Baker (argued), El Paso, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and MAGILL,^* Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from a father's murder of his wife and fifteen-year old daughter. The girl's grandmother filed this damage action against the City of El Paso and the 911 operator who allegedly mishandled the victim's initial emergency call. The district court perfunctorily denied the 911 operator's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the 911 operator now appeals. Because the appellee failed to state a violation of clearly established equal protection or due process rights against the 911 operator, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in her favor.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 1999, Sonye Herrera ("Sonye") called 911 to report that her father, Armando Herrera ("Herrera"), was drunk and was becoming physically and verbally abusive to her and her mother, Irene Beltran-Garcia ("Garcia"). Police units were dispatched and Sonye's father was arrested and charged with felony child injury.

A few months later, on April 16, 2000, Sonye again called 911 from her home to report that her father was drunk and potentially violent. Sylvia Amador, the 911 operator who received the call, discussed the situation with Sonye in order to ascertain the nature of the emergency. At the outset of the call, Sonye indicated that her father had threatened her and that she was afraid for her life and hiding in a bathroom, but she did not indicate that she had been physically abused. Sonye repeatedly asked Amador to send the police to her house. Amador responded to Sonye that the police were receiving the information that Amador was placing into the 911 system. At one point during the call, Sonye informed Amador that she believed her father had left the premises. Amador then requested information about Herrera's automobile and potential destination. Before disconnecting the call, Amador informed Sonye that the police would be sent out and suggested that if Sonye believed her father was still in the house, she might wish to remain locked in the bathroom for her safety. Amador then disconnected the call.

While recording Sonye's information into the dispatch computer, Amador did not include Sonye's statements that she feared for her life or the prior report of Herrera's domestic violence. Based on the family relationship between Sonye and her father and Amador's understanding of the situation, Amador coded the call a "family violence assault," a priority level 4 call. Amador's entries led a police dispatch operator to send out two general broadcasts regarding the incident. No police units immediately responded and soon thereafter, Herrera, who had not actually left the house, shot and killed his wife and daughter.

Manuela Beltran ("Beltran"), Sonye's grandmother, sued the City of El Paso and Amador on behalf of herself and the decedents' estates. The action filed in state court alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Texas Family Violence Prevention Act,¹ along with a variety of other state law tort and contract claims. Amador removed the case to federal court and, following discovery, moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied Amador's motion in a one-paragraph order holding that disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether Amador was entitled to qualified immunity. Amador has filed a proper interlocutory appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The court of appeals reviews a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo. Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.2002). As a general matter, where a district court has found that genuine factual disputes exist in an interlocutory appeal asserting qualified immunity, the court of appeals must accept the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. See Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir.2000). Nevertheless, where a district court does not set out the factual basis underlying its legal determinations related to a claim of qualified immunity, the court of appeals must review the record to determine what facts the district court assumed. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).

B. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government official from liability based on the performance of discretionary functions. Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir.2001). To establish an entitlement to qualified immunity, a government official must first show that the conduct occurred while he was acting in his official capacity and within the scope of his discretionary authority. Cronen v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 977 F.2d 934, 939 (5th Cir.1992). Once a defendant has properly invoked qualified immunity, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show that the defense does not apply. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc).

Courts apply a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity is applicable in a given case. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right. See id. at 322-23. Second, the court must determine whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established legal rules at the time of the alleged violation. Id.

1. Amador's Discretionary Authority

As a threshold matter, Beltran contends that Amador's position did not involve the type of discretionary decisionmaking authority for which qualified immunity is designed. Beltran argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Amador exercised any measure of discretionary authority in her position as a 911 operator. According to Beltran, Amador holds a purely ministerial position requiring her to transcribe and enter caller-provided information into a computer system in accordance with departmental policies. Beltran contends that Amador possessed neither the requisite education, training or skills to exercise personal deliberation in her job.

Because the district court did not set out the facts it relied upon to determine that genuine issues of material fact existed, we must examine the record below in the light most favorable to Beltran, the nonmoving party, to determine what facts guided the district court. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151. The record indicates no factual dispute between the parties concerning Amador's education, training, skills, or the actual tasks attendant to her job. Likewise, there is no dispute that Amador was acting in her official capacity during the incident and that, if she had discretionary authority, her actions fell within its scope. Thus, the only disagreement between the parties is whether Amador possessed a sufficient quantum of discretionary authority to be entitled to a qualified immunity defense. To the extent Beltran suggests the facts on this issue are disputed, the discrepancies are not material. For this reason, despite the district court's determination that genuine issues of material fact exist in this action, the order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity is appealable as a legal issue. See Hatfield, 306 F.3d at 225.

Whether viewed as a matter of characterization or of quantification, the evidence demonstrates that Amador exercised crucial discretion in her job. Amador's job appears ministerial to the extent that she is required to transcribe information from callers in a relatively structured manner. But considering the urgency inherent in emergency situations, 911 operators like Amador regularly make a variety of judgment calls. Their principal role is to determine how a particular caller's information should be entered into the system so that it will be useful to emergency service providers. One of Amador's specific tasks is to enter a short statement regarding the "immediate reason" an officer is needed at the scene of the incident. Such determinations are the paradigmatic type of discretionary decisions that law enforcement personnel routinely undertake. Moreover, the parties agree that Amador is required to classify calls based on the facts she gleans in careful conversation with the caller. Indeed, Beltran's equal protection claim centers on the assertion that Amador improperly classified Sonye's call as a priority level 4 "family violence assault" call rather than a priority level 3 "injury to child in progress" call. Amador's responsibility to interpret and then classify and transcribe calls based on the information she obtains, buttresses our conclusion that Amador possessed the necessary quantum of discretionary authority to properly assert qualified immunity.

2. Existence of a Clearly Established Constitutional Right

a. Equal Protection Claim

Beltran argues that by coding Sonye's 911 call a priority level 4 "family violence assault," rather than a priority level 3 "injury to a child in progress," Amador violated both Sonye's and Garcia's rights to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The "Due Process Clause does not require a State to provide its citizens with particular protective services." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Therefore, "a...