Beltran v. Strachota
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-C-1101 |
| Parties | ALICIA BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. JIM STRACHOTA, MARK D. BENSEN, WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, JOHN DOE, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DOCS. 34, 42) AND DISMISSING CASE
According to Alicia Beltran's petition in this case,1 when she was about three and months pregnant a state-court commissioner ordered her to inpatient treatment for drug abuse. The commissioner based the order on Wis. Stat. § 48.133, which provides that a state court can exercise jurisdiction over a pregnant woman and order treatment if the pregnant woman "habitually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child, and of the child when born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant mother receives prompt and adequate treatment for that habitual lack of self-control."
After learning she was pregnant, Beltran went to a clinic for a prenatal checkup and detailed her medical history for a physician's assistant. (Doc. 1 at 8.) That medical historyincluded Beltran's report that she had a prior issue with Percocet and had just finished taking Suboxone to end her Percocet dependency. The physician's assistant recommended that Beltran submit to a prescribed regimen of Suboxone, but Beltran refused. (Id.) Apparently the physician's assistant reported Beltran's drug use to authorities. About two weeks after Beltran's visit to the clinic, five law enforcement officials arrived at her door with a warrant for her arrest. She was handcuffed, placed in a police car, and driven to a hospital, where she was required to submit to a doctor's examination. The doctor declared Beltran and her pregnancy to be healthy. (Id. at 9.) Nevertheless, Beltran was held in the Washington County Jail for hours until she was taken, in handcuffs and shackles, to a courtroom. (Id.)
Beltran asked the presiding court commissioner if she could speak to an attorney. The commissioner stated that none would be provided but that Beltran would get counsel at the next hearing. (Id. at 9-10.) The district attorney of Washington County had filed a child-in-need-of-protective-services (CHIPS) proceeding. (See id. at 10.) At the end of the hearing, Beltran was taken to a halfway house. The following day she was transported in handcuffs and shackles to the Casa Clare Treatment Center, a private women's facility providing drug treatment through counseling. Upon arrival at Casa Clare, Beltran was subjected to a urinalysis test, which was negative for all drugs, including Suboxone. (Id.)
Beltran remained at Casa Clare for over two months. She then filed this habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Four days after Beltran filed this case seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to gain her release and a permanent injunction against enforcement of Wis. Stat. § 48.133, a Washington County Circuit Court judgeallowed her release from Casa Clare with restrictions. After this court scheduled a status conference (but before the conference took place), the Washington County District Attorney withdrew the CHIPS petition, the state-court case was dismissed, and all restrictions imposed by the Washington County Circuit Court expired.2 (See Doc. 39 at 1; Doc. 40 at 1.) Beltran's projected due date was approximately in January 2014. (See Doc. 1 at 10.)
Beltran filed this habeas case against Washington County District Attorney Mark Bensen; the County's director of human services, Jim Strachota; the Washington County Circuit Court; and the executive director of Casa Clare. After Beltran was released from Casa Clare this court dismissed all § 2241 claims against Casa Clare's executive director because he could no longer be considered her physical custodian for § 2241 purposes (if he ever was). Further, the court denied Beltran's motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The Washington County Circuit Court, Strachota, and Bensen have moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(6), and ©. Bensen argues that he is not a proper respondent because he was not and is not Beltran's custodian, the case is moot because all CHIPS proceedings were dismissed, and Beltran failed to exhaust her state remedies. Strachota and the Washington County Circuit Court also argue mootness and failure to exhaust. Moreover, they contend that an abstention doctrine applies and the state court is not a suable entity.
Only the mootness issue under Rule 12(b)(1) needs to be addressed. Regardless, if Beltran's allegations are true, what happened to her is extremely disturbing. But, she is no longer in custody and no collateral consequences attend her.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter related in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party seeking to exercise jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled on other grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004).
For any motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are assumed to be true, and all such facts, as well as the reasonable inferences therefrom, are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (7th Cir. 1997). However, for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) the court may look beyond the complaint to evidence that calls the court's jurisdiction into question. Sutton v. Napolitano, 986 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2013); see Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009) (). Here, the court considers the undisputed release of Beltran from custody, the dismissal of the CHIPS proceeding, and references to Beltran's due date that indicate that her pregnancy must have ended about nine months ago.
Beltran filed this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a basic requirement of that habeas corpus statute is that the petitioner be "in custody." Rivas-Melendrez v.Napolitano, 689 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2012). However, if custody exists at the time a petition is filed, the custody requirement is satisfied. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). For purposes of the present motions no one disputes that Beltran was in custody at the time she filed this case and that this court acquired subject matter jurisdiction at that time.
Nevertheless, Beltran's subsequent release from custody may have caused her case to become moot. See id. Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides federal courts with jurisdiction over "cases" and "controversies." The usual rule is that an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the action, including during any appeal or certiorari review. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). The case-or-controversy requirement means that "throughout the litigation, the plaintiff 'must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). If the controversy evaporates, the case is moot; the court loses jurisdiction over it and must dismiss. "No matter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute 'is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs' particular legal rights.'" Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013) (quoting Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009).
Habeas petitions are most often brought by those convicted of crimes, and an incarcerated person or parolee's challenge to the validity of a conviction constitutes a case or controversy because incarceration and restrictions during parole or supervisionconstitute "concrete injur[ies], caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. But even for those convicted of crimes, once the custody or restriction has expired "some 'collateral consequence' of the conviction" must exist for a habeas suit to avoid mootness. Id. And while a criminal conviction is generally presumed to have continuing collateral consequences,3 other proceedings, such as parole revocations, do not. Id. at 8, 14.
Beltran admits that she is no longer subject to any liberty restraints. (Doc. 44 at 3.) She was not convicted; nor was she subject to any civil judgment in the CHIPS case. So no presumption of collateral consequences exists and she must demonstrate them to obtain relief under § 2241. See id. But she has failed to so demonstrate. Collateral consequences consist of restrictions such as the inability to vote or serve as a juror. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968). A simple possibility of future restrictions or outcomes—such as an increased future sentence for the next crime committed, which is contingent upon a person's violation of the law, getting caught, and being convicted—is too speculative to constitute a collateral consequence. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15.
Beltran contends that she is subject to a collateral consequence because she "may suffer loss of parental rights at the State's initiative" as a result of her previous arrest and detention under § 48.133. (Doc. 44 at 11.) She argues that a guardian ad litem may initiate proceedings for termination of parental rights and the court would consider past drug use during that case. But these...
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