Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego

• Decision Date: 12 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-55274,19-55274
• Citation: 993 F.3d 1134
• Parties: John BENAVIDEZ; Heather Benavidez; J.C.B., a minor; A.J.B., a minor by and through their Guardian Ad Litem Diana Benavidez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; Jennifer Lisk; Benita Jemison, Defendants-Appellees, and San Diego Health and Human Services Agency; Polinksy Children's Center; Does, 1 through 50 inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

993 F.3d 1134

John BENAVIDEZ; Heather Benavidez; J.C.B., a minor; A.J.B., a minor by and through their Guardian Ad Litem Diana Benavidez, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; Jennifer Lisk; Benita Jemison, Defendants-Appellees,andSan Diego Health and Human Services Agency; Polinksy Children's Center; Does, 1 through 50 inclusive, Defendants.

No. 19-55274

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2020 Pasadena, California

Filed April 12, 2021

KATZMANN, Judge:

This appeal turns on the sufficiency of allegations in an amended complaint asserting judicial deception and violation of other constitutional rights in securing a court order resulting in medical examinations of minors without notice to or consent of the parents. The Benavidezes, John and Heather Benavidez ("Parents") and their children J.C.B. and A.J.B. ("Minors"), assert claims against the County of San Diego, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency ("HHSA"), the Polinsky Children's Center ("PCC") (collectively, "the County") and the County's social workers, Jennifer Lisk and Benita Jemison ("Lisk and Jemison"), based on medical examinations of Minors during their time in protective custody. The Benavidezes seek to hold Lisk and Jemison liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional judicial deception in seeking a state juvenile court order to authorize unconstitutional medical examinations of the Minors without notice to or consent of the Parents. They further seek to hold the County liable for the unconstitutional medical examinations. The district court dismissed with prejudice the claim against Lisk and Jemison based on qualified immunity and the claim against the County based on a failure to allege Monell liability. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") alleges as follows: Acting on behalf of the County, HHSA social workers Lisk and Jemison obtained a protective custody warrant and, with police assistance, removed the Minors from their home to PCC. Three days later, on March 21, 2016, a California juvenile court held a detention hearing to review the removal of the Minors and issued an "Order Authorizing Medical Examination and Treatment" for each of the Minors (collectively, "Orders"). The Parents were present at the detention hearing. However, neither Lisk, Jemison, nor any County employee discussed the medical examinations with the Benavidezes before or after the hearing. Furthermore, there was no discussion of medical examinations at the hearing.

Prior to this hearing, the County submitted a Detention Report to the court. The Report notably did not contain any discussion of efforts made to obtain the Parents' consent to medical examinations of the Minors. The SAC alleges that neither Lisk nor Jemison nor any County employee sought the Parents' consent or advised them of their right to be present at the medical examinations of the Minors at any point between the date of the Minors' removal and the date of the hearing and subsequent issuance of the Orders. These alleged events contravene a policy enacted by the County in 2015 ("2015 Policy"), which required County employees to obtain parental consent and to advise parents of their right to be present at medical examinations at PCC.

As a result of the Orders, the Minors were subjected to medical examinations at PCC on March 22, 2016, one day after the hearing and four days after the Minors were removed from their home. The medical examinations included "a full body inspection including the children's genital and/or anal areas, obtaining urine to test, and drawing blood and/or vaccinations

." The Parents were not informed of these medical examinations until after they happened, did not consent to these medical examinations, and were not present or given the opportunity to be present at these medical examinations. The Parents "did not become aware that the examinations had occurred until after the Minor Plaintiffs were released from PCC." The Benavidezes then appealed the juvenile court decisions involving removal of the Minors from their home in California state court but did not there challenge the medical examinations or related Orders.

The Benavidezes filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California on March 16, 2018. The Benavidezes amended their complaint on July 5, 2018, after the County filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed their first amended complaint, concluding that it was a prohibited de facto appeal of the state court decision under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine, failed to allege constitutional violations, and failed to allege claims against the County. The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. On November 9, 2018, the Benavidezes filed the SAC. On February 12, 2019, the district court again dismissed their complaint, this time with prejudice. The district court concluded that: (1) the Rooker - Feldman doctrine did not bar exercise of jurisdiction; (2) the Benavidezes alleged constitutional violations in the medical examinations; (3) the Benavidezes failed to allege a claim against Lisk and Jemison because the government employees were entitled to qualified immunity; (4) the Benavidezes failed to allege a claim against the County because they did not allege "a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation"; and (5) further amendments would be futile, so the case was dismissed with prejudice. The Benavidezes timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a)(3). The Benavidezes timely filed notice of appeal on March 8, 2019. This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's jurisdictional determination under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine, Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose , 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) ; a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, Palm v. L.A. Dep't of Water & Power , 889 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2018) ; a district court's decision on qualified immunity, Thompson v. Mahre , 110 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1997) ; and a district court's decision on municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; see, e.g. , Dougherty v. City of Covina , 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend. See OSU Student All. v. Ray , 699 F.3d 1053, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

The Benavidezes' appeal involves two primary issues: first, whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction where the County contends that the Rooker - Feldman doctrine bars this claim as a de facto appeal of a state court decision, second, whether the Benavidezes sufficiently pleaded section 1983 liability against Lisk and Jemison in light of qualified immunity and limited liability against municipalities under Monell . As to these issues, we hold that the Rooker - Feldman doctrine permits federal subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, that the Benavidezes adequately pleaded Lisk and Jemison's section 1983 liability, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing with prejudice the Benavidezes' claims against the County.

I. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Bar Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

As a threshold matter, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that the Rooker - Feldman doctrine does not bar the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The district court held that the claims alleged were based on the asserted legal wrongs committed by Lisk and Jemison and the County's corresponding policy and custom and were not challenging the Orders issued by the juvenile court. The County argues, as it did below, that the Benavidezes' claims constitute a prohibited de facto appeal of the juvenile court's decision, and thus the court does not have jurisdiction under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. We disagree.

The Rooker - Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). "Under Rooker - Feldman , a federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court." Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam , 334 F.3d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 2003). The Rooker - Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction "to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings." Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano , 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Branson v. Nott , 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA , 856 F.3d 696, 710 (9th Cir. 2017) ) (other citations omitted). " Rooker - Feldman is a statute-based doctrine, based on the structure and negative inferences of the relevant statutes rather than on any direct command of those statutes." Noel v. Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs thus cannot come to federal court to seek "what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment." Johnson v. De Grandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) (citations omitted).

Noel provided the following "general formulation" of the Rooker - Feldman doctrine: "If a ... plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court ..., Rooker - Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If ... [a] plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker - Feldman does not bar jurisdiction." 341 F.3d at 1164.

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