Bencomo v. Bencomo
Citation | 200 So.2d 171 |
Decision Date | 31 May 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 35678,35678 |
Parties | Carmela BENCOMO, a/k/a Carmen Bencomo, Appellant, v. William C. BENCOMO, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Horton & Schwartz, Miami, and Harold Ungerleider, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Pallot, Silver, Pallot, Stern & Proby, Miami, for appellee.
This case brings for review a decision of the trial court dismissing a cause of action by the appellant-plaintiff against the appellee-defendant for an alleged intentional tort committed during coverture of marriage between the parties, the suit being filed after the marriage had been dissolved by divorce. The plaintiff contends that she has such a right to maintain the suit under Sections 1, 4 and 12 of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., and under Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of Florida, and also under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The trial court construed such constitutional provisions in its final judgment, and this court has jurisdiction to review on direct appeal under Section 4(2), Article V, Constitution of Florida.
We are thus confronted with the question of whether or not a former spouse can maintain an action in tort against the other spouse for a tort allegedly committed during marriage, where such marriage has been dissolved by divorce. The trial court held she could not and dismissed the suit. We agree.
This court has long been committed to the proposition that one spouse can not sue the other because, under the common law, they are one person. See Corren v. Corren, Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 774, in which this court said:
'The appellant regards Chapter 21932, supra, as having destroyed the 'unity of the marriage association' as it theretofore existed and reasons that if the wife may enter into agreements, as is provided in Section 2 of the act, and may 'sue and be sued,' as is provided in Section 1, it follows that she, being empowered to sue her husband in case of a breach of their agreement, may also sue him for a tort committed upon her. But we cannot follow the appellant to this conclusion. 'Under the common law', we said in Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876, 880,
Continuing on Page 776:
'Our opinion coincides with that of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111, 112, 54 L.Ed. 1180, 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 1153, 21 Ann.Cas. 921, that any change in the law so far-reaching and radical as to obliterate the common law unity 'should only be wrought (by the legislature) by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention.' In that decision the court commented upon the effect upon public welfare and domestic harmony if each spouse were given the right to sue the other as if they were not married and then further observed: 'Had it been the legislative purpose not only to permit the wife to bring suits free from her husband's participation and control, but to bring actions against him also for injuries to person or property as though they were strangers, thus emphasizing and publishing differences which otherwise might not be serious, it would have been easy to have expressed that intent in terms of irresistible clearness.'
'The legislature will assume grave responsibility when it enacts that each spouse may treat the other as a stranger so far as legal rights are concerned; and when it does so, the language proclaiming this revolutionary change should be positive and unambiguous.
'We are impelled to the conclusion that the circuit judge was eminently correct when he held that the appellant could not and should not prevail in this case.'
The decision in the Corren case is buttressed by the general rule announced in 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 396, which says:
In 27 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 589, it is also stated that:
Also in 27 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 594, there appears the following language:
* * *.'
Also compare Amendola v. Amendola, Fla.App.1960, 121 So.2d 805; and see 43 A.L.R.2d 632.
In reaching this decision we have not overlooked the case of Alexander v. Alexander, D.C., 140 F.Supp. 925. In that case the United States District Court in another state undertook to construe and apply the Florida law on this subject and reached a decision opposite to the rule announced in this state in the cases herein cited. We have no way of knowing why that court elected to depart from the rule previously announced in this state, but nevertheless we still adhere to our former decisions and reject the construction adopted by the South Carolina Federal court.
I think our decisional law should no longer support with pristine force the common law prohibition against actions between Former husbands and wives for intentional torts committed by one upon the other during coverture, due to subsequent modifying provisions of our Federal and State constitutions and state laws. See: F.S. Section 2.01, F.S.A., which provides in part that the 'common law (shall) be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of this state.' Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution provides the state courts shall be open 'so that every person for Any injury done him in his * * * person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law * * *' (Emphasis added) Section 1, Amend. XIV, United States Constitution, provides in part '* * * nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Aside from the language mechanics indicating a modification of the common law prohibition has occurred, the reasons stated in the decisional law of Florida supporting the common law rule have in large part now disappeared because of later overruling decisions interpreting individual rights guaranteed by organic law. In support of this proposition see Prosser on Torts, 3rd Ed. pp. 879, 883, as follows:
'The courts which follow this majority view have buttressed their conclusion by inventing new arguments, not found in the early cases, for denying the remedy. Apart from stare decisis or judicial inertia, and the policy of strict construction of statutes changing the common law, it has been said that each spouse has remedy enough in the criminal and divorce laws--which obviously is untrue, since neither compensates for the damage done, or covers all the torts that may be committed. Stress has been laid upon the danger of fictitious and fraudulent claims on the very dubious assumption that a wife's love for her husband is such that she is more likely to bring a false suit against him than a genuine one; and likewise the possibility of trivial actions for minor annoyances, which might well be taken care of by finding consent to all ordinary frictions of wedlock--or at least assumption of risk! The chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however,...
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