Benacquista v. Spratt

• Decision Date: 17 November 2016
• Docket Number: 1:16-CV-581
• Citation: 217 F.Supp.3d 588
• Parties: Brianna BENACQUISTA, Plaintiff, v. Joshua SPRATT, City of Watervliet, Board of Education Enlarged City School District of the City of Watervliet, New York, and Watervliet City School District, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

217 F.Supp.3d 588

Brianna BENACQUISTA, Plaintiff,

v.Joshua SPRATT, City of Watervliet, Board of Education Enlarged City School District of the City of Watervliet, New York, and Watervliet City School District, Defendants.

1:16-CV-581

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed November 17, 2016

E. STEWART JONES HACKER MURPHY, LLP, 28 Second Street, OF COUNSEL: RYAN M. FINN, ESQ., DAVID I. IVERSEN, ESQ., Troy, NY 12180, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

LAMARCHE, SAFRANKO LAW FIRM, 1539 Crescent Road, P.O. Box 5437, OF COUNSEL: ANDREW R. SAFRANKO, ESQ., Clifton Park, NY 12065, Attorneys for Defendant Joshua Spratt.

GOLDBERG, SEGALLA LAW FIRM, 8 Southwoods Boulevard, Suite 300, OF COUNSEL:

JONATHAN M. BERNSTEIN, ESQ, Albany, NY 12211, Attorneys for Defendant City of Watervliet.

REHFUSS, LIGUORI LAW FIRM, 40 British American Boulevard, OF COUNSEL: STEPHEN J. REHFUSS, ESQ., Latham, NY 12110, Attorneys for Defendants Board of Education and Watervliet City School District.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brianna Benacquista ("Benacquista" or "plaintiff"), a former student at Watervliet High School, initially filed this civil rights action in Supreme Court, Albany County, against defendants Joshua Spratt ("Spratt"), Watervliet City School District (the "District"), the District's Board of Education (the "Board"), and the City of Watervliet (the "City"). Plaintiff alleges that Spratt, a City police officer employed part-time by the District as a "school resource officer," coerced her into an illegal sexual relationship during her senior year of high school.

Benacquista's six-count federal complaint, which she filed after defendants removed this action to federal court, asserts claims for federal relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection (Second Cause of Action) and due process (Fourth Cause of Action) as well as for violations of her rights secured under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") (Third Cause of Action). Plaintiff's complaint also asserts state law claims pursuant to the Dignity for All Students Act ("DASA") (Sixth Cause of Action), negligence (First Cause of Action), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Fifth Cause of Action), and battery (Fifth Cause of Action).

The District and the Board (collectively the "School Defendants") have moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action. The motion is fully briefed and has been considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND¹

During Benacquista's senior year of high school, the District employed Spratt, an officer with the City's police department, as a part-time "school resource officer." Compl. ¶ 9. A school resource officer like Spratt "is a police officer who is assigned to act as a liaison between the police department and the staff and students at a school district." EC ex rel. RC v. Cty. of Suffolk , 882 F.Supp.2d 323, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Spratt typically spent three days a week at the District, where he maintained an office in the high school. Compl. ¶ 20.

According to the complaint, Spratt used his status as both a City police officer and a school resource officer to "groom" Benacquista and at least two other unnamed female students; that is, Spratt built a friendship with each of them in an effort to "lure[ ] and coerce[ ]" them into "illegal sexual relationships." Compl. ¶¶ 4, 15. With respect to plaintiff in particular, Spratt initiated a friendship by spending "at least two or three class periods" with her each day before later volunteering to tutor her in trigonometry. Id . ¶¶ 20, 25. Eventually, Spratt and plaintiff engaged in a series of illegal sexual acts between April 19 and May 24, 2015, near the end of her senior year. See id . ¶ 7.

As relevant here, Benacquista maintains that the District and its officials were on notice of Spratt's increasingly impermissible behavior but failed to take preventive or corrective action. See generally Compl. For example, plaintiff and other high school students, a "disproportionate" number of whom were female, would often "hang out" in Spratt's office, which was situated adjacent to one occupied by Assistant Principal Lewinter, for long periods of time. Id . ¶¶ 21, 23. During these "hang out" sessions, Spratt obstructed the view into the window on his office door so that passers-by in the hallway could not see inside. Id . ¶ 26.

Benacquista further asserts that parents and various District employees raised "repeated concerns" about Spratt's behavior that included, but were not limited to, their observations that he was "flirting" and "getting too close" to female students. Compl. ¶ 22. For instance, Mary Griffin, a hall monitor, was "consistent[ly] concerned" about Spratt's "inappropriate relationships" with female students and "repeatedly" raised these concerns with the District. Id . ¶ 21. Likewise, other employees, such as Mrs. Dragon, Mrs. Coffey, Mrs. Aubri, and Mrs. Lavick, "raised repeated concerns" about "the inappropriate relationships" they had "repeatedly and consistently observed" Spratt form with several female students.² Id . ¶ 22. According to the complaint, at least one parent also contacted the District with specific concerns about how plaintiff and Spratt seemed to spend an "inordinate amount of time" together. Id . ¶¶ 19-20.

The complaint also asserts that Patrick Cunniff, Spratt's friend and a teacher at the high school, had similarly exchanged "inappropriate text messages of a sexual nature" with female high school students. Compl. ¶ 27. Cunniff was eventually terminated when the District became aware of this behavior. Id . Finally, the complaint asserts that a number of Spratt's fellow police officers were aware of his misdeeds and took no action despite being required by law to do so. Id . ¶¶ 28-33.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca , 839 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "Although a complaint need only contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ ( FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2) ), more than mere conclusions are required." Id ."Indeed, ‘[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.’ " Id . (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). "Dismissal is appropriate only where plaintiff has failed to provide some basis for the allegations that support the elements of his claims." Id . ; see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (requiring "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face").

IV. DISCUSSION

The School Defendants argue that Benacquista's equal protection, DASA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and battery claims must be dismissed against them. Further, they assert that punitive damages are not available against either the District or the Board.

A. Equal Protection (Second Cause of Action)

First, the School Defendants argue that Benacquista's § 1983 equal protection claims must be dismissed against them because plaintiff has failed to identify any similarly situated individuals or groups who were treated more favorably. Alternatively, defendants argue the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are insufficient to establish that either entity was "deliberately indifferent" to reports of Spratt's sexual misconduct. Plaintiff, citing Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck , 462 F.Supp.2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), responds that her equal protection claims are for "gender based intentional discrimination and harassment" and therefore do not require her to supply proof of any similarly situated individuals or groups. Further, plaintiff asserts that she has sufficiently pleaded that Spratt's "motivations were based upon gender" because he targeted "only female students" for "illegal sexual relationships."

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The parties agree that this constitutional provision is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. , 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Beyond this basic principle, however, further analysis of the parties' dispute on this issue is complicated by their apparent reluctance to engage with the relevant issues and, in Benacquista's case, an insistence on repeated citations to only tenuously relevant case law.

As an initial matter, Benacquista is correct to assert that various courts, in this Circuit and others, have recognized a constitutional right under the equal protection clause "to an educational environment free of sexual harassment." Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist. , 163 F.3d 749, 759 (2d Cir. 1998) (considering peer-on-peer harassment claim), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm. , 555 U.S. 246, 258, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009) (holding that Title IX does not preclude a parallel § 1983 suit "based on the Equal Protection Clause" for "plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools"); see also Kern v. City of Rochester , 93 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that "sex-based discrimination, including sexual harassment, may be actionable under § 1983 as a violation of equal protection"); Cowan v. City of Mt. Vernon , 95 F.Supp.3d 624, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (observing that "[s]exual harassment that rises...