Benedetto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 12–4110–KES.,CIV. 12–4110–KES.
• Parties: Mark BENEDETTO, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

917 F.Supp.2d 976

Mark BENEDETTO, Plaintiff,

v.DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

No. CIV. 12–4110–KES.

United States District Court,

D. South Dakota,

Southern Division.

Jan. 7, 2013.

Melissa Rose Jelen, Stephen C. Landon, Alex M. Hagen, Cadwell, Sanford, Deibert & Garry, LLP, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff.

James L. Hoy, Hoy Trial Lawyers, Prof. L.L.C., Sioux Falls, SD, Richard G. Grotch, Coddington, Hicks & Danforth, Redwood City, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

KAREN E. SCHREIER, District Judge.

Defendant, Delta Air Lines, Inc., moves the court to dismiss Mark Benedetto's complaint in its entirety. Docket 11. Benedetto alleges claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, and punitive damages. Docket 1–1. Delta argues that Benedetto's claims for negligence and breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing are preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA), or alternatively, fail to state actionable claims. Delta also argues that Benedetto's claims for breach of contract and punitive damages fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Benedetto opposes the motion. For the following reasons, Delta's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts, according to the complaint (Docket 1–1), are as follows:

Mark Benedetto is a resident of South Dakota. Delta Air Lines, Inc. is a Delaware corporation and has its principal office in Atlanta, Georgia. Delta is authorized to and does transact business in South Dakota.

Benedetto and his wife, Gail Benedetto, purchased round trip tickets from Delta to travel from Sioux Falls Regional Airport in Sioux Falls, South Dakota to LaGuardia Airport in New York City, New York and then back to Sioux Falls. Benedetto's initial flight to New York from Sioux Falls took off on September 28, 2011. As required by Delta and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Benedetto declared to a Delta ticket agent during his check-in process that he was transporting a pistol in his checked luggage. Following the ticket agent's instructions, Benedetto placed a red tag into his luggage and was allowed to check in his pistol with his luggage. Delta offered no warning to Benedetto regarding New York's gun laws. Similarly, Delta did not disclose to Benedetto its policy that required ticket agents at LaGuardia Airport to report anyone with a firearm to the Port Authority of New York–New Jersey. Benedetto then boarded his plane and flew to New York.

On October 2, 2011, Benedetto arrived at LaGuardia Airport to catch his return flight to Sioux Falls. Benedetto again notified a Delta ticket agent that he was traveling with a pistol in his checked luggage. He was again given a red tag to place in his luggage, which he did. The Delta ticket agent then notified the Port Authority Police that there was a passenger who had declared a firearm. Benedetto was arrested by the Port Authority Police for illegal possession of a firearm.¹ After this arrest, Benedetto was turned over to the New York City Police, transported to the Queens Boulevard Precinct, and jailed overnight. Benedetto was charged with a handgun violation and was required to return to New York for legal proceedings after his release.

Benedetto alleges that he was subjected to physical, emotional, and verbal abuse, reasonably feared for his safety, and suffered severe emotional distress while in police custody. He also alleges that he suffered an injury to his shoulder when a police officer handcuffed him.

Benedetto brought this action against Delta on May 24, 2012, in the Second Judicial Circuit of South Dakota. Subsequently, the suit was removed to this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the court to review the complaint as a whole to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir.2009). The facts alleged in the complaint must be considered true, and all inferences must be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir.2004). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). “A complaint states a plausible claim for relief if its ‘factual content ... allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Braden, 588 F.3d at 594 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

DISCUSSION

I. Negligence

Benedetto alleges in his negligence claim that Delta owed him a duty to warn him of New York's gun laws and to warn him of Delta's policy at LaGuardia that requires its ticket agents to notify Port Authority Policy when a passenger declares a firearm. Delta argues that Benedetto's negligence claim must be dismissed because it is preempted by the ADA.

The ADA was passed to promote “maximum reliance on competitive market forces” in order to “further efficiency, innovation, and low prices as well as variety and quality of air transportation services.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (citation omitted). Included in the ADA is an express preemption clause that prohibits states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). Congress's intent was to “ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031. The preemption clause is read “to mean ‘States may not seek to impose their own public policies or theories of competition or regulation on the operations of an air carrier.’ ” Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 494 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 n. 5, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995)). The laws that are “forbidden” because of the preemption clause are those with a “significant impact” on carrier prices, routes, or services. Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 375, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008) (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 388, 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031). Laws that affect prices, routes, or services in “too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner,” however, are not preempted by the ADA. Id. (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has analyzed the language found in the preemption clause of the ADA on two separate occasions. In Botz v. Omni Air International, 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir.2002), the court held that the ADA preempted application of a Minnesota whistleblower statute. Because the statute gave flight attendants the ability to refuse assignments, the court determined that the statute had a “forbidden connection with air-carrier services.” Id. at 494. Although the statute only related to air-carrier services “indirectly,” it was Minnesota's attempt to impose its “own public policies or regulatory theories on an air carrier's operations, an imposition that Congress intended the ADA to pre-empt.” Id. at 495.

In Data Manufacturing, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (FAAAA), preempted a plaintiff's claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and money had and received. Before delving into its preemption analysis, the court noted that the FAAAA preemption language “reads very much like” the preemption language found in the ADA. Id. at 853. The court noted that because of the nearly identical language, “the preemption clauses in the ADA and FAAAA are identical in scope.” ²Id. at 853 n. 2 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370, 128 S.Ct. 989).

The Eighth Circuit applied a two-part test in determining that the FAAAA preempted the plaintiff's claims. The court specified that the claims were preempted if they (1) related to a price, route, or service of a carrier, and (2) derived from the enactment or enforcement of state law. Id. at 852. After noting that the Supreme Court has “broadly interpreted the phrase ‘relating to’ as encompassing all state laws having any connection with or reference to the carrier's rates, routes, or services,” the court concluded that a carrier's $10 billing charge was part of the carrier's “operations” and thus related to the carrier's prices and services. Id. (“While the work to re-bill may have been de minimus, it was still part of the UPS accounting department's operations to do so.”). Turning to the second part of the test, the court concluded that all of the plaintiff's claims, with the exception of the contract claim, derived from the enforcement of state law. Id. at 853. The plaintiff's claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and money had and received “all depended upon and are associated with the state of Missouri, through its common law, guiding and policing UPS's economic policies.” Id. The court noted that the claims “arise outside of the four corners of the contract between UPS and DMI, and are claims that are enlarged or enhanced, and indeed, are dependent upon, Missouri state laws and polices. Accordingly, these claims are preempted.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit next analyzed the plaintiff's contract claim to determine if it was preempted. The contract claim alleged that the plaintiff “did not agree to pay the fee, and it was a penalty, unlawful, and void as against public policy.” Id. at 854. The court asserted...