Bender v. Bender
Decision Date | 28 July 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 18306.,18306. |
Citation | 975 A.2d 636,292 Conn. 696 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | John BENDER et al. v. Edward BENDER et al. |
Howard B. Schiller, Willimantic, with whom was Stephen D. Button, for the appellants (defendants).
Ronald F. Ochsner, with whom was Brendan Schain, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.
The defendants, Edward Bender and Clara Bender, in their capacity as executors of the estate of Edward Stebner (decedent), appeal1 from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, John Bender and Carl Bender, on their claim for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property held by the estate. The principal issue in this appeal is whether res judicata barred the plaintiffs from bringing an action in the Superior Court for breach of contract and specific performance of the contract after the Probate Court had denied the plaintiffs' petition for an order for specific performance of the contract. The defendants also challenge the trial court's conclusions that the action could proceed without the residuary beneficiaries of the decedent's will, that there was a valid contract of sale, and that the contract could not be avoided under any of the defenses raised. We conclude that, because the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims brought in the Superior Court, res judicata did not bar the present action. In addition, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered specific performance of the underlying contract. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following procedural history and undisputed facts. On July 16, 2002, the decedent died testate, leaving a will naming the defendants as executors.2 In addition to specific devises of personal property to the defendants, the will named as residuary beneficiaries the defendants' five grandchildren and the Ebenezer Lutheran Church of Willimantic. The decedent's estate included a parcel of undeveloped land in Hampton (property), which was not specifically devised to any beneficiary. The will expressly authorized the defendants, as executors, to make any division of the estate required therein, to determine what property should be included in each share, and to sell the decedent's real property without the permission or oversight of the Probate Court or any other court.
On or about February 24, 2004, the plaintiffs met with the defendants to discuss purchasing the property. At that meeting, the plaintiffs and the defendants completed and signed a real estate purchase agreement form conveying the property from the decedent's estate to the plaintiffs. As called for in the agreement, the plaintiffs tendered a deposit of $500 by check. The agreement stipulated that a closing on the property would take place on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, some discussions ensued between the parties' attorneys about the amount of the deposit and the form of the agreement, after which the defendants informed the plaintiffs that they were unwilling to close on the property.
The plaintiffs then filed a petition for an "order of sale of real property" in the Probate Court, seeking to compel the defendants in their capacity as executors to conduct a closing and convey the property. The Probate Court denied the petition.
The plaintiffs did not appeal from the Probate Court's judgment, but instead filed a two count complaint in the Superior Court seeking specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The defendants filed an answer denying that they had entered into a contract and advancing numerous special defenses. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs were not before it pursuant to an appeal from the Probate Court's judgment; (2) the plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata in light of the previous Probate Court judgment; (3) the defendants lacked authority to complete the real estate transaction; and (4) the plaintiffs had failed to join the decedent's residuary beneficiaries as indispensable party defendants.
The trial court, Martin, J., denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. With respect to the defendants' jurisdictional and res judicata claims, the court first concluded that the plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, which sought damages, was a distinct action from the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance, which sought an equitable remedy. The trial court concluded that res judicata did not bar a Superior Court action on the breach of contract claim because the Probate Court could not award damages. The trial court further concluded that the Probate Court was not a court of competent jurisdiction for the plaintiffs' specific performance claim because that court has no equitable jurisdiction unless such a claim arises in the context of another matter properly pending before it, which was not so in the present case. The trial court therefore concluded that res judicata did not bar the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance, and, as a result, the plaintiffs were not required to appeal from the Probate Court judgment in order for the Superior Court to have jurisdiction.
After a trial to the court, the trial court, Robaina, J., issued a decision dismissing the plaintiffs' count seeking damages for breach of contract because the plaintiffs had offered no evidence as to damages from the alleged breach, but rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the count for specific performance.3 In addressing the defendants' res judicata and jurisdictional defenses, Judge Robaina adopted Judge Martin's decision denying summary judgment as the law of the case. Regarding the merits of the plaintiffs' specific performance count, Judge Robaina found that the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants was a valid contract and that specific performance was warranted. In so doing, the trial court rejected the defendants' special defenses as to whether the action could proceed without the residuary beneficiaries and whether the contract otherwise was unenforceable. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendants raise legal and factual challenges to the trial court's judgment that fall into essentially the following three categories. First, they claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs could proceed on their action in light of the res judicata effect of the Probate Court judgment and the plaintiffs' failure to appeal from that judgment. Second, they claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the absence of the decedent's residuary beneficiaries did not defeat the plaintiffs' claim. Third, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the contract was enforceable because it improperly found that the agreement: (1) was sufficiently definite and mutually assented to, rather than abandoned by the parties; and (2) was neither the result of mistake nor unconscionable. We disagree and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.
The defendants raise a jurisdictional claim, which we typically would address as a threshold matter. See Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 85, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). The defendants' claim that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction only if the plaintiffs had appealed from the Probate Court's judgment, however, is entirely dependent on their claim that the Probate Court had jurisdiction in the first instance, which forms the basis of their res judicata argument. Therefore, we begin with the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly determined that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the plaintiffs from bringing their action in the Superior Court. Specifically, the defendants contend that, because the Probate Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' initial action for specific performance under General Statutes § 45a-98(a)(3),4 the Probate Court's judgment was conclusive.5 We conclude that the trial court properly entertained the plaintiffs' action because the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' action for specific performance.
The record reveals the following additional undisputed facts. The plaintiffs' petition in Probate Court named as respondents the defendants in their capacity as executors of the decedent's estate. The petition requested that the Probate Court "enter an order directing the Fiduciaries to conduct a closing of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and to convey the Property as they have agreed to do." The plaintiffs alleged therein, inter alia, that: the defendants were authorized under the will to sell the decedent's real property without permission of the Probate Court; the plaintiffs and the defendants had entered into a valid real estate purchase contract; and the defendants neither had conducted a closing nor conveyed the property to the plaintiffs in accordance with their contract. The plaintiffs' petition did not state a basis on which they claimed the Probate Court could exercise jurisdiction.
After a hearing, the Probate Court denied the petition, making the following determinations in support of its decision. The court first stated that it "has jurisdiction to approve [the] sale of land in an estate upon petition of executors if it is in the interest of all beneficiaries and is necessary to satisfy claims against the estate." The court then noted that the plaintiffs were not the executors, and that the defendants as the executors had not petitioned the court for permission to sell the land. Finally, the court found that there was no evidence that the proposed sale was in the best interest of the affected beneficiaries or that the sale of the land was necessary to satisfy claims against the estate. The Probate Court's decision...
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