Benchoff v. Fogal, 1:13-cv-01216
| Decision Date | 07 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13-cv-01216,1:13-cv-01216 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | ROBERT BENCHOFF, Plaintiff v. MATTHEW FOGAL and DOUGLAS HERMAN, Defendants |
(Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Mehalchick)
Before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Benchoff's motion for reconsideration of objections he filed in response to Magistrate Judge Mehalchick's Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 36.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and the case will remain closed.1
On December 13, 1995, Plaintiff was sentenced on two counts of Interference of Custody of Children and one count of burglary. (Doc. No. 25.) His sentence included an order prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting his children and his sister-in-law without further order of the Court. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and was resentenced onMarch 10, 1998 by Defendant Judge Herman for the burglary conviction. (Id.) His resentencing included an order prohibiting him from contact with his children and his sister in law. (Id.)
On March 4, 2004 Plaintiff filed a Petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), alleging violations of his constitutional rights and requesting modification of the orders to permit him contact with his children. (Id.) The Commonwealth stated the Petition was untimely. (Id.) On November 4, 2004 the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's PCRA for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.) On March 30, 2010 Plaintiff filed a motion for extraordinary relief and requested that the "no contact" order be lifted from his sentence. (Id.) The Court treated the motion as a motion for modification of sentence or, in the alternative, a PCRA petition, and Defendant Judge Herman denied the request for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. (Id.)
On May 6, 2013 Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants Judge Herman and Matthew Fogal, District Attorney of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1.) Specifically, he asserted that application of the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations for filing for post-conviction relief violated the ex post facto clause, as well as his right of access to courts and due process of law. (Id.) Defendant Judge Herman is named because he ruled that Plaintiff's PCRA petition was untimely, and it appears that Defendant Fogal is named because he represented the government in opposing Plaintiff's petition. (Id.) Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking this Court to restore the state court's jurisdiction over his petition, which lapsed after Plaintiff'sone-year period for filing a PCRA petition expired.3 (Id.) Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (Doc. Nos. 15, 18.)
On November 4, 2013 Magistrate Judge Mehalchick issued a Report and Recommendation, in which she recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice. (Doc. No. 25.) Specifically, she concluded that: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to assess the claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) Defendants are entitled to judicial, prosecutorial, and Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff's suit, (3) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions; and (4) the complaint otherwise fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id.) Objections to the Report and Recommendation were due by November 21, 2013. On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed objections (Doc. No. 26) but the Court concluded that no timely objections were filed, adopted Magistrate Judge Mehalchick's Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice on November 27, 2013.4 (Doc. No. 27.)
Subsequently, on February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b) and (d). (Doc. No. 36.) He alleges that the Court erred in concluding that he didnot file timely objections, as he placed his objections in the prison mail system within the time proscribed, and asks the Court to now consider his objections. (Id.) He also reasserts and elaborates on his original objections to the Report and Recommendation, and highlights errors he believes were made by Magistrate Judge Mehalchick in recommending the Court dismiss his complaint. (Id.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
The Court will first address Plaintiff's contention that the Court erred in concluding that he did not file timely objections. The Court will then address Plaintiff's objection to the recommendation that the two-year statute of limitations on Section 1983 actions mandated dismissal of his complaint. The Court will then address Plaintiff's objection to the recommendation that he did not state viable constitutional claims. The Court will then address Plaintiff's objection to the recommendation that the Eleventh Amendment and principles of judicial and prosecutorial immunity mandated dismissal of his complaint. Lastly, the Court will address Plaintiff's objections to the recommendation that this Court did not have jurisdiction over his complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Mehalchick's Report and Recommendation are dated November 18, 2013. (See Doc. No. 27.) In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff includes a receipt showing that he deposited mail in the prison mailroom on that same day, and that the objections were mailed on November 19, 2013. (Doc Nos. 36 at 3-4, 36-1.) Although the objections were received five days after the deadline, the "prison mailbox rule" considers the date of filing to be "when a prisoner transmits documents to prison authorities for mailing."Spencer v. Beard, 351 Fed. App'x. 589, 590 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, because Plaintiff's objections are dated before the November 21, 2013 deadline, Plaintiff's objections are timely.5 The Court will therefore proceed to address Magistrate Judge Mehalchick's Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's objections thereto, raised in both his initial objections and in his Rule 60(b) motion.
Magistrate Judge Mehalchick recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice as barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 actions in Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 25 at 14.) Plaintiff objects, first, that (Doc. No. 27 at 4.) Plaintiff also argues that the continuing violations doctrine should apply to his case. (Doc. No. 36 at 8-9.)
The Court will overrule Plaintiff's objections. First, the Court finds no support for Plaintiff's theory that the statute of limitations somehow does not apply to him at all because of the posture of his case; it is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 are plainly subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for such an action is two years. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. 5524. Plaintiff is suing Defendants for alleged civil rights violations that occurred when the court ruled that his PCRA petitions were untimely. Accordingly, his cause of action was subject to the two year statute of limitations and began accruing when he knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based. Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff learned of his alleged injury, at latest, on November 4, 2004 when Judge Herman explained the procedural bar in an opinion, a bar which he again explained in an order dated November 17, 2010. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 18-21.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint, filed May 6, 2013, was outside of the statute of limitations and was therefore untimely.
However, Plaintiff insists that the continuing violations doctrine should be applied to his claims because he filed an additional petition in 2012 that Judge Herman again denied as untimely. (Doc. No. 36 at 8-9.) The continuing violations doctrine is an "equitable exception to the timely filing requirement." Powell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, "when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred." Id. (quoting Brenner v. Local 514. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283,1295 (3d Cir. 1991). In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts." Id. The Third Circuit has recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. The third factor, "degree of permanence," is the most important of the factors. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's isolated act of filing yet another untimely...
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