Bender v. Deflon Anderson Corp.

Decision Date06 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 5290,1971,5290
Citation298 A.2d 346
CourtDelaware Superior Court
PartiesMichael J. BENDER, Claimant-Appellant, v. DEFLON ANDERSON CORPORATION, Employer, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Insurer, Appellees. Civ. A
OPINION

WALSH, Judge.

This appeal from the Industrial Accident Board (hereinafter 'the Board') raises the issue of the Board's authority to require an injured employee, receiving total disability benefits, to submit to vocational rehabilitation as a condition of continuing benefits.

The facts are not in serious dispute. The claimant, Michael J. Bender, (hereinafter 'the claimant') sustained a serious leg injury on January 18, 1967 when he fell from a scaffold while working as a carpenter for Deflon Anderson Corporation (hereinafter 'the employer'). On February 13, 1967 claimant and employer entered into a compensation agreement, which was later approved by the Board, providing total disability benefits pursuant to 19 Del.C. § 2324. On February 11, 1970, the employer filed a petition with the Board seeking to terminate compensation benefits because of claimant's failure to pursue a rehabilitation program. At a legal conference before the Board on May 6, 1970, at which claimant was not present, claimant's then counsel agreed to encourage claimant to engage in rehabilitation. Apparently no effort toward rehabilitation was forthcoming on the part of the claimant and the matter was again before the Board at employer's request on September 13, 1971. At this hearing claimant, who was not represented by counsel, argued that any vocational rehabilitation efforts would be futile and despite the medical recommendation that it should be explored, the claimant contended that the Board should not require the effort. However, at the conclusion of this hearing, the claimant agreed to 'accept rehabilitation' and make 'a genuine effort in that direction, but it will not pan out'. Based on the representation of the claimant the Board entered its findings and order on October 6, 1971, requiring claimant to 'adhere' to its order dated May 13, 1970 and directing claimant 'to report to vocational rehabilatation (sic) for evaluation and treatment in order to have compensation reinstated.' Apparently, claimant later changed his mind since he filed an appeal to this Court on October 19, 1971.

Claimant argues that the Board does not have authority to make an award conditional upon submission to vocational rehabilitation and, even if such authority existed, The Board failed to determine as a premise to the exercise of such authority that the rehabilitation services were available and would probably be effective in claimant's situation. Employer counters that the Board acted properly in attempting to ameliorate claimant's disability by requiring him to explore the avenue of vocational rehabilitation and claimant's deliberate refusal to permit evaluation for that purpose justified the Board's action in suspending his benefits.

The right of an employer to require an injured employee to avail himself of reasonable medical treatment as a means of improving or restoring his injury is statutorily...

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5 cases
  • State ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 28, 2002
    ...with job training and/or necessary accommodations to enable him or her to return to the workforce. See Bender v. Deflon Anderson Corp., 298 A.2d 346, 348 (Del.Super.Ct.1972) ("In the framework of workmen's compensation, rehabilitation is generally considered to be of two types: physical and......
  • Malczewski v. McReynolds Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • April 9, 1981
    ...to direct his limited physical capability into other useful channels of productivity." (Emphasis added.) Bender v. Deflon Anderson Corporation, 298 A.2d 346, 348 (Del.Super.1972). Vocational rehabilitation involves methods to be used in retraining an injured person. Dr. Dillman did not test......
  • General Motors Corp. v. Burgess
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • May 10, 1988
    ...case is proper only if the Board had the authority to require it as a condition of receiving compensation. Bender v. Deflon Anderson Corp., Del.Super., 298 A.2d 346, 348 (1972) (citation omitted) (applying Section 2353(a) as it read prior to the 1972 In 1974, Section 2353(a) was further ame......
  • Mosley v. Bank of Delaware
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • February 9, 1977
    ...(under § 2322) to require that such medical treatment be provided in the first instance at his request'. Bender v. Deflon Anderson Corp., Del.Super., 298 A.2d 346, 348 (1972). As 'parallel sections' of the Act relating to medical services, a common legislative purpose has been ascribed them......
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