Bement v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co.

Citation160 N.W. 424,194 Mich. 64
Decision Date21 December 1916
Docket NumberNo. 400.,400.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan
PartiesBEMENT v. GRAND RAPIDS & I. RY. CO.

194 Mich. 64
160 N.W. 424

BEMENT
v.
GRAND RAPIDS & I. RY. CO.

No. 400.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 21, 1916.


Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Joseph Barton, Judge.

Action by George D. Bement against the Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Argued before STONE, C. J., and KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, and BROOKE, JJ.

[160 N.W. 424]

H. Monroe Dunham and John M. Dunham, both of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

James H. Campbell, of Grand Rapids (Elvert M. Davis, of Grand Rapids, of counsel), for appellee.


KUHN, J.

Section 6 of the federal Employers' Liability Act (35 U. S. Stat. 65, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, vol. 4, pages 3912-3916), provides:

‘No action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.’

The action in this case was not commenced within the two years prescribed by the statute, for the reason, as alleged by the plaintiff, that he relied upon certain fraudulent representations made to him by the defendant company, and that because of these fraudulent representations defendant company is estopped from asserting or setting up the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action. It is the contention of the defendant that the rules which apply to ordinary statutes of limitations do not apply to a statute creating a right of action and a new liability and fixing therein the time in which that action may be commenced. This presents the sole question here for review.

The statute in question being a federal statute, we should be governed in its construction by the decisions of the federal courts. While no decision of the United States Supreme Court involving the precise question here raised has been called to our attention, the exact question has had the consideration of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Morrison v. B. & O. R. Co., 40 App. Cas. D. C. 391, where it was said:

‘* * * Plaintiff seeks to invoke the well-recognized rule that when a defendant, who relies upon an ordinary statute of limitations, has previously been guilty of deception or violation of duty toward the plaintiff, causing him to subject his claim to the statutory bar, such a defendant will be held to have wrongfully obtained an advantage, which, in good conscience, he is estopped to hold or plead. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 22 L. Ed. 636;Holman v. Omaha & C. B. R. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa, 268, 90 N. W. 833,62 L. R. A...

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