Belville v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:13–6529.
• Citation: 13 F.Supp.3d 528
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Lance R. BELVILLE, Donald C. Carr, Mindi Stewart, Stanley Stewart, Dean Richardson, Christine Salamone, Charles Johnson, Jill Durant, Beverly Gorton, Josh Legato, Michael Antramgarza, Roofwerks, Inc., Quintin Williams, ACA Legal Investigations, Inc., John McGee, Mills Allison, David H. Patton, Inez A. Patton, Laura Elsinger, and Gabriel Kletschka, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

13 F.Supp.3d 528

Lance R. BELVILLE, Donald C. Carr, Mindi Stewart, Stanley Stewart, Dean Richardson, Christine Salamone, Charles Johnson, Jill Durant, Beverly Gorton, Josh Legato, Michael Antramgarza, Roofwerks, Inc., Quintin Williams, ACA Legal Investigations, Inc., John McGee, Mills Allison, David H. Patton, Inez A. Patton, Laura Elsinger, and Gabriel Kletschka, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:13–6529.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.

Signed March 31, 2014.

Adam J. Levitt, John E. Tangren, Grant & Eisenhofer, Aleksandra M. S. Vold, Joseph J. Siprut, Siprut, Chicago, IL, Jeff A. Almeida, Kyle J. McGee, Grant & Eisenhofer, Wilmington, DE, Alison K. Hurley, Benjamin L. Price, Keith G. Bremer, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara, Newport Beach, CA, C. Calvin Warriner, III, John Scarola, Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, West Palm Beach, FL, Caitlin Duffy, Squitieri & Fearon, New York, NY, E. Powell Miller, Richard L. Merpi, II, The Miller Law Firm, Rochester, MI, Grant Lavalle Davis, Timothy C. Gaarder, Davis Bethune & Jones, Kansas City, MO, Gregory M. Travalio, Mark H. Troutman, Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, Columbus, OH, Guy R. Bucci, Timothy C. Bailey, L. Lee Javins, II, Bucci Bailey & Javins, Niall A. Paul, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Edgar F. Heiskell, III, Edgar F. Heiskell, III, Charleston, WV, James Bartimus, Stephen M. Gorny, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, Leawood, KS, John T. Murray, Murray & Murray, Sandusky, OH, Mark A. Dicello, Robert F. Dicello, The Dicello Law Firm, Mentor, OH, Nathan B. Atkinson, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Winston–Salem, NC, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Trask, McGuire Woods, UK, Bradley J. Schmalzer, Michael Bonasso, Susan W. Romaine, William J. Hanna, Flaherty Sensabaugh & Bonasso, Charleston, WV, Jeffrey A. Holmstrand, Flaherty Sensabaugh & Bonasso, Wheeling, WV, John Tracy Walker, IV, Sarah Virginia Bondurant, Tennille Jo Checkovich, McGuireWoods, Richmond, VA, Peter J. Fazio, Aaronson Rappaport Feinstein & Deutsch, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS, Chief Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 34. The Court held a hearing on the matter on February 6, 2014. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, and DENIES, IN PART, Ford's motion.

I.FACTS

On March 28, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a 135 page Class Action Complaint against Defendant Ford Motor Company. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert they purchased or leased Ford vehicles in West Virginia, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin.¹ The vehicles at issue involve various models of Ford vehicles manufactured between 2002 and 2010, which are equipped with electronic throttle control systems (referred to as ETC systems or ETCS).

At the hearing, Plaintiffs explained the ETC system receives and sends data to various components and sensors in the vehicles, which includes opening and closing the throttle. Plaintiffs assert these ETC systems are defectively designed and may malfunction and cause sudden unintended acceleration. To mitigate a sudden unintended acceleration, which is what Plaintiffs refer to as a consequence of the alleged defect, they assert Ford should have installed a Brake Over Accelerator system (BOA system, also referred to as a Brake Override System), which Plaintiffs claim allows a driver to depress the brake pedal and mitigate a sudden unintended acceleration event. According to Plaintiffs, these malfunctions in the ETC systems may be the result of electromagnetic interference (EMI), resistive shorts, or other voltage and resistance fluctuations. Compl. at ¶ 105. At the hearing, Plaintiffs summarized their allegations in the Complaint regarding the problem with this system as follows:

1. The electronics do not properly communicate in a fault tolerant manner:

a. The ETCS can only detect a single point of failure which results in an unwanted open throttle. (¶ 172)

b. The accelerator pedal sensors are designed to ignore one of the sensor signals which can result in an open throttle. (¶ 173)

c. The ETCS improperly goes into and out of limp home mode resulting in an [ ] open throttle (¶¶ 172, 173, 174)

2. The failsafe limp home mode is unreliable. (For example, the signal for the diagnostic trouble code can indicate that the limp home mode should trigger but does not) (¶¶ 10, 136, 172, 173, 174)

3. The ETCS is a safety critical system which does not work—the lack of a Brake–Over Accelerator is just one aspect of its defective condition (¶¶ 100, 106, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137)

Plaintiffs assert that Ford's failure to equip its ETC vehicles with a failsafe system rendered the vehicles unreasonably dangerous and defective at the time of purchase. As a result, Plaintiffs allege they have suffered economic damages because they paid more to purchase or lease the vehicles than their actual worth.²

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the United States Supreme Court disavowed the “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), which was long used to evaluate complaints subject to 12(b)(6) motions. 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In its place, courts must now look for “plausibility” in the complaint. This standard requires a plaintiff to set forth the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to relief” that is more than mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true (even when doubtful), the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Id. (citations omitted). If the allegations in the complaint, assuming their truth, do “not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the requirements of Rule 8 and the “plausibility standard” in more detail. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations[.]” 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a mere “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Facial plausibility exists when a claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court continued by explaining that, although factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a plausible claim is stated in a complaint requires a court to conduct a context-specific analysis, drawing upon the court's own judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. If the court finds from its analysis that “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting, in part, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). The Supreme Court further articulated that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.

III.DISCUSSION

A.Failure to Adequately Allege a Defect

Ford first argues that the entire Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific design or manufacturing defect in the ETC system which makes its vehicles susceptible to sudden unintended acceleration events. Instead, Ford argues, these claims are made in a conclusory fashion and cannot survive scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6). For instance, Ford asserts Plaintiffs merely allege that a sudden unintended acceleration “may” be caused by electro-magnetic interference without identifying any specific defect. Ford argues that Plaintiffs' failure to identify any specific design defect with the ETC system makes their claims insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly. Upon review of the Complaint, the Court disagrees.

The Court finds Ford's argument misframes Plaintiffs' real claim of defect in this case. It is true that Plaintiffs allege there may be a malfunction in the ETC system for a variety of reasons. However, Plaintiffs' claim of defect is that, when there is a malfunction, the ETC system itself is defective because it only is designed to detect a single point of failure, depriving the operator of control over the throttle and allowing the throttle to remain open and result in a sudden unintended acceleration. Plaintiffs assert the ETC system could and should have been designed in such a way to detect multiple faults at the same time, and Ford should have added failsafes, such as a BOA system, to give control of the throttle back to the driver if a sudden unintended acceleration occurs. In other words, ...